This article reports on the use of enforceable undertakings by the Australian employment standards enforcement agency, the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), and its predecessor, the Workplace Ombudsman. Enforceable undertakings are used by the FWO as an alternative enforcement tool to court litigation in relation to breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), which regulates wages, working hours and other minimum employment conditions. Proponents of enforceable undertakings argue that they deliver value to regulatory agencies as a responsive alternative to traditional, punitive enforcement action. On the other hand, critics have raised concerns about the accountability and effectiveness of this enforcement tool. The authors provide a critical analysis of the FWO's use of enforceable undertakings, including consideration of the decision-making process, content, monitoring and enforcement of undertakings. The analysis is based on a review of all enforceable undertakings concluded in the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2012, as well as qualitative interviews with approximately 60 inspectors, managers and lawyers of the FWO, and a number of specialist workplace relations lawyers. The article reveals that the FWO has made limited but promising use of enforceable undertakings in the review period. Through deployment of enforceable undertakings, the FWO has demonstrated that it has a mix of regulatory approaches available to it that are consistent with the key principles of responsive regulation. The number of enforceable undertakings accepted by the FWO, however, remains fairly limited. We set out a number of ways in which the regulator may maximise the utilisation of enforceable undertakings, and more fully realise the regulatory benefits of this particular compliance tool.

Anti-discrimination law in Australia is at a crossroads. After four decades of proliferation of legislation to regulate discrimination, national attention has turned from increasing regulation to legislative consolidation and reform. This article contributes a theoretical analysis to the reform debate. Two liberal theoretical justifications for prohibiting discrimination, harm and redistributive justice, are considered. This investigation assists to determine when the state should intervene in order to restrict discrimination, and whether state and territory anti-discrimination regimes have a legitimate continuing role in Australia's legislative landscape.

Williams v Commonwealth of Australia is a landmark decision of the High Court on the scope of federal executive power in s 61 of the Constitution. The decision is also important for the interpretive methodology adopted by the Court. Notably, each judge based their understanding of s 61 upon federal readings of the Constitution. This methodology raises fresh questions about how the Constitution is to be interpreted, and whether Williams marks a break from orthodox understandings of that task. This article assesses the significance of Williams for constitutional interpretation in Australia, and whether it lays the foundation for a more robust protection of state interests by the High Court.

The use of history in constitutional interpretation is widespread. It is defended by scholars and practised by judges, both in Australia and, in particular, the United States. Originalism, as this practice has come to be known, also attracts many critics. There is extensive debate, for example, about whether originalism disguises or serves political agendas, or whether constitutional pre-commitment is legitimate: in short, whether the present should be bound by the past. Originalism comes in many forms, but common to all is the assumption that the meaning of constitutional provisions is to be found in the past. Critics challenge this assumption primarily on normative grounds. What originalists and critics alike rarely consider is whether, and, if so, how, it is possible to know the relevant history. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to this fundamental methodological question: if history is to guide constitutional interpretation, how should the courts ‘do’ history? What are the disciplinary rules of research that should be followed if historical meaning is genuinely to be delivered?

This paper explores what conventional historians do (and the fallacies and errors they attempt to avoid), and identifies some of the basic rules of historical methodology, an awareness of which is a precondition for any claim to interpret historically. It surveys the High Court of Australia's record of reference to Australia's constitution-framing, including and following the leading ‘originalist’ case, Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360. It considers several alternative ways in which judges might approach the use of history methodologically, albeit without becoming historians. It neither defends nor contests originalism but concludes that history should be used in constitutional interpretation only with great care and only rarely.

A key objective of Australia's recent national water reforms is to keep water licence and entitlement holders accountable for the amounts of water they extract, trade and use. Water metering and the recording and reporting of water extraction and trading data are processes designed to ensure this accountability, and are central to Australia's water accounting regimes. Yet much of the data necessary to ensure compliance with water licences and access entitlements is not publicly available in Australia. This absence of publicly accessible information is due to a lack of rigour and transparency in statutory water accounting regimes. There are also restrictions imposed by water legislation and the laws of privacy and confidentiality that prevent public access to water accounting data, except in aggregated form. Consequently, commercial and industrial water consumers in Australia are not kept accountable for their consumptive water use and water market objectives are unfulfilled, contrary to the express provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (‘NWI’). This article argues that statutory and policy frameworks for water accounting in most Australian jurisdictions fail to meet the NWI objectives for national water accounting. In response, it advocates legislative reforms that would facilitate the achievement of these objectives.

In the context of proposals to amend the Australian Constitution to recognise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the Expert Panel established by the Australian Government recommended the insertion of a prohibition of racial discrimination. Canadian experiences may assist when exploring the potential implications of prohibiting discrimination in the Australian Constitution and when considering the various options that are available. With this in mind, in this article I discuss the constitutional ideas regarding equality and non-discrimination that have already begun migrating from Canada to Australia and could continue to inform Australian consideration of the numerous issues that may arise. I start with an appraisal of the perceived problems surrounding s 51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution and the reform options that have already been identified, before considering what Canadian approaches could offer Australia, if anything. My view is that the utility of the transplantation of constitutional provisions depends on the starting point. Its usefulness may be less when the focus is a parochial issue. While it may be possible to draft a tighter prohibition, there could remain a risk that focusing on non-discrimination could overshadow the Aboriginal rights dimensions underlying many calls for recognition.

People who lose their jobs as a consequence of discriminatory treatment at work face an array of options for redress. They might bring proceedings for unfair dismissal before a statutory tribunal (the Fair Work Commission), or they may pursue a claim in the Federal Court of Australia. This article contemplates the possibility that the system for dealing with discriminatory dismissal could be rationalized so that aggrieved employees might have a single, accessible pathway through an administrative process to deal with such complaints. This would involve rethinking whether discrimination complaints ought to be treated as a matter of vindicating legal rights, or as a matter of arbitrating competing interests. Abandoning the language of rights may facilitate a pathway around the Boilermakers' doctrine (which mandates that only Chapter III courts can determine legal rights), and so enable the establishment of a more accessible and effective avenue for dealing with discrimination at work.