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The Rejection of Constitutional Incrementalism in Nepal’s Federalisation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Mara Malagodi
Mara Malagodi*
Affiliation:
City Law School, City, University of London
*
* Email: [email protected].
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Abstract

The relationship between federalism and identity was the single most contentious issue in the drafting of Nepal’s 2015 Constitution, and remains an embattled feature of the country’s post-conflict constitutional settlement. This article explains why ‘constitutional incrementalism’—the innovative constitution-making strategy for deeply divided societies theorised by Hanna Lerner—was ultimately (and wisely) rejected in Nepal’s federalisation process. Historically a unitary state since its creation in the late eighteenth century, Nepal committed itself to federal restructuring in 2007, but profound disagreements endured over the set of institutional choices concerning the features of Nepal’s federal arrangements throughout the constitution-making process (2008–15). Constitutional incrementalism with its emphasis on deferral, ambiguity and contradiction was thought of in some quarters as a pragmatic and instrumental way out of Nepal’s political impasse. In the end, the 2015 Constitution expressly named the provinces (even if by just using numbers) and demarcated their boundaries already at the time of its promulgation. Any changes to this framework can only take place by way of constitutional amendment. This article explains why the incrementalist approach was rejected in Nepal’s federalisation process, and reflects on the conditions under which constitutional incrementalism may succeed in societies that present profound disagreements over the collective identity of the polity.

Type
Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 521 - 540
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

*

I am grateful to the special issue editors, Rosalind Dixon, Ron Levy, and Mark Tushnet, and the anonymous peer-reviewers for their insightful and generous comments.

References

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6 Hinduism is the religion of 81 per cent of the population. Nepali remains the lingua franca of the majority of the population, but only 44.6 per cent named it as their mother tongue, alongside 122 other mother tongues. Of the country's 125 caste and ethnic groups, only the largest six account for more than 5 per cent of the total population. The two biggest groups are the Chetri (ie Kshatriyas of local Khas origins) who make up 16.6 per cent of the population and the Bahun (ie Pahari or hill Brahmins) who make up another 12.2 per cent. Together, these two high-caste Hindu groups constitute the Parbatiya group (28.8 per cent) to which Nepal's royal family and most of the elites belong. In terms of historically marginalized groups, dalits (ie ‘former untouchables’) form about 14 per cent of Nepal's population. The 63 groups classified under the umbrella term Adivasi Janajati (ie ‘indigenous people’), who can be described as ethno-linguistic groups that do not use Nepali as their mother tongue, account for 36 per cent of the total population. Madhesi groups (ie non-Pahari ‘Terai plain dwellers’, often erroneously described as ‘of Indian origins’) constitute slightly less than 20 per cent of the population. See, Government of Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census (2011) <http://cbs.gov.np/image/data/Population/National%20Report/National%20Report.pdf>; Government of Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics, Population Monograph of Nepal: Volume II (December 2014) <http://cbs.gov.np/image/data/Population/Population%20Monograph%20of%20Nepal%202014/Population%20Monograph%20V02.pdf>.

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13 Malagodi, above n 9.

14 Hesselbarth, above n 12.

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16 Ibid s 8.

17 Ibid s 172(2)(e).

18 National Foundation for the Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) Act 2002, Schedule pertaining to s 2(a).

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20 Malagodi, above n 9, 164–8.

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23 International Crisis Group, ‘Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism’ (Asia Report No 199, 13 January 2011) 8.

24 The Maoists controlled almost 35 per cent of the seats and the Madhesi parties were respectively the fourth and fifth biggest parties.

25 The fourteen provinces identified by the CA1 Committee on State Restructuring and Distribution of State Authority were: 1) Limbuwan, 2) Mithila-Bhojpura-Koch-Madhes, 3) Kirant, 4) Sunkoshi, 5) Sherpa, 6) Tamsaling, 7) Newa, 8) Narayani, 9) Tamuwan, 10) Magarat, 11) Lumbini-Awadh-Tharuwan, 12) Karnali, 13) Jadan, and 14) Khaptad.

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27 International Crisis Group, above n 21.

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29 16 Point Agreement (2015) South Asia Terrorism Portal <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/16-point_agreement.htm>.

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33 Prakash Acharya, ‘CA on cusp of promulgating constitution’, The Himalayan Times (online), 24 August 2015 <http://thehimalayantimes.com/kathmandu/ca-on-cusp-of-promulgating-constitution/>.

34 Human Rights Watch, ‘Like We Are Not Nepali’: Protest and Police Crackdown in the Terai Region of Nepal (16 October 2015) Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/16/we-are-not-nepali/protest-and-police-crackdown-terai-region-nepal>.

35 Lerner, above n 1, 39–40.

36 Ibid 41.

37 Ibid.

38 Krishna Khanal, Frits Sollewijn Gelpke, and Uddhab Pyakurel, Prasad, Dalit Representation in National Politics of Nepal (Nepal National Dalit Social Welfare Organisation, 2012)Google Scholar <www.idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/Nepal/2013/Dalit_Representation_in_National_Politics_of_Nepal_-_2012.pdf>.

39 International Crisis Group, above n 21, i.

40 Kamal Dev Bhattarai, ‘CA caucus debate rages; parties divided’, The Kathmandu Post (online), 8 March 2014 <www.ekantipur.com/2014/03/08/top-story/ca-caucus-debate-rages-parties-divided/386395.html>.

41 Martin Chautari, ‘Attendance and Process in Constituent Assembly II’ (Briefing Paper No 11, Martin Chautari, September 2014), 3–4.

42 The Nepali Times Blog, ‘Fast-track Drafting’, The Nepali Times (online), 3 July 2015 <http://archive.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2015/07/03/fast-track-drafting>.

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47 Human Rights Watch, above n 34.

48 Lerner, above n 1, 43–4.

49 Ibid.

50 Dixon and Ginsburg, above n 8.

51 Lerner, above n 1, 44–6.

52 Ibid 147.

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54 Lerner, above n 1, 210–11.