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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 January 2025
There has recently been a minor research and publishing boom in the field of refusals of royal assent to Bills in Australia. When in the throes of finalising my own contribution to this outburst of scholarship, I discovered that the figurehead German Federal President had just refused his assent to two government Bills passed by the Bundestag (the lower house of Parliament). In the two cases, which occurred in October and December 2006, the Federal President acted because he thought the proposed statute unconstitutional. Further research revealed that these were the seventh and eighth refusals of assent by a Federal President against the government's wishes since the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949. As a result, there is a long-running academic debate in Germany about the circumstances in which the figurehead Federal President may refuse assent. Some scholars even permit the Federal President to assess every proposed law to ensure that it complies with the constitutional charter of rights, while others take a more restrictive view and confine his task to errors of parliamentary procedure and/or restrictions on law-making power other than those to be found in the charter of rights.
For their assistance during the course of research for this article, the author wishes to thank Herren Kraft and Simmet of the Zentrale Informationsstelle of the Bayerischer Landtag, Rüdiger Hitz, Dr Konrad Lachmayer, Corey Ogilvy, Dr Sabine Pittrof, Professor Dr Friedrich Schoch and Dr Christian Tams. Warm thanks are also due to Dr Pittrof and the anonymous referees for their comments on a draft; the usual caveat applies.
1 Greg, Taylor, ‘Two Refusals of Royal Assent in Victoria’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 85Google Scholar; Anne, Twomey, ‘The Refusal or Deferral of Royal Assent’ [2006] Public Law 580, 599-600Google Scholar; John, Waugh, ‘Government Control of Royal Assent in Victoria’ (2006) 8 Constitutional Law & Policy Review 69Google Scholar.
2 There are some isolated examples from the nineteenth century to the contrary, but they are predicated on relationships of subordination which no longer exist; see Taylor, ‘Two Refusals’, above n 1, 87; Garth, Stevenson, Ex Uno Plures: Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada, 1867–1896 (1993) 244Google Scholar. Disallowance and reservation (for a list of cases see Taylor, ‘Two Refusals’, above n 1, 87 fn 8) are also merely legal history nowadays: Australia Act 1986 (Imp & Cth) ss 7(5), 8, 9. The last Australian example of final refusal of royal assent of which I am aware is recorded in Re Scully (1937) 32 Tas LR 3, 29–30, but note the other cases involving delays or other unusual events, dealt with in the articles mentioned above n 1.
3 Gallant v R (1949) 23 MPR 48, 52; Frank, MacKinnon, The Government of Prince Edward Island (1951) 154-5Google Scholar; Frank, MacKinnon, ‘The Royal Assent in Prince Edward Island: Disallowance of Provincial Acts, Reservation of Provincial Bills, and the Giving and Withholding of Assent by Lieutenant-Governors’ (1949) 15 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 216Google Scholar; John, Saywell, The Office of Lieutenant-Governor: A Study in Canadian Government and Politics (1957) 222Google Scholar.
4 Famously, the last example was in 1707, although little appears to be known about the precise circumstances. See, eg, Rodney, Brazier, Constitutional Practice (1988) 154Google Scholar. In the newer Commonwealth there are more recent examples of at least hesitation in granting assent, however. See H P, Lee, ‘The Malaysian Constitutional Crisis: King, Rulers and Royal Assent’ in F A, Trindade and H P, Lee (eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and Developments (1986) 237Google Scholar; Ramaswamy, Venkataraman, My Presidential Years (1994) 42, 84, 335Google Scholar.
5 The provision was the first proviso to s 60 of the Constitution Act 1855 (Imp). See further Taylor, ‘Two Refusals’, above n 1, 120-30.
6 Greg, Taylor, Constitution of Victoria (2006) 132-4Google Scholar.
7 Further information in English may be found in a number of readily available sources, eg, Klaus, von Beyme, ‘Overseas Studies: Germany’ in Republic Advisory Committee, An Australian Republic: The Options – The Appendices (1993) 52Google Scholar.
8 All Federal Presidents have been gentlemen.
9 Volker Epping, ‘Das Ausfertigungsverweigerungsrecht im Selbstverständnis der Bundespräsidenten: Warum der Bundespräsident das 10. Änderungsgesetz zum LuftVG nicht unterschreiben wollte’ JZ 1991, 1102, 1105; Ernst, Friesenhahn, ‘Zum Prüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten’ in Karl, Dietrich Bracher et al (eds), Die moderne Demokratie und ihr Recht: Festschrift für Gerhard Leibholz zum 65. Geburtstag (1966) vol 2, 687–8Google Scholar. It is amusing to note that one writer on this topic (Friedrich Schack, ‘Die Prüfungszuständigkeit des Bundespräsidenten bei der Ausfertigung der Gesetze’ AöR 89 (1964), 88, 92) accidentally refers to the assent of the Emperor to laws under art 70 of the Constitution of the Weimar Republic.
10 Except the first Reich President, who was appointed by the Constituent Assembly at Weimar.
11 Article 63 of the Basic Law, which provides that the Federal President proposes, but the Bundestag disposes. In particular, if the former’s nominee is not elected by the latter, it may elect another candidate of its own choosing.
12 Hartmut, Bauer, in Horst, Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz: Kommentar (2nd ed, 2006) vol 2, 1902Google Scholar; Karl, Heinrich Friauf, ‘Zur Prüfungszuständigkeit des Bundespräsidenten bei der Ausfertigung der Gesetze’ in Bodo, Börner, Hermann, Jahrreiß and Klaus, Stern (eds), Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit: Festschrift für Karl Carstens zum 70. Geburtstag am 14. Dezember 1984 (1984) vol 2, 547Google Scholar; Joachim Kniesch, ‘Die Stellung des Bundespräsidenten nach Grundgesetz und Staatspraxis’ NJW 1960, 1325, 1327; Hans, Schneider, Gesetzgebung: ein Lehr- und Handbuch (3rd ed, 2002) 280Google Scholar.
13 Biographical notes on Dr Köhler in English are available from his official website: Bundespräsidialamt, Curriculum Vitae Prof Dr Horst Köhler <http://www.bundespraesident.de/en/-,11166/Horst-Koehler.htm> at 22 February 2007.
14 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (2000) <http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/function/legal/germanbasiclaw.pdf> at 22 February 2007. This version of the Basic Law is now out of date, but this sentence has not been altered since that version was published. Generally however I have made my own translations of other portions of the Basic Law quoted in the text. The reason for relying on the official text in this case appears shortly.
15 In this context only, this sloppiness might be defended (but, as far as I am aware, is not in Germany) on the grounds that assent to a Bill ‘converts it into an Act, uno ictu’: I C, Harris (ed), House of Representatives Practice (5th ed, 2005) 393Google Scholar.
16 For the list of organs with standing to sue, see § 63 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act: each of the two Houses of Parliament, the federal government and any other organs of Parliament with legal capacity conferred upon them by the Basic Law or one House of Parliament’s Standing Orders.
17 Georg Anders, ‘Zum Prüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten’ DöV 1963, 653, 658–9 states that Ministers could not be similarly sued for refusing to counter-sign laws and thus implicitly providing advice to assent, and that they should therefore sign in cases of doubt but qualify their signature by explaining their doubts to the Federal President. Hans Joachim Hallier, ‘Die Ausfertigung und Verkündung von Gesetzen und Verordnungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ AöR 85 (1960), 391, 403 disagrees with the first premiss.
18 Not an injunction compelling signature, and not a decision of the Court which is directly effective as Ausfertigung: Hallier, above n 17, 400; Joachim, Mewing, Die Prüfungskompetenz des Bundespräsidenten bei der Gesetzesausfertigung, insbesondere beim teilnichtigen Gesetz (1977) 25Google Scholar; Walther, Pohl, Die Prüfungskompetenz des Bundespräsidenten bei der Ausfertigung von Gesetzen (2001) 94Google Scholar.
19 Hansjörg, Biehl, Die Gegenzeichnung im parlamentarischen Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1971) 114Google Scholar; Roman, Herzog, ‘Bundespräsident und Bundesverfassungsgericht’ in Bodo, Börner, Hermann, Jahrreiß and Klaus, Stern (eds), Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit: Festschrift für Karl Carstens zum 70. Geburtstag am 14. Dezember 1984 (1984) vol 2, 601, 606–7Google Scholar; Mewing, above n 18, 23–4, 28; Michael, Nierhaus, Entscheidung, Präsidialakt und Gegen-zeichnung: ein Beitrag zur verfassungsrechtlichen Stellung des Bundespräsidenten im System des Grundgesetzes (1973) 103Google Scholar; Michael, Nierhaus, ‘Nochmals: Das Prüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten bei der Ausfertigung von Bundesgesetzen’ in Rudolf, Wendt et al (eds), Staat — Wirtschaft — Steuern: Festschrift für Karl Heinrich Friauf zum 65. Geburtstag (1996) 233, 247Google Scholar; Pohl, above n 18, 158; Gisela, Wild, Die Ausfertigung von Gesetzen und Rechtsverordnungen und die Anordnung zu ihrer Verkündung (1969) 60–1Google Scholar.
20 Jürgen Jekewitz, ‘Der Bundespräsident und die Gesetzgebung des Bundes: Was kann, darf, muß das Staatsoberhaupt bei der Ausfertigung der Gesetze nach art 82 GG leisten?’ RuP 2007, 11, 11; Nierhaus, ‘Nochmals’, above n 19; Friedrich Schnapp, ‘Ist der Bundespräsident verpflichtet, verfassungsmäßige Gesetze auszufertigen?’ JuS 1995, 287, 290-1 (drawing a somewhat fine distinction between the Federal President qua person and qua office-holder, but coming to the right conclusion). Jörg, Lücke, in Michael, Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz: Kommentar (3rd ed, 2003) 1689Google Scholar, tries in addition to derive an obligation to assent without delay from § 121(1) of the Civil Code, but this is somewhat optimistic. The Weimar Constitution contained a one-month deadline but this was dropped in the Basic Law.
21 See eg, Mewing, above n 18, 18; Hallier, above n 17, 398; Schack, ‘Prüfungszuständigkeit’ above n 9, 89.
22 There are also equivalent passages in arts 81(2)(1) and 115d(2)(3), and these would also be included, as is pointed out by Michael Brenner, in Hermann, von Mangoldt, Friedrich, Klein and Christian, Starck (eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (2005) vol 2, 2359Google Scholar; Lücke, above n 20, 1688. However, as the two named emergency provisions have never been used, they will not be mentioned again.
23 In art 17, where the equivalent noun Ausfertigung was used. See Hartmut Maurer, in Rudolf, Dolzer et al (eds), Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (2006)Google Scholar art 82, 9; Heinz, Herbert Weigt, Das Recht des Reichspräsidenten zur Prüfung der Gesetze (1933) 7Google Scholar. The latter mentions the Bavarian Constitution of 1818 as using the word as well. That Constitution certainly uses Ausfertigung and ausgefertigt but not, as I read it, in relation to assent to laws especially. As far as I can see, not being an expert on this long-since-superseded document, Titel VII § 30 is the provision on that topic, and it uses the word sanctioniert (‘sanctions’) to describe the process. Weigt states, however, that ausgefertigt gradually became established with the meaning of ‘signed’ thereafter, and that Ausfertigung first appeared with the modern meaning in constitutional law in the 1867 North German Constitution.
24 Hallier, above n 17, 394.
25 Friedrich, Schack, Die Prüfung der Rechtmäßigkeit von Gesetz und Verordnung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Preußens und des Deutschen Reiches (1918) 178Google Scholar.
26 Cf Antonio, Barcelona, ‘The Case for a Metonymic Basis of Pragmatic Inferencing: Evidence from Jokes and Funny Anecdotes’ in Klaus-Uwe, Panther and Linda, Thornburg (eds), Metonymy and Pragmatic Inferencing (2003) 90, 98Google Scholar.
27 Pohl, above n 18, 74-75, 97; Karlheinz, Rode, Die Ausfertigung der Bundesgesetze (1968) 20Google Scholar; Schack, ‘Prüfungständigkeit’, above n 9, 88, 90.
28 Rode, above n 27, 17. The remaining portion of the word, -ge-, has a grammatical rather than a semantic function; it marks the past participle.
29 Walter Frormann, ‘Die Beteiligung des Kaisers an der Reichsgesetzgebung’ AöR 14 (aF) (1899), 31, 57, 59, 65; Friedrich Kolbow, ‘Das Veto des deutschen Kaisers’ AöR 5 (aF) (1890), 73, 105. Needless to say, all views expressed in this period are affected by the extent to which the writer in question thought it desirable to subject the Emperor to the Reichstag’s and thus the people’s wishes: Rode, above n 27, 42.
30 There were four further cases of refusal on advice, listed in Wild, above n 19, 26-7. See also Anders, above n 17, 654.
31 On the general Weimar background and for references to one further case, in 1930, in which von Hindenburg considered refusing assent but was talked around, see Anders, above n 17, 653-4; Claus Arndt, ‘Das Prüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten’ DöV 1958, 604, 604–5.
32 As well as the sources given in relation to each individual case in other parts of the text, there is a list for the period from 1949 to the mid-1990s (cases 2 to 7 inclusive) in Peter, Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949 bis 1999 (1999) vol 2, 2453-5Google Scholar.
33 The story is told, and von Hindenburg’s letter to the federal government is reprinted, in Wild, above n 19, 25-9. See also Gerhard, Anschütz, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August 1919 (14th ed, 1933) 377Google Scholar (here the leading commentator on the Weimar Constitution more or less assumes that von Hindenburg’s objection was in fact political rather than legal); Weigt, above n 23, 37-40 (who defends the legal view taken by von Hindenburg, even if rather hesitantly). On the manoeuvres to cancel the Bill see also Hans Heinrich Lammers, ‘Die Aussetzung der Verkündung des Duellgesetzes’ DJZ 1926, 507-8; Fritz Poetzsch-Heffter, ‘Vom Staatsleben unter der Weimarer Verfassung II. Teil’ JöR 17 (aF) (1929), 1, 131. There is no sign in the article by Lammers of any contamination connected with his later involvement in the Hitler regime.
34 Anders, above n 17, 657; Mewing, above n 18, 16.
35 BVerfGE 1, 76. This case report also includes relevant documents.
36 Documents relevant to this case are not published in any official source: Epping, above n 9, 1102, 1107 fn 71, 1108 fn 84. The story is, however, told by Professor Epping and in Professor Otto Bachof’s ruminations quoted there and to be found in the original in Otto Kimminch, ‘Das Staatsoberhaupt in der parlamentarischen Demokratie’ VVdStRL 25 (1967), 228.
37 Bundestag, Drucksache V/4695, 5 (notice of decision only).
38 BVerfGE 26, 246. The case is referred to in David, Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 48Google Scholar.
39 It seems to be generally assumed that this Bill was covered by the Court’s ruling as well, but Karl, Carstens, Politische Führung: Erfahrungen im Dienst der Bundesregierung (1971) 104Google Scholar, is not absolutely certain. Perhaps the last iota of doubt was why the Federal President’s letter (see below n 40) referred to the possibility of seeking a declaration that he was wrong if the government disagreed with his view. They, at all events, did not mount a challenge.
40 Bundestag, Drucksache VI/1143.
41 Katrin, Haghgu, Die Zustimmung des Bundesrates nach Art 84 I GG: Wider die sogenannte Einheitsthese (2007) 279Google Scholar.
42 Bundestag, Drucksache 7/5856.
43 BVerfGE 48, 127, 177.
44 Haghgu, above n 41, 283-4; Pohl, above n 18, 47.
45 See generally Epping, above n 9, 1102; Norbert Riedel and Axel Schmidt, ‘Die Nichtausfertigung des Gesetzes zur Privatisierung der Flugsicherung durch den Bundespräsidenten’ DöV 1991, 371.
46 Bundestag, Drucksache 12/67, 2.
47 Brun-Otto Bryde, in Philip, von Kunig (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar (5th ed, 2003), vol 3, 281Google Scholar; Epping, above n 9, 1109.
48 See Debates of the Bundestag, 7 April 2006, 2782 (Uwe Beckmayer).
49 Federal President, ‘Bundespräsident Horst Köhler fertigt Gesetz zur Neuregelung der Flugsicherung nicht aus’ (Press Release, 24 October 2006) <http://www.bundespraesident.de/Journalistenservice/Pressemitteilungen-,11107.633675/Bundespraesident-Horst-Koehler.htm?global.back=/Journalistenservice/-%2c11107%2c3/Pressemitteilungen.htm%3flink%3dbpr_liste> at 27 February 2007.
50 This argument is elaborated in the letter of the Federal President informing the legislature of his decision published in Bundestag, Drucksache 16/3262.
51 Reinhard Müller, ‘„Evident verfassungswidrig” — Hoheitliche Aufgabe: Auch Köhler lehnt ein Gesetz zur Flugsicherung ab’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt), 25 October 2006, 2.
52 See, eg, Debates of the Bundesrat, 822nd meeting, 19 May 2006, 157; Karsten Baumann, ‘Bundeseigenverwaltung und Wettbewerb? Die Neuordnung der Flugsicherung’ DVBl 2006, 332; Christian Tams, ‘Article 87d(1) GG und die Neuordnung der Flugsicherung’ NVwZ 2006, 1226.
53 ‘Streit über Flugsicherung: Parteien halten trotz Veto des Bundespräsidenten an Privatisierung fest’, Handelsblatt (Düsseldorf), 25 October 2006, 1; Sibylle Haas and Jens Schneider, ‘Koalition nimmt Köhler beim Wort: Union und S P D erwägen Änderung des Grundgesetzes, um Luftverkehrssicherung doch privatisieren zu können’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 25 October 2006, 1.
54 There is a good general summary of this case in Stephanie Schiedermair, ‘Bundespräsident verhindert Verbraucherinformationsgesetz’ DöV 2007, 726, 729-31.
55 BGBl 2006 I 2033, 2036.
56 Wolfram Försterling, ‘Kompetenzrechtliche Probleme nach der Föderalismusreform’ ZG 2007, 36, 41-5; Hans-Jörg Hennecke, ‘Durch Bundesgesetze dürfen Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbänden Aufgaben nicht übertragen werden: Betrachtungen aus Anlaß der Nichtausfertigung des Verbraucherinformationsgesetzentwurfs und der Änderung des SGB XII’ NdsVbl 2007, 57, 57-66 (both of whom demonstrate at great length that the Federal President’s view was correct and accorded with the intention of the amendment); Jörn Ipsen, ‘Die Kompentenzverteilung zwischen Bund und Ländern nach der Föderalismusnovelle’ NJW 2006, 2801, 2802, 2805–6; Irene Kesper, ‘Reform des Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: die geplanten Änderungen im Überblick’ NdsVBl 2006, 145, 153; Friedrich Schoch, ‘Verfassungswidrigkeit des bundesgesetzlichen Durchgriffs auf Kommunen’ DVBl 2007, 261, 261.
57 As introduced, it is in Bundestag, Drucksache 16/1408; the amendments by the time it had reached the Bundesrat are in Bundesrat, Drucksache 584/06.
58 Debates of the Bundesrat, 825th meeting, 22 September 2006, 292 (Dr Ehrhart Körting).
59 The official public statement from the Federal President’s office is at <http://www.bundespraesident.de/Journalistenservice/Pressemitteilungen-,11107.634505/Bundespraesident-Horst-Koehler.htm?global.back=/Journalistenservice/-%2c11107%2c11/Pressemitteilungen.htm%3flink%3dbpr_liste> at 9 April 2007. The letter of the Federal President informing the legislature of his decision was published in Bundestag, Drucksache 16/3866.
60 Public statements of various politicians against the decision are collected by Schoch, above n 56, 268.
61 For example, Christoph Schwennicke, ‘Ein Präsident, der auch in der Ferne Nähe findet — Eine Ghana-Reise markiert den Beginn seiner zweiten Halbzeit im Amt: Horst Köhler zeigt in Afrika Qualitäten, die zu Hause nicht jeder sieht’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 15 January 2007, 3. See also Heribert Prantl, ‘Halbzeit eines Präsidenten’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 8 December 2006, 4.
62 Maximilian Steinbeis, ‘Köhler nennt Verkauf der Luftaufsicht „evident verfassungswidrig“: Bundespräsident kippt mit deutlichen Worten die Privatisierung der Flugsicherung’, Handelsblatt (Düsseldorf), 25 October 2006, 3.
63 Law of 5 November 2007, BGBl, 9 November 2007, 2558, § 1(2), final sentence.
64 For pre-1949 cases, see above n 30. I disregard these because constitutional arrangements were significantly different and not comparable.
65 In this situation, one of the classic commentaries, Theodor Maunz, in Theodor, Maunz and Günter, Dürig (eds), Grundgesetz: Kommentar (2006)Google Scholar art 82, 3, proclaims the sweeping view that a Minister in such a position must resign, although no reason is given for this. In the case discussed in the text, no resignation occurred.
66 This function is easily perceived from the point of view of someone used to our constitutional system, and by Brenner, above n 22, 2358 and Markus Gehrlein, ‘Braucht Deutschland einen Bundespräsidenten?’ DöV 2007, 280, 282; but in Germany not all see the point, eg, Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 61.
67 BVerfGE 10, 234; Stephanie Berger, ‘Materielles Prüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten?’ Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 1971, 3, 4-5; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 27. In addition, the Bundestag’s resolution approving the Bill was formally cancelled by the next statute in the same field: see § 29 of the law of 17 July 1954, BGBl 1954 I 203, 209. Without referring to this case, Hans-Uwe Erichsen, ‘Der Bundespräsident, Teil II’ Jura 1985, 424, 426 rejects the idea of federal Ministers advising the refusal of assent because, he says, it is inconsistent with their responsibility to Parliament. I have dealt with similar Australian arguments in Taylor, ‘Two Refusals’, above n 1, 109-13.
68 Pohl, above n 18, 64; Wild, above n 19, 62–5, 89–92.
69 Under the second sentence of arts 51(2) and (3) of the Basic Law.
70 Bundesrat, 774th meeting, 22 March 2002, 171.
71 The Federal President’s statement is reprinted in ZAR 2002, 210.
72 BVerfGE 106, 310.
73 Johannes, Rau, ‘Vom Gesetzesprüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten’ in Peter, Häberle, Martin, Morlok and Vassilios, Skouris (eds), Festschrift für Dimitris Tsatos zum 70. Geburtstag am 5. Mai 2003 (2003) 562, 572, 574Google Scholar. A slightly revised version was published as Johannes Rau, ‘Vom Gesetzesprüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten’ DVBl 2004, 1.
74 BVerfGE 61, 149. The Basic Law was later amended to add art 74(25) conferring concurrent power in this field on the federal legislature.
75 He is the author of the book referred to above n 39.
76 Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 2 July 1981, 545.
77 He used this expression also in an address to the Association of German Constitutional Law Teachers reprinted in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 4 October 1983, 943.
78 For commentary on this incident, see Pohl, above n 18, 48-50.
79 Under art 125 of the Basic Law, which is still in force and re-adjusts legislative responsibilities having regard to the re-introduction of a federal division of powers in 1949.
80 Bavaria, Parl Paper No. III/2685 (1957).
81 Bavaria, Parliamentary Debates, State Assembly, 15 December 1964, 2298 (Alfons Goppel, Premier). The Basic Law (art 31) states that if there is a conflict between federal and State law, the latter is invalid (not merely ineffective). Both cases are also referred to in para 3 of Schweiger’s commentary on art 76 of the State Constitution, Karl Schweiger, in Hans, Nawiasky et al (eds), Die Verfassung des Freistaates Bayern (2006) 86-94Google Scholar.
82 For a survey of the various States’ rules on this topic, see Anne-Louise, Schümer, Die Stellung des Ministerpräsidenten in den Bundesländern im Vergleich (2006) 86–94Google Scholar.
83 There is a parallel dispute in relation to the Ausfertigung of State laws. In Germany there is no apolitical State figurehead comparable to the Federal President to do this, so the State Constitutions give the task variously to the State Premier, the Cabinet or the president of the legislature. The arguments are nevertheless very similar to those in the federal sphere and are summarised in ibid 87–90.
84 Mewing, above n 18, 18.
85 Quoted in full above, text accompanying above n 14.
86 Bryde, above n 47, 281; Epping, above n 9, 1102, 1105; Rode, above n 27, 50–1. Matthias Hederich, ‘Zur Kompetenz des Bundespräsidenten, die Gesetzesausfertigung zu verweigern’ ZG 1999, 123, 124 adds questions arising under the parliamentary Standing Orders, but he is alone in this as far as I am aware, and rightly contradicted by Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 24. It is for Parliament to enforce, or to dispense with compliance with, its standing orders. For further information in English on the legislative procedures, see Currie, above n 38, 62.
87 For example, Friesenhahn, above n 9, 679–80; Lücke, above n 20, 1688; Ulrich Ramsauer, in Erhard, Denninger et al (eds), [Alternativ-]Kommentar zum Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2nd ed, 1989) vol 2, 624-5Google Scholar.
88 Most commentators assume that this is so, if they do not expressly state it (as does for example Nierhaus, ‘Nochmals’, above n 19, 235). Even the most determined supporter of the narrow view agreed (Friesenhahn, above n 9, 685). Only rarely does one come across an argument such as that in Heinz, Mayer, B-VG: Kurzkommentar (3rd ed, 2002) 201Google Scholar (Austria): the President should check whether the constitutional procedure that was deemed applicable was complied with, but not whether the right procedure was chosen.
89 The common law concept of case law is not out of place in this area, as § 31 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act provides that the decisions of that Court bind all constitutional organs and in some circumstances also ‘have the force of law’.
90 The only exception is a brief obiter dictum of the Hessian State Constitutional Court apparently supporting the broad view. But it is not only a brief obiter dictum; it also dates from 1950, is unsupported by reasons, was uninformed by post-1949 experience and deals with a State constitution only: decision of 4 August 1950 by the Hessian State Constitutional Court under the Hessian State Constitution, which I have read in full in Beilage Nr. 7 zum ‘Hessischen Staatsanzeiger’ 1950, 41–4, and which is also recorded in JZ 1951, 244 sub 2(b). Sometimes BVerfGE 1, 396, 412; 2, 143, 169; 34, 9, 22-3 are cited as relevant case law, eg, by Brenner, above n 22, 2360. But these cases contain old dicta (the latest is from 1972); the point was not directly raised in them; the dicta state that the Federal President has some function of checking the constitutionality of laws presented to him for assent, but the Court does not even consider precisely how far that function extends, or attempt to determine whether what I call the narrow, the middle or the broad view is correct. Cf Paul Glauben, ‘Das Prüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten’ DriZ 2007, 38, 38-9; Hederich, above n 86, 125; Jekewitz, above n 20, 13; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 16. Of even less use is BVerfGE 7, 330, 337, also sometimes cited, for reasons which appear on reading the passage concerned.
91 Mewing, above n 18, 58; Weigt, above n 23, 9.
92 Bryde, above n 47, 281; Martin Nolte and Christian Tams, ‘Der Bundespräsident und das Flugsicherungsgesetz’ JuS 2006, 1088, 1089.
93 Epping, above n 9, 1106. Furthermore, the Court can take action only after assent, so it could also be argued on that ground that there is no conflict with a power to refuse assent: Nolte and Tams, above n 92, 1089; Schümer, above n 82, 89 (States).
94 Under art 56, the President swears an oath which includes a promise to ‘uphold and defend the Basic Law and the laws of the Federation’ and to ‘conscientiously fulfil my duties’.
95 Bryde, above n 47, 283; Epping, above n 9, 1105; Friauf, above n 12, 550; Friesenhahn, above n 9, 686; Wolfgang Heyde, ‘Zum Umfang der materiellen Prüfungskompetenz des Bundespräsidenten’ DöV 1971, 797, 798; Dietmar Jahnel, ‘Die Mitwirkung des Bundespräsidenten an der Bundesgesetzgebung’ JBl 1987, 683, 638; Gerold Lehnguth, ‘Die Verweigerung der Ausfertigung von Gesetzen durch den Bundespräsidenten und das weitere Verfahren’ DöV 439, 442; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 19; Mewing, above n 18, 74-5; Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 94; Nierhaus, ‘Nochmals’, above n 19, 240-1; Nolte and Tams, above n 92, 1089; Pohl, above n 18, 136; Rau, above n 73, 564; Riedel and Schmidt, above n 45, 372-3; Rode, above n 27, 64. Schümer, above n 82, 88 makes the same point at State level.
96 Bauer, above n 12, 1904; Brenner, above n 22, 2361; Karl-Heinrich Hall, ‘Überlegungen zur Prüfungskompetenz des Bundespräsidenten’ JZ 1965, 305, 306; Lehnguth, above n 95, 442; Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 65-6, 104; Pohl, above n 18, 145, 149; Rau, above n 73, 564; Schümer, above n 82, 89-90, 93 (States).
97 Bryde, above n 47, 283; Friauf, above n 12, 559-60; Hederich, above n 86, 132-3; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 19; Nolte and Tams, above n 92, 1089.
98 Friauf, above n 12, 554.
99 Indeed, Arndt, above n 31, 605 states that breaches of the Basic Law committed with dolus eventualis, very roughly equivalent in function to common law recklessness, would be included in the breaches for which the Federal President could be called to account by the Federal Constitutional Court under art 61, mentioned earlier.
100 Friauf, above n 12, 561.
101 Cf R v Commissioner for Transport (Qld); Ex parte Cobb & Co Ltd [1963] Qd R 547, 568.
102 Biehl, above n 19, 114; Lehnguth, above n 95, 443; Mewing, above n 18, 77–9; Nierhaus, ‘Nochmals’, above n 19, 249. Obviously, if it were the true position that any valid clause could save a whole Bill, ‘tacking’ would be rewarded: the government could deliberately add a certainly valid provision to an otherwise doubtful Bill, and claim the right to have it assented to as a result. On the other hand, if only one detail of a Bill is doubtful there might be any number of good reasons for letting it through so that the point can be finally determined and the rest of the provisions are not held up as a result of a problem that is trifling when considered as a proportion of the whole. Case 9 may be an example of this.
103 Herzog, above n 19, 610; Heyde, above n 95, 800; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 22; Pohl, above n 18, 193.
104 As do authors like Lehnguth, above n 95, 443, who rely on the argument that the subjection of the Federal President to the rules of constitutional law means that he should not sign unconstitutional laws, only to go on and add that he may nevertheless decide to do so for tactical reasons.
105 Biehl, above n 19, 113. Others to put forward this argument include Maunz, above n 65, art 82, 2; Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 98-99; Schneider, above n 12, 277; Wild, above n 19, 58-60.
106 Anschütz, above n 33, 368; Arndt, above n 31, 605.
107 In relation to the States, Schümer, above n 82, 89, refers to two States with similar provisions prohibiting implied amendments in relation to which the same arguments pertain, but does not go on to tell us about the other fourteen. The federal rule is also a point of distinction with the Weimar Constitution, which did not prohibit implied amendments: Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 96-7; Pohl, above n 18, 134; Rode, above n 27, 55–7.
108 Epping, above n 9, 1106; Hederich, above n 86, 125-6, 136.
109 Riedel and Schmidt, above n 45, 373. See also Heyde, above n 95, 798.
110 Rode, above n 27, 56-7.
111 Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 18-19.
112 Bryde, above n 47, 289; Friauf, above n 12, 563, 565. However, Pohl, above n 18, 159-60, points out that citizens nowadays can generally be expected to cope with the idea that there will be occasional differences of opinion about the correct legal answer to a question, and thus loss of prestige is not inevitable.
113 Pace Christian Lutze, ‘Ein präsidiales Mißverständnis über die formelle Prüfungskompentenz’ NVwZ 2003, 323, 325, the involvement of the office in political speculation began not when Herr Rau eventually signed the law, but rather as a result of speculation and suggestions that he should not — in other words, because the power existed.
114 Mewing, above n 18, 28.
115 Friauf, above n 12, 545.
116 A notable example of the shift in the focus of the argument is Riedel and Schmidt, above n 45, 374; and see Bryde, above n 47, 282; Epping, above n 9, 1109; Gehrlein, above n 66, 281; Glauben, above n 90, 39; Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 15-16, 17; Martin, Nettesheim, ‘Die Aufgaben des Bundespräsidenten’ in Josef, Isensee and Paul, Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2005) 1091Google Scholar; Rüdiger, Sannwald, in Bruno, Schmidt-Bleibtreu and Franz, Klein (eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (2004) 1540-1Google Scholar; Schiedermair, above n 54, 728-9. And there are some early voices calling for certainty of error to be the principal criterion: Heyde, above n 95, 800; Ulrich Scheuner, ‘Probleme und Verantwortungen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik’ DöV 1952, 293. Nevertheless this development still causes surprise to Bauer, above n 12, 1902-3 and Lutze, above n 113, 324, who believe that the criterion of obviousness applies only to non-procedural errors although citing cases such as the State Liability Bill in which the practice has diverged.
117 Pohl, above n 18, 62; Rau, above n 73, 565-6.
118 Arndt, above n 31, 604-5; Friesenhahn, above n 9, 688-9; Wilhelm Wertenbruch, ‘Für und wider das materielle Prüfungsrecht des Bundespräsidenten’ DöV 1952, 201.
119 Hederich, above n 86, 127.
120 It thus has the coveted status of herrschende Meinung or prevalent opinion (among academics that is — although that is more important in a civil law country). For statements that it is the hM see, eg, Friauf, above n 12, 548-9 (pointing out that reasoning differs even among supporters of the hM); Friesenhahn, above n 9, 680, 692; Hall, above n 96, 306; Herzog, above n 19, 605; Heyde, above n 95, 797; Riedel and Schmidt, above n 45, 372; Rode, above n 27, 11-12.
121 Brenner, above n 22, 2361; Herzog, above n 19, 605, 609.
122 Friauf, above n 12, 567; Hederich, above n 86, 135-7; Jahnel, above n 95, 639-40 (Austria). Nierhaus, ‘Nochmals’, above n 19, 248-9, makes a similar point although a supporter of the broad view.
123 Bryde, above n 47, 282-3; Hederich, above n 86, 136-7.
124 For example, Kimminch, above n 36, 85, although he also shows awareness of the limitations of this rule of thumb. Whether there is a real difference between charters of rights and other provisions in this respect has recently been the subject of a thoughtful article: Adrienne, Stone, ‘Judicial Review without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1Google Scholar. I do not mean to imply that I take the same view as Professor Stone, but clearly there is a lot in what she says.
125 Carstens, above n 39, 103-4.
126 Hederich, above n 86, 140; Pohl, above n 18, 181–3.
127 Maurer, above n 23, art 82, 22-3.
128 Ibid art 82, 23.
129 Ibid art 82, 21-2; Pohl, above n 18, 174.
130 Schoch, above n 56, 268.
131 ‘Spectator’, ‘Der Mahner: Bundespräsident Köhler ist im Begriff, seine Rolle zu finden und seiner Funktion gerecht zu werden’ RuP 2006, 193, 193. It is interesting to find Bagehot also cited in Gehrlein, above n 66, 285; Jekewitz, above n 20, 11; Nierhaus, Entscheidung, above n 19, 110. See also Schiedermair, above n 54, 726, 731-2. His dictum also applies, of course, in Australia. See Principle ‘R’ of the Australian Constitutional Convention reproduced in C J G, Sampford, ‘“Recognise and Declare“: An Australian Experiment in Codifying Constitutional Conventions’ (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 369, 420Google Scholar.
132 Josiah, Symon, ‘Royal Assent’ in Patrick, Brazil and Bevan, Mitchell (eds), Opinions of the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth of Australia (1981) vol 1, 238, 239Google Scholar.
133 Ibid 239.
134 Charles, Parkinson, ‘The Early High Court and the Doctrine of Immunity of Instrumentalities’ (2002) 13 Public Law Review 26, 37Google Scholar.
135 Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Association v New South Wales Railway Traffic Employes Association (1906) 4 CLR 488.
136 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Company Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 (‘Engineers Case’), 159, 171; confirmed in Australian Railways Union v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1930) 44 CLR 319, 346, 381, 390-1.
137 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 4 — the words including State-run industries in the definition of ‘industrial dispute’.
138 W A, Townsley, The Government of Tasmania (1976) 88–90Google Scholar; W A, Townsley, ‘The Government of Tasmania’ in S R, Davis (ed), The Government of the Australian States (1960) 479, 524–6Google Scholar; John, Waugh, ‘Deadlocks in State Parliaments’ in George, Winterton (ed), State Constitutional Landmarks (2006) 185, 202–4Google Scholar.
139 Herbert, Evatt, The King and His Dominion Governors (2nd ed, 1967) 189–91Google Scholar.
140 See, eg, Brazier, above n 4, 195–6; Ian, Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights: A Critical Introduction (3rd ed, 2003) 273–4Google Scholar. The idea of refusing assent was considered at the time of the Home Rule crisis and rejected, one reason for which, it may be safely said, was that it became clear that even Home Rule was not sufficiently extreme to warrant such action: Vernon, Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution (1995) 129Google Scholar.
141 Bradley, Selway, Constitution of South Australia (1997) 42Google Scholar; Greg Taylor, Constitution of Victoria, above n 6, 132-4; George, Winterton, ‘The Constitutional Position of Australian State Governors’ in H P, Lee and George, Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Perspectives (1992) 274, 293–4Google Scholar.
142 I have expressed my views elsewhere on this question, with references to alternative views, and do not repeat them here as the discussion is not germane to the comparison. I may however note that in the last Australian example referred to, above n 2, ministerial advice did accompany refusal of assent (see Re Scully (1937) 32 Tas LR 3, 30). See also ‘New Zealand Gazette’, 21 June 1878, 91–3, for a case in New Zealand in 1878 in which the Governor of New Zealand insisted on assenting to a Bill despite ministerial advice to veto it (referred to in Alpheus, Todd, Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies (2nd ed, 1894) 664Google Scholar). It is clear that that case is of very limited value because it occurred at an earlier stage of constitutional government, before the party system had developed and when the Governor still had a reservoir of independent discretion as a result of his connexion with the Colonial Office. The Governor’s main reason for refusing the veto was that he would be ‘lending [himself] to something little short of a trick upon Parliament’ if he did refuse assent because the government had not indicated its objection to Parliament when it was still sitting. I think that nowadays such a pronouncement would seem something of an intervention in day-to-day politics and that no Governor would say that in relation to today’s Parliaments, most of which are dominated by the executive.
143 I am conscious that controversy exists about whether this term can accurately be applied to the Australian Vice-Regal representatives as distinct from Her Majesty the Queen. In this context, however, the term is convenient and, given the locus of the power under discussion, accurate enough.
144 For a discussion of what might happen in Australia if the Governor-General refused assent for reasons of public policy, expressed in characteristically amusing terms, see Geoffrey, Sawer, Federation under Strain: Australia 1972–1975 (1977) 184-5Google Scholar.
145 Jahnel, above n 95, 633. As Jahnel’s article is now twenty years old, I have also checked with an Austrian source that no cases have occurred since. While the practice thus seems to be quite clear, the theory is less so, as the scholars are divided even about what is the majority opinion among them. See Ludwig, Adamovich and Bernd-Christian, Funk, Österreichisches Verfassungsrecht: Verfassungsrechtslehre unter Berücksichtigung von Staatslehre und Politikwissenschaft (3rd ed, 1985) 212Google Scholar; Mayer, above n 88, 201–2; Robert, Walter and Heinz, Mayer, Grundriß des österreichischen Bundesverfassungsrechts (8th ed, 1996) 189Google Scholar.
146 Michael, Stokes, ‘The Resignation of Richard Butler as Governor of Tasmania’ (2004) 23 University of Tasmania Law Review 207Google Scholar, 208–10; Taylor, Constitution of Victoria, above n 6, 79; George, Winterton, ‘The Hollingworth Experiment’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 139, 143–5Google Scholar.
147 Schoch, above n 56, 267.
148 See Maurer, above n 23.
149 Sawer, above n 144, 159-60.
150 As Anders points out, there is no written prohibition on taking this course, and in a country of codes that is equivalent to permission: Anders, above n 17, 657.
151 Bachof, above n 36, 230; Berger, above n 67, 10.
152 Carstens, above n 39, 104.
153 See above, text accompanying n 36.
154 As is suggested by Rolf Lamprecht, ‘Der Bundespräsident in Geiselhaft — ein Rechtsgutachten aus Karlsruhe hätte ihn befreien können!’ NJW 2002, 2686.
155 Rau, above n 73, 575.
156 Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257.
157 A well-known recent case is Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 SCR 698, although it is hard to escape a suspicion that one reason for making this reference was to mobilise the Court’s prestige in favour of a controversial innovation. On the other hand the Court refused to answer one of the questions asked of it, so it was doubtless alive to this danger itself; and an unfriendly challenge to the legislation — which the Court, after all, found invalid in one respect — was hardly unlikely.
158 A-G (Vic); ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 272-3.
159 Formally this would be not be a case of abstrakte Normenkontrolle, as no law would have been enacted for examination, but rather an Organstreit, a dispute among constitutional organs about their duties and relationships. However, that does not affect the substantive point made in the text. For a description of these procedures in English, see Donald, Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2nd ed, 1997) 12–14Google Scholar (he calls the Organstreit ‘disputes between higher federal organs’ and abstrakte Normenkontrolle ‘abstract judicial review’).
160 Basic Law art 93(1)(2).
161 This issue appears to be unresolved in Australian law: see Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494, 531, 556-7, 578-9, 618–20.
162 French Constitution art 61(2); John, Bell, French Constitutional Law (1992) 32Google Scholar.
163 Henry, Burmester, ‘Locus Standi in Constitutional Litigation’ in George, Winterton and H P, Lee (eds), Australian Constitutional Perspectives (1992) 148, 150-61Google Scholar.
164 In addition to those mentioned in the text, see Australian Constitution s 58, second paragraph; Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 14; Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s 56; Constitution Act, RSBC 1996, c 66, s 48; and no doubt many others.
165 Namely the Commonwealth (Sampford, above n 131, 416) and Victoria (Taylor, Constitution of Victoria, above n 6, 303–4). The same position appears to obtain in South Australia having regard to the most recent cases of the provision’s use there (eg, South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 1 March 1966, 4352-3); but I have no information at all about the recent practice in British Columbia and enquiries directed to its legislature have produced no answer. There are some older cases in which advice was apparently not obtained: Saywell, above n 3, 221 fn 97.
166 Mahabir, Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (5th ed, 2004) 64–5Google Scholar appears to assume that this power could have been exercised without advice, but in fact in the case he mentions it was not according to Venkataraman, above n 4, 335.
167 South African Constitution art 79(4).
168 Australian Constitution s 61. Furthermore, under s 3(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), a decision by the Governor-General is not amenable to review under that Act because it is not a ‘decision to which this Act applies’.
169 Australia Act 1986 (Imp & Cth) s 7(2). State legislation, in so far as it is relevant, is not always quite as clear, but the Queensland and Tasmanian Acts, for example, apply only to a decision ‘of an administrative character’, which the decision to give assent certainly is not : Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 4; Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas) s 4(1).
170 R v Governor of South Australia (1907) 4 CLR 1497, 1510–12; Enid, Campbell, ‘Royal Assent to Bills’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 9, 12-13Google Scholar; Stanley, de Smith and Rodney, Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th ed, 1998) 28Google Scholar; cf also Mark, Aronson, Bruce, Dyer and Matthew, Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, 2004) 144-5Google Scholar, 724-5.
171 [1932] AC 526; (1932) 47 CLR 97. A-G (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545 is another more recent example.
172 Taylor, Constitution of Victoria, above n 6, 518.
173 Anders, above n 17, 656.
174 Hallier, above n 17, 404.
175 Berger, above n 67, 9; Friesenhahn, above n 9, 682; Heyde, above n 95, 797-8; Lücke, above n 20, 1688.
176 Schümer, above n 82, 93–4.
177 Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) s 28. See also Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) s 25(1); Geoffrey, Lindell, ‘The Arrangements for Self-Government for the Australian Capital Territory: A Partial Road to Republicanism in the Seat of Government?’ (1992) 3 Public Law Review 5, 13-15Google Scholar.
178 Malaysian Constitution arts 66(4), (4A). See Lee, above n 4.
179 Lehnguth, above n 95, 441; Schneider, above n 12, 276; Wild, above n 19, 34; cf Bryde, above n 47, 281.
180 Bauer, above n 12, 1902; Ramsauer, above n 87, 621.