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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
The principle that the constitution derives its ultimate authority from the sovereignty of the people and the nationhood power were both developed by the High Court in the context of Australia's emergence as an independent nation. Although this shared provenance suggests the possibility of a more significant connection between the two doctrines, such a connection has not been developed in Australian constitutional jurisprudence. The heavily criticised judgment of French J in the Tampa decision appears to allude to such a connection, but the relevant reasoning is ambiguous and either left undeveloped or implicitly rejected in subsequent High Court cases. This paper critically examines the relationship between popular sovereignty and the nationhood power on two levels. In the first instance, the paper investigates whether it is even coherent to seek to provide a normative ground for the nationhood power in popular sovereignty. The paper then considers whether such a justification is consistent with Australian constitutional doctrine. Unsurprisingly, the weight of constitutional principle and doctrine supports the general subjection of the executive to prior legislative authorisation, rather than a robust non-statutory executive power grounded in popular sovereignty. While this conclusion is predictable in an Australian context, a detailed examination of the relationship between the weaker conception of popular sovereignty operative in the reasoning of High Court and the nationhood power nonetheless reveals some important underlying assumptions of current doctrinal orthodoxy.
I am grateful to the following mentors, friends and colleagues for helpful discussions, comments and suggestions: Carlo Dellora, Simon Evans, Constance Youngwon Lee, Benjamin B Saunders, Peta Stephenson, Lael Weis and Thomas Wu.
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5 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 70 (Deane and Toohey JJ); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 (Mason CJ) (‘Australian Capital Television’); Theophanous v The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 172–3 (Deane J); McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 236 (McHugh J).
6 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138. The implied freedom of political communication cases precipitated some extravagant rhetoric, including references to a ‘fundamental paradigm shift’ and ‘glorious revolution.’ See George, Winterton, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Continuity’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 1Google Scholar, 1 and the references cited there.
7 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138, citing Geoffrey, Lindell, ‘Why is Australia's Constitution Binding?—The Reasons in 1900 and Now and the Effect of Independence’ (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 29, 30, 49Google Scholar.
8 Lindell, above n 7, 37.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. This appeal to the tacit consent of ‘acquiescence’ is suggestive of a weaker conception of popular sovereignty than that embodied in appeals to the ‘will and authority of the people.’ See Vinx, below n 49.
12 See Cheryl, Saunders, The Constitution of Australia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2011) 59–62Google Scholar.
13 Lindell, above n 7, 37–8.
14 Ibid.
15 Cf Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 (French CJ).
16 (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540 [183].
17 Ibid 542 [191].
18 Ibid 542 [191]–[192].
19 Ibid 543 [193].
20 George, Winterton, ‘The Relationship Between Commonwealth Legislative and Executive Power’ (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 21, 34Google Scholar.
21 Ibid.
22 s 4.
23 Leslie, Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 279, 293Google Scholar.
24 (2015) 257 CLR 178, 207 [45] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). Cf Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530, 571 [104], 578 [135], 581 [146], 583 [158] (Keane J); Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508, 593 [196]–[197] (Keane J); Murphy & Anor v Electoral Commissioner & Anor (2016) 90 ALJR 1027, 1058 [176] (Keane J).
25 Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Scope of Executive Power’ (Papers on Parliament No 59, Procedure Office of the Department of the Senate, Parliament of Australia, 2013).
26 (2009) 238 CLR 1.
27 (2012) 248 CLR 156.
28 Saunders, The Constitution of Australia, above n 12, 11–12.
29 Ibid 11; John, Quick and Robert, Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1901) (Legal Books, 1976) 148–162Google Scholar; John, Andrew La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne University Press, 1972) 199–202Google Scholar; Nicholas, Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of the Australian Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 172–6Google Scholar. The sense of popular sovereignty at play in the debates nonetheless frequently emphasises representative and responsible government and is thus consistent with the claims made in the current section. See William, McMillan, Speech on the Referendum as a Mode of Settling Disputes Between the Two Houses of Parliament (Angus & Robertson, 1896) 9–10Google Scholar; Henry, Wrixon, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia: An Address (Melville, Murray & Slade, 1901) 6Google Scholar. My analysis here also draws on Benjamin B. Saunders, ‘Government by Contradiction? The Expectations and Intentions of the Framers of the Australian Constitution Regarding Responsible Government’ (unpublished PhD thesis) chapter 6.
30 The process was not uniform, however: The Western Australian Parliament, rather than the people, chose its representatives and Queensland representatives did not attend the 1897–8 Convention. See Saunders, The Constitution of Australia, above n 12, 11–12.
31 SirOwen, Dixon, ‘The Law and the Constitution’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 590, 597Google Scholar.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 SirOwen, Dixon, ‘Sources of Legal Authority’ in Judge, Woinarski (ed), Jesting Pilate: and other Legal Addresses (W S Hein, 1965) 198–9Google Scholar.
35 Loughlin, ‘Constituent Power Subverted’, above n 4, 27.
36 Mark, Philp, ‘English Republicanism in the 1790s’ (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 235, 258Google Scholar.
37 Loughlin, ‘Constituent Power Subverted’, above n 4, 47. The framers of the Commonwealth Constitution did, however, sometimes propound a more populist interpretation of British constitutional history. See Convention Debates (1891), 735 (Playford), Sydney (1897), 537 (Cockburn), (1898), 2199 (Wise); see also the quotations in Anonymous, ‘The Federal Bill’ (1898) 12 Review of Reviews 297, 298–9. There are echoes of concern regarding populism in the judgments of Hayne and Heydon JJ in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 219 [159] (Hayne J) and 223–8 [177]–[183] (Heydon J). As suggested below in this section, a guarded view of the role of the popular will in constitutional argument is reconcilable with more moderate conceptions of popular sovereignty.
38 Saunders, The Constitution of Australia, above n 12, 29.
39 (1985) 159 CLR 351.
40 Ibid 441–2. In the same case Murphy J was already declaring that the ‘authority for the Australian Constitution then [1 January 1901] and now is its acceptance by the Australian people.’ Ibid 383.
41 (1992) 177 CLR 1.
42 Ibid 72. As Winterton notes, this view was in essence repeated by Deane J in Theophanous v The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 180 and then taken up by Toohey J in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 201. See Winterton, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Continuity’, above n 6, 4 (n 24).
43 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138.
44 (1996) 186 CLR 140.
45 Ibid 230. See also ibid 237.
46 James, Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 1901) vol 2, 57Google Scholar; Simon, Evans ‘Why is the Constitution Binding? Authority, Obligation and the Role of the People’ (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 107Google Scholar.
47 Evans, ‘Why is the Constitution Binding?’ above n 46, 110. Simon Evans raises very plausible concerns regarding the underlying cogency of attempts to ground the moral validity of the Constitution in popular sovereignty. Perhaps even more dubious—as Evans notes—is the claim that the popular sovereign became the new Grundnorm following the Australia Acts. Insofar as my focus in this paper is upon the clarification of the relationship between popular sovereignty—as interpreted by the High Court—and the nationhood power I leave these concerns to one side.
48 Daniel, Lee, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought (Oxford University Press, 2016) 1Google Scholar. See also Richard, Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2016)Google Scholar; Richard, Bourke and Quentin, Skinner (eds), Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2016)Google Scholar.
49 Lars, Vinx, ‘The Incoherence of Strong Popular Sovereignty’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 101Google Scholar.
50 Ibid 102, citing Jürgen, Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (William Rehg trans, Polity Press, 1996) 82–131Google Scholar [trans of: Faktizität und Geltung (first published 1992)]; John, Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993) 271–8Google Scholar.
51 Ibid 102
52 Ibid 102–3.
53 Carl, Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Jeffrey Seitzer trans, Duke University Press, 2008) 125 (1928)Google Scholar.
54 Ibid 75.
55 Ibid 128–32.
56 Ernst-Wolfgang, Böckenförde, ‘The Concept of the Political: A Key to Understanding Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory’ in David, Dyzenhaus (ed) Law as Politics (Duke University Press, 1998) 42–4Google Scholar.
57 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, above n 53, 131. Schmitt presents his constitutional theory as an analytical/descriptive account, but it also has clear normative implications. See ibid 53.
58 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 70 (Deane and Toohey JJ); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 (Mason CJ); Theophanous v The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 172–3 (Deane J); McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 236 (McHugh J).
59 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106, 137 (Mason CJ), quoting Australian Constitution ss 7, 24.
60 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 71–2.
61 Ibid 70. See Elisa, Arcioni, ‘The Core of the Australian Constitutional People—’The People’ as ‘The Electors’’ (2016) 39 University of New South Wales Law Journal 421, 428–33Google Scholar.
62 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138.
63 (1994) 182 CLR 104, 172–3.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid 171. Deane J also argues that the ‘present legitimacy of the Constitution as the compact and highest law of our nation lies exclusively in the original adoption (by referenda) and subsequent maintenance (by acquiescence) of its provisions by the people’.
66 (1996) 186 CLR 140, 230.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid 272.
71 Ibid 285.
72 (2015) 257 CLR 178, 207 [45].
73 Ibid 257. Nettle J sources this implied right in ss 7, 24, 62, 64, 128 and related provisions of the Constitution.
74 Ibid.
75 (2013) 252 CLR 530.
76 (2014) 254 CLR 508.
77 (2013) 252 CLR 530, 578, 581, 583–4. Cf Murphy v Electoral Commissioner [2016] HCA 36 (Keane J).
78 (2014) 254 CLR 508, 601.
79 Ibid.
80 Winterton ‘The Relationship Between Commonwealth Legislative and Executive Power’, above n 20, 33, quoting Geoffrey Sawer, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth and the Whitlam Government’ (Speech delivered at the Octagon Lecture, The University of Western Australia, 1976) 10.
81 Michael, Crommelin, ‘The Executive’ in Gregory, Craven (ed), The Convention Debates 1891–1898: Commentaries, Indices and Guide (Legal Books, 1986) 127, 147Google Scholar.
82 Gabrielle, Appleby and Stephen, McDonald, ‘Looking at the Executive Power through the High Court's New Spectacles’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 253Google Scholar. See also Saunders, The Constitution of Australia, above n 12, 178.
83 Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd (1922) 31 CLR 421, 422 (Isaacs J).
84 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 107 (Brennan J).
85 R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 555 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
86 Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 397 (Mason J).
87 Leslie, Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 4th ed, 1997) 251Google Scholar.
88 Nicholas, Condylis, ‘Debating the Nature and Ambit of the Commonwealth's Non-Statutory Executive Power’ (2015) 39 Melbourne University Law Review 385, 392Google Scholar and the authorities cited there. British Courts have tended to favour A V Dicey's conception of the prerogative as ‘the residue of the discretionary power left at any moment in the hands of the Crown’ over Blackstone's conception of the prerogative as referring to the Crown's unique powers. See A V, Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 8th ed, 1915) 421Google Scholar; William, Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765–9) vol 1, 232Google Scholar; Benjamin, B Saunders, ‘Democracy, Liberty and the Prerogative: The Displacement of Inherent Executive Power by Statute’ (2013) 41 Federal Law Review 363, 365–8Google Scholar.
89 (1974) 131 CLR 477.
90 Ibid 498 (Mason J). See also Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ).
91 (1988) 19 FCR 347.
92 Ibid 369. See Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195, 210–211 [30]–[34] for a more recent restatement of this view.
93 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540 (French J).
94 (1988) 166 CLR 79.
95 Ibid 93 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ) (emphasis added).
96 (1975) 134 CLR 338.
97 Ibid 406.
98 Ibid 397.
99 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 109–10.
100 (1915) 20 CLR 425, 438 (Griffith CJ), 440 (Isaacs J).
101 (1951) 83 CLR 1, 187–8 (Dixon J), 232 (Williams J).
102 Condylis, above n 88, 392.
103 Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542–3 [191]–[193]. For criticism of French J's reasoning, see, in addition to the references cited in notes 21 and 23 above, Adam, Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2005) 58–60Google Scholar; Simon, Evans, ‘The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’ (2002) 13 Public Law Review 94, 98Google Scholar; Peter, Billings, ‘Refugees, the Rule of Law and Executive Power: A(nother) Case of the Conjuror's Rabbit?’ (2003) 54(4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 412Google Scholar.
104 Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid 542–3.
107 Ibid 543.
108 Ibid 540 [183]. Cf Re Ditfort (1988) 19 FCR 347, 369 (Gummow J).
109 Condylis, above n 88, 394–5, citing Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63–4 (French CJ), 89 (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). See also Duncan, Kerr, ‘The High Court and the Executive: Emerging Challenges to the Underlying Doctrines of Responsible Government and the Rule of Law’ (2009) 28 University of Tasmania Law Review 145Google Scholar.
110 Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83.
111 Ibid 60; Appleby and McDonald, above n 82, 261–2; Anne, Twomey ‘Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power—Pape, The Prerogative and Nationhood Powers’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 313, 316–7Google Scholar.
112 Thanks to Benjamin B Saunders for discussion of this point.
113 (2016) 257 CLR 42.
114 Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 500.
115 Ibid 501.
116 Ibid 508 (French CJ), 514 (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).
117 Ibid 597 (French CJ), 512 (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).
118 (2014) 252 CLR 416.
119 Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 192–3, 205–6 (French CJ), 235–6 (Gummow and Bell JJ), 347–8 (Crennan J); Williams [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416, 468–9 (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ. See also Condylis, above n 88, 396.
120 I discuss the implication of Williams [No 1] further in section 5.
121 See, eg, Leslie, Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 279Google Scholar; Peter, Gerangelos, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia: Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution, “Nationhood” and the Future of the Prerogative’ (2012) 12 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 97Google Scholar; Condylis, above n 88, 389.
122 I am grateful to Simon Evans for discussion of this point.
123 Gerangelos, above n 121, 99, 102, 104. Similar criticisms are made in Winterton, ‘The Relationship Between Commonwealth Legislative and Executive Power’, above n 21, 33 and Twomey, above n 111, 319–20.
124 Twomey, above n 111, 327; Gerangelos, above n 121, 98.
125 See Gerangelos, above n 121, 119–25; Condylis, above n 88, 397–402.
126 Winterton, ‘The Relationship Between Commonwealth Legislative and Executive Power’, above n 21, 35–6. It is in this context that Winterton has argued that the ‘depth’ of executive power (i.e. the sorts of activities that can be carried out by the executive) should be determined by the prerogative. On Winterton's view, the ‘breadth’ of executive power should be determined by reference to the contours of s 51 legislative power. See George, Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General: A Constitutional Analysis (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 30, 38Google Scholar.
127 Winterton ‘The Relationship Between Commonwealth Legislative and Executive Power’, above n 21, 33, citing Geoffrey Sawer, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth and the Whitlam Government’ (Speech delivered at the Octagon Lecture, The University of Western Australia, 1976). See also Condylis, above n 88, 389.
128 (1988) 19 FCR 347, 369.
129 Kerr, ‘The High Court and the Executive’, above n 109, 158.
130 Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 570 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).
131 Gerangelos, however, argues that the archaism of the prerogative is in fact advantageous because it leads to increased certainty. See Gerangelos, above n 121, 122.
132 Condylis, above n 88, 390 and references cited there. I do not have sufficient space here to assess Condylis’ arguments for an indigenous prerogative that reconciles the inherent and common law views.
133 Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542–3 [192].
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid 543 [193].
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid. It is certainly arguable that there is a categorical slippage in French J's reasoning between popular sovereignty and national sovereignty. This raises a number of complex questions that are briefly considered below but are outside the scope of the main theme of this paper.
138 Ibid, citing Davis (1988) 166 CLR 79.
139 Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83 (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).
140 (2001) 110 FCR 491, 543 [193].
141 Charter of the United Nations art 1(2).
142 Grimm, Sovereignty, above n 2, 128.
143 Ibid 120.
144 See Joseph Raz, ‘The Future of State Sovereignty’ (2016) (unpublished manuscript).
145 See, eg, Michael, Walzer, ‘The Distribution of Membership’ in Peter, G Brown and Henry, Shue (eds.) Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (Rowman and Littlefield, 1981) 1–35Google Scholar.
146 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
147 The argument is obviously open to other challenges, particularly from a cosmopolitan viewpoint of the kind found in, for instance, Thomas, Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’ (1992) 103 Ethics 48Google Scholar and Joseph, H. Carens: ‘Aliens and Citizens: the Case for Open Borders’ (1987) 49 The Review of Politics 251Google Scholar.
148 An interesting question—outside the scope of this paper—is the relationship between the conceptions of popular sovereignty outlined in section 2 and the symbolic level of foundational myths and narratives.
149 Margit, Cohn, ‘Non-Statutory Executive Powers: Assessing Global Constitutionalism in a Structural-Institutional Context’ (2015) 64 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65, 69Google Scholar.
150 Ibid 101. On the simultaneous mutual dependence and antithetical relationship of the modern constitution and executive power see Harvey, C Mansfield Jr, Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power (John Hopkins University Press, 1993) 181Google Scholar.
151 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, first published 1680, 1993 ed) ii, §159.
152 Ibid ii, §147.
153 Ibid ii, §160.
154 See John, Finnis, ‘Nationality and Alienage’ in Human Rights and Common Good: Collected Essays III (Oxford University Press, 2011) 139Google Scholar.
155 Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83 (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).
156 Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Duncker & Humboldt, first published 1931, 1996 ed).
157 Vinx, above n 49, 103. Vinx's conception of legitimacy derives from Jeremy, Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346Google Scholar.
158 Vinx, above n 49, 103.
159 Winterton, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Continuity’ above n 6, 12–13.
160 Nicholas, Aroney, ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2012 Term—Explanatory Power and the Modalities of Constitutional Reasoning’ (2013) 36 University of New South Wales Law Journal 863, 881Google Scholar. On parliamentary supremacy see Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions for New South Wales (1996) 189 CLR 51, 74 (Dawson J) and Katinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 355.
161 Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, [136] (Gummow and Bell JJ).
162 Aroney, ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2012 Term’, above n 160, 881. The High Court has asserted the centrality of responsible government to Australian constitutional arrangements over a long duration. See Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 146–7; R v Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermakers’ Society (1956) 94 CLR 254, 275; Marks v Commonwealth (1964) 111 CLR 549, 557–8; New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 364–5; Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 384, 405–6; Salemi v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (Cth) [No 2] (1977) 137 CLR 396, 403; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54, 87; FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342; Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424. See also the discussion in Winterton, ‘The Relationship Between Commonwealth Legislative and Executive Power’, above n 21, 41 and 44 and Saunders, ‘Democracy, Liberty and the Prerogative’, above n 88, 368–9.
163 Ingeborg, Maus, Über Volkssouveränität—Elemente einer Demokratietheorie (Suhrkamp, 2011) 8, 108Google Scholar.
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165 Ibid. See also Edmund, S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (W W Norton and Company, 1988)Google Scholar.
166 Maus, above n 163, 108.
167 Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 217–239 [85]–[166] (Gummow and Bell JJ).
168 Ibid 232 [136]. See Appleby and McDonald, above n 82.
169 Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 216–7 [83] (French CJ), 235–6 [148] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 357 [542] (Crennan J).
170 Ibid 341–2 [481] (Hayne J), 362 [559] (Kiefel J). See also Shipra, Chordia, Andrew, Lynch and George, Williams, ‘Williams v Commonwealth: Commonwealth Executive Power and Australian Federalism’ (2013) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 189, 190–1Google Scholar.
171 (2015) 255 CLR 514.
172 Ibid 596 [260].
173 Ibid.
174 (2016) 257 CLR 42.
175 Ibid 138.
176 (1975) 134 CLR 338.
177 Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 23, 292.
178 Evans, ‘The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’, above n 103, 99. An important related issue that there is insufficient space to discuss here is the implications of my argument for French J's assertion in Vadarlis that there must be a ‘clear and unambiguous intention’ per Barton for the abrogation of inherent executive power i.e. a stronger requirement for the displacement of the prerogative by legislation than the ‘covering the same subject matter’ test of De Keyser. See Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’, above n 23, 292; Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477; Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508.