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Gone but not Forgotten: In Defence of Hickman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Jacob Waller*
Affiliation:
BA, LLB (Hons) (Monash

Abstract

Judicial review of executive action is the stage upon which all three arms of government engage in stark interplay. The High Court, by virtue of s 75(v) of the Constitution, is vested with supervisory jurisdiction to undertake judicial review of executive action and to grant the constitutional writs of mandamus, prohibition and injunction. However, for centuries, legislatures have enacted privative clauses designed to limit the ability of courts to perform this function, thereby unshackling the executive from judicial restraint. In 1945, the authoritative approach in Australia to construing such clauses was established in the case of Hickman. This approach was substantially overturned by the High Court in 2003 in the case of Plaintiff S157. In this much lauded case, the High Court recognised that s 75(v) amounts to an ‘entrenched minimum provision of judicial review’ and constitutes ‘textual reinforcement’ of the rule of law. Notwithstanding this strong stance, by 2008 the High Court had given effect to a so-called no-invalidity clause which, although conceptually different from the privative clause, enabled Parliament to evade the reach of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction. This paper seeks to defend Hickman on its own terms, arguing that it is consistent with the modern jurisprudence on statutory interpretation. It then proceeds to criticise the soundness of Plaintiff S157. Finally, it claims that a return to Hickman represents the best way in which to construe no-invalidity clauses.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

A previous version of this article was submitted for assessment in the Honours program at Monash University. I thank Dr Lisa Burton Crawford and Associate Professor Patrick Emerton for their guidance. I also thank Emeritus Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Emeritus Professor Mark Aronson and the anonymous referees for their constructive comments.

References

1 See Aronson, Mark, Groves, Matthew and Weeks, Greg, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2017) 1058–9Google Scholar.

2 R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 (‘Hickman’).

3 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 (‘Plaintiff S157’).

4 Crawford, Lisa Burton, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution (Federation Press, 2017) 111Google Scholar.

5 Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33 (6 September 2017) [45] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ), [118]–[120] (Edelman J) (‘Graham’). The plurality judgment does not explicitly reference Hickman but cites Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168, 194 (‘Richard Walter’) at which Brennan J deals exclusively with the Hickman approach in general terms.

6 As to the terminology ‘no-invalidity clause’ see below n 21.

7 Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 (‘Project Blue Sky’).

8 National Security (Coal Mining Industry Employment) Regulations 1941 (Cth) reg 17.

9 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 614.

10 Commonwealth Constitution. Subsection (v) is in some respects coextensive with s 75(iii).

11 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616.

12 R v Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 CLR 387, 398 (‘Murray’).

13 Ibid (emphasis added). See also Graham [2017] HCA 33 (6 September 2017) [45] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

14 For an early consideration of the operation of privative clauses by English courts, see Colonial Bank of Australasia v Willan (1874) LR 5 PC 417, 442–3 (‘Willan’). See also Clancy v Butchers’ Shop Employees Union (1904) 1 CLR 181 and Baxter v New South Wales Clickers’ Association (1909) 10 CLR 114 in which the High Court read down privative clauses without reference or recourse to s 75(v).

15 See Boughey, Janina and Crawford, Lisa Burton, ‘Jurisdictional Error: Do We Really Need It?’ in Elliott, Mark, Varuhas, Jason NE and Stark, Shona Wilson (eds), The Unity of Public Law? Doctrinal, Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2018) 395Google Scholar in which the authors consider various bases, beyond constitutional entrenchment under s 75(v), for distinguishing between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error. Although the authors do not consider the question, these bases can be extrapolated to provide the reasons, beyond the constitutional limitation, for why privative clauses often may not be understood literally.

16 R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Workers’ Union (1983) 153 CLR 415, 418 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J) (‘Coldham’). Dixon J did not himself use this terminology.

17 As to the inconsistency, see below nn 23–6 and accompanying text. Subsequent authority has sought to classify the Hickman approach as merely one of construction, without any connection to questions of constitutionality: see, eg, Richard Walter (1995) 183 CLR 168, 180 (Mason CJ); Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602, 631 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 501; Graham [2017] HCA 33 (6 September 2017) [45] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). Kirk, Jeremy, ‘Administrative Justice and the Australian Constitution’ in Creyke, Robin and McMillan, John (eds), Administrative Justice—The Core and the Fringe (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 2000) 78, 90–1Google Scholar.

18 Murray (1949) 77 CLR 387, 398.

19 Ibid.

20 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 614.

21 The term ‘no-invalidity clause’ was coined by Leighton McDonald in ‘The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 14, 15. Therefore, attaching the term to Dixon J's judgment is somewhat anachronistic. However, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 175 has contained a no-invalidity clause since its enactment in 1936. Privative clauses are likely much older, its earliest form dating back to at least the 18th century: see Rubinstein, Amnon, Jurisdiction and Illegality: A Study in Public Law (Clarendon Press, 1965), 71–3Google Scholar, cited in Burton, Lisa, ‘Why These Three—The Significance of the Selection of Remedies in Section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution’ (2014) 42 Federal Law Review 253, 262 n 54CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Regarding no-invalidity clauses generally, see Crawford, Lisa Burton, ‘Who Decides the Validity of Executive Action? No-Invalidity Clauses and the Separation of Powers’ (2017) 24 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 81, 83–6Google Scholar.

22 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 614.

23 Richard Walter (1995) 183 CLR 168, 194.

24 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616.

25 Coldham (1983) 153 CLR 415, 418.

26 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616.

27 Murray (1949) 77 CLR 387, 399.

28 See (1945) 70 CLR 598, 615. For an authoritative discussion of the Hickman decision see Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 1, 1055.

29 (1949) 77 CLR 387, 399–400.

30 Ibid 400.

31 Whether or not this second step is inherent within the three existing provisos has been the subject of some judicial observation: see, eg, O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 232, 274 (Brennan J), 305 (Dawson J); Mitchforce Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2003) 57 NSWLR 212, 232 (Spigelman CJ).

32 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 618.

33 The effect of the Hickman approach on the availability of remedies for non-jurisdictional errors is not considered in this article.

34 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, 351; SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294, 319, 345–6, 353–4; Chief JusticeFrench, Robert, ‘Constitutional Review of Executive Decisions: Australia's US Legacy’ (2010) 35 University of Western Australia Law Review 35, 39–40Google Scholar; O’Donnell, Benjamin, ‘Jurisdictional Error, Invalidity and the Role of Injunction in s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution’ (2007) 28 Australian Bar Review 291, 313–26Google Scholar; Leeming, Mark, ‘The Riddle of Jurisdictional Error’ (2014) 38 Australian Bar Review 139Google Scholar.

35 Murray (1949) 77 CLR 387, 398.

36 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146, 168 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) (‘Futuris’).

37 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 501 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

38 Ibid.

39 See above n 28.

40 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 502 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) (citations omitted).

41 Migration Act s 474(2).

42 The term ‘constructional choice’ is borrowed from Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 50 (French CJ) (‘Momcilovic’); see also below n 80 and accompanying text.

43 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 506 (citations omitted).

44 Ibid 505–6 (emphasis added).

45 Ibid 506.

46 Ibid 504. But see McDonald, above n 21, 17 where he observes that ‘the post-Plaintiff S157 litigation history … has demonstrated that the Migration Act privative clause has, in practical effect, been read out of the legislation’.

47 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 490–4 (Gleeson CJ).

48 Ibid 508 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

49 See below nn 116–18 and accompanying text.

50 SirMason, Anthony, ‘The Analytical Foundations, Scope and Comparative Analysis of the Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ in Lindell, Geoffrey (ed), The Mason Papers (Federation Press, 2007) 180, 188Google ScholarPubMed.

51 Keane, Pat, ‘Judicial Power and the Limits of Judicial Control’ in Cane, Peter (ed), Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia (LexisNexis, 2004) 295, 310Google Scholar.

52 (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384.

53 Ibid (citations omitted).

54 See, eg, A-G (Vic) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 267 (Dixon J); Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins (2000) 202 CLR 629, 644 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) (‘Residual Assco’).

55 Breaches of constitutional limitations would still be reviewable, however, see Zines, Leslie, ‘Constitutional Aspects of Judicial Review of Administrative Actions’ (1998) 1 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 50, 52Google Scholar.

56 See Crawford, ‘Who Decides the Validity of Executive Action’, above n 21, 98 in which the author notes that ‘[i]t is an exclusively judicial function to ascertain the validity of executive action’.

57 Graham [2017] HCA 33 (6 September 2017) [47]–[48]. But see Edelman J's dissent at [185] in which he notes that this is a novel claim about which no submissions were made by either party.

58 I thank Patrick Emerton for this suggestion. This does not necessarily conflict with the plurality view in Graham given the different types of clauses in question in that case, which do not as readily give rise to an implication of repeal

59 Coldham (1983) 153 CLR 415, 418.

60 (1874) LR 5 PC 417. See, eg, Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 487–8 (Gleeson CJ), 531–2 (Callinan J); H W R Wade and C F Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 9th ed, 2004) 727.

61 Willan (1874) LR 5 PC 417, 442.

62 See extensive authority cited in Roos, Oscar, ‘Accepted Doctrine at the Time of Federation and Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 781, 790–2Google Scholar; see also Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 533–4 (Callinan J).

63 Murray (1949) 77 CLR 387, 400.

64 Willan (1874) LR 5 PC 417, 442.

65 See cases and academic commentary cited in Roos, above n 62, 791 nn 58–9.

66 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15A (‘Interpretation Act’).

67 Residual Assco (2000) 202 CLR 629, 644 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), quoting United States v Hutcheson 312 US 219, 235 (Frankfurter J) (1941); see also Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 352, 381 (Gageler J); but see dicta of French CJ and Gageler J cautioning misuse of this principle in International Finan ce Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319, 349 (French CJ) and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569, 604–5 (Gageler J); below nn 96–7 and accompanying text; see also the similar rule against rendering words nugatory discussed below n 76 and accompanying text.

68 See above nn 12–13 and 54–8 and accompanying text.

69 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 369 (‘Bank Nationalisation Case’).

70 Ibid 370.

71 Ibid; see also Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508, 585–8 (Gageler J).

72 Bank Nationalisation Case (1948) 76 CLR 1, 371.

73 Ibid (emphasis added).

74 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1, 241 (Kirby J) (‘Work Choices’); see also Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323, 339 (Brennan J); Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 392 (Brennan CJ and Toohey J); see also below nn 143–5 and accompanying text regarding s 3A of the Migration Act.

75 Bank Nationalisation Case (1948) 76 CLR 1, 371.

76 Project Blue Sky (1998) 194 CLR 355, 382, quoting Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405, 414; see also O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 232, 273–4 in which Brennan J made a similar argument.

77 Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 592 (emphasis added).

78 Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378, 389 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

79 Ibid 390 (citations omitted).

80 Chief JusticeFrench, Robert, ‘The Courts and the Parliament’ (2013) 87 Australian Law Journal 820, 824Google Scholar; see also French CJ's comments in Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1, 50. This bears certain similarities to the well-known distinction between ‘[the] core of certainty and [the] penumbra of doubt’ articulated in Hart, H L A, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 123Google Scholar.

81 French, ‘The Courts and the Parliament’, above n 80, 824.

82 Ibid; Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1, 50.

83 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616.

84 Residual Assco (2000) 202 CLR 629, 644 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), quoting Cabell v Markham 148 F 2d 737, 739 (2nd Cir, 1945).

85 See above nn 59–63 and accompanying text.

86 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 (‘Industrial Relations Act Case’).

87 But see above n 67 and accompanying text.

88 (1998) 194 CLR 355, 390–1 (citations omitted).

89 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616 (emphasis added); see also Bateman, Will, ‘The Constitution and the Substantive Principles of Judicial Review: The Full Scope of the Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review’ (2011) 39 Federal Law Review 463, 479CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

90 Project Blue Sky (1998) 194 CLR 355, 382.

91 R v Metal Trades Employers’ Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1951) 82 CLR 208, 248

92 These terms are borrowed from the judgment in Project Blue Sky (1998) 194 CLR 355, 382 and applied to the current context.

93 Ibid 381.

94 Coldham (1983) 153 CLR 415, 418; Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 617.

95 See, eg, Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 142 (Hayne J); Graham [2017] HCA 33 (6 September 2017) [45].

96 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616; Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 504; see also Interpretation Act s 15A.

97 Residual Assco (2000) 202 CLR 629, 644 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), quoting United States v Hutcheson 312 US 219, 235 (Frankfurter J) (1941); Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 352, 381 (Gageler J); see also Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297, 321 (Mason and Wilson JJ).

98 International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319, 349 (French CJ); North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569, 604–5 (Gageler J).

99 Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616; Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 504.

100 Dixon J's interpretation of the other writs mentioned in the privative clause which may be available for non-jurisdictional errors, such as injunction, is not considered in this article.

101 Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v Aberfield Coal Mining Co Ltd (1942) 66 CLR 161, 182 (Starke J).

102 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 506.

103 Ibid 501.

104 See Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, ‘Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution’ in Lindell, Geoffrey (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (Federation Press, 1994) 150, 154, 157–61Google Scholar; Emerton, Patrick, ‘Freedoms and Entitlements in the Australian Constitution—An Example of Referential Intentions Yielding Unintended Consequences’ (2010) 38 Federal Law Review 169, 173CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

105 Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v Aberfield Coal Mining Co Ltd (1942) 66 CLR 161, 182 (emphasis added).

106 Ibid. While the lawfulness of administrative action has been substantially constrained since 1942, owing to the expanding category of jurisdictional errors, the principle that administrative action derives its legal force from the instrument remains fundamentally the same: see, eg, Gageler, Stephen, ‘Legitimate Expectation: Comment on the Article by the Hon Sir Anthony Mason AC KBE’ (2005) 12 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 111, 114Google Scholar.

107 Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v Aberfield Coal Mining Co Ltd (1942) 66 CLR 161, 182.

108 (1945) 70 CLR 598, 615 (emphasis added).

109 Ibid.

110 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 506.

111 O’Donnell, above n 34, 313–14.

112 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597, 616 (‘Bhardwaj’).

113 Gaudron and Gummow JJ were both members of the Plaintiff S157 plurality. McHugh J concurred with Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597, 618, and he too was a member of the Plaintiff S157 plurality.

114 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 506; see above nn 41–3 and accompanying text.

115 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 506.

116 Above nn 41–3 and accompanying text.

117 For more on s 3A see below n 143–5 and accompanying text.

118 Project Blue Sky (1998) 194 CLR 355, 382, quoting Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405, 414; see O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 232, 273–4 in which Brennan J makes a similar argument; see above n 76.

119 See Roos, above n 62, 790–2.

120 Gageler, Stephen, ‘The Legitimate Scope of Judicial Review’ (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 279, 289Google Scholar, citing Richard Walter (1995) 183 CLR 168, 194 and Darling Casino Ltd v New South Wales Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602, 633.

121 See also Campbell, Colin D, ‘An Examination of the Provisions of the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 4) 1997 Purporting to Limit Judicial Review’ (1998) 5 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 135, 147–8Google Scholar which analysed the likely legal effect of the amending Bill and proceeded upon the assumption that Hickman was authoritative.

122 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 September 2001, 31559 (Philip Ruddock).

123 Ibid 31561.

124 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 499.

125 (1987) 162 CLR 574.

126 Ibid 594; see also Public Service Association of New South Wales v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (1985) 1 NSWLR 627, 640 (Kirby P).

127 See, eg, Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 455–6; Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 592. Note, however, that this scepticism is much disputed: see especially Ekins, Richard and Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, ‘The Reality and Indispensability of Legislative Intentions’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 39Google Scholar.

128 Project Blue Sky (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384.

129 NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 123 FCR 298, 412 (emphasis added).

130 Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297, 321 (Mason and Wilson JJ).

131 Goldsworthy, ‘Implications’, above n 104, 182.

132 Emerton, above n 104, 178.

133 Ibid 179.

134 Ibid 180. Although Dixon J saw his approach as a continuation of existing authority, his judgment in Hickman was widely considered the critical judgment in establishing the approach to privative clauses.

135 Ibid 180 n 42 (citations omitted).

136 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 482.

137 David Dyzenhaus, ‘Disobeying Parliament? Privative Clauses and the Rule of Law’ in Richard W Bauman and Tsvi Kahana (eds), The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 508.

138 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 476, quoting Migration Act s 474(2).

139 See, eg, Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378, 393; Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146, 177–9 (Kirby J); Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 608 (Gummow J), 638–9 (Hayne J); Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144, 193–202; Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security (2012) 251 CLR 1, 59–60 (Gummow J).

140 See above nn 77–81 and accompanying text.

141 See above nn 57–8 and accompanying text regarding whether Graham would require all federal courts to be afforded the same constitutionally protected jurisdiction.

142 Industrial Relations Act Case (1996) 187 CLR 416, 502–3.

143 Graham [2017] HCA 33 (6 September 2017) [66]. The plurality in Graham also extended the protection to federal courts exercising the same jurisdiction, but see above nn 55–6 and accompanying text.

144 Transcript of Proceedings, Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth [2002] HCATrans 420 (3 September 2002) 739–817.

145 Ibid.

146 See above nn 66–74 and accompanying text.

147 Migration Act s 474(2).

148 R v Secretary of State for Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131.

149 O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 232, 249 (Mason CJ). See also Aronson, Mark, Dyer, Bruce and Groves, Matthew, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Lawbook, 4th ed, 2009) 970Google Scholar at which the authors note that the Hickman approach ‘was used to cure what would otherwise have been jurisdictional error in only eight cases (at most)’. It is also noteworthy that in oral argument before the High Court shortly after Plaintiff S157, Gummow J described the Hickman requirement of bona fides as ‘a piece of verbal mysticism’ with which the Court did ‘the best [they] could’: see Transcript of Proceedings, MIMIA v SGLB [2004] HCATrans 9 (12 February 2004).

150 See above nn 121–2 and accompanying text.

151 On the interplay between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law see Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 57–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

152 Australian Railways Union v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1930) 44 CLR 319, 386 (Rich, Starke and Dixon JJ).

153 Bank Nationalisation Case (1948) 76 CLR 1, 372.

154 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513, citing Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193.

155 Kerr, Duncan and Williams, George, ‘Review of Executive Action and the Rule of Law under the Australian Constitution’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 219, 224Google Scholar; but see Graham [2017] HCA 33 (6 September 2017) [105]–[107] (Edelman J).

156 Crawford, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution, above n 4, 110.

157 See McDonald, above n 21.

158 (1998) 194 CLR 355, 390; Mark Aronson, ‘Nullity’ in M Groves (ed), Law and Government in Australia (Federation Press, 2005) 139, 154–5.

159 This is the language used in Project Blue Sky (1998) 194 CLR 355, 390.

160 (2002) 209 CLR 597, 613, quoted in Aronson, ‘Nullity’, above n 158, 154.

161 Although Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212 (‘Palme’) was also decided after Plaintiff S157, it concerned a much narrower no-invalidity clause. For some discussion of Palme, see below nn 168–72 and accompanying text.

162 Section 175 provided that ‘[t]he validity of any assessment shall not be affected by reason that any of the provisions of this Act have not been complied with’.

163 Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146, 157 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

164 Ibid 154.

165 Ibid 157.

166 It has been suggested that the existence of the alternative avenues of review does not affect the interpretation of the no-invalidity clause but its constitutional validity. That is, some supervisory jurisdiction is constitutionally required, but it can be transferred to a court of limited jurisdiction: see Basten, John, ‘The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts’, (2011) 85 Australian Law Journal 273, 298Google Scholar. This is, however, not apparent in the Court's reasoning.

167 McDonald, above n 21, 20, citing James Stellios, The Federal Judicature: Chapter III of the Constitution—Commentary and Cases (LexisNexis, 2010) 323–8.

168 That provision provided that ‘[a] failure to comply with this section in relation to a decision does not affect the validity of the decision’.

169 (2003) 216 CLR 212, 225 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ).

170 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 495–6, 514, 538–9.

171 Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212, 247–8 (citation in original); see also Kirby J's dissenting judgment in Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146, 171–2, 182–91. The characterisation of the legislative requirements as ‘surplusage’ is perhaps an overstatement given the availability of the writ of injunction to restrain non-jurisdictional errors.

172 Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212, 251.

173 Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 1, 1056.

174 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513.

175 This language is taken from Crawford, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution, above n 4, 121.

176 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513.

177 Kirk, Jeremy, ‘The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review’ (2004) 12 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 64Google Scholar; O’Donnell, above n 34; McDonald, above n 21; Bateman, above n 89; Noonan, Charles, ‘Section 75(v), No-Invalidity Clauses and the Rule of Law’ (2013) 36 University of New South Wales Law Journal 437, 460–7Google Scholar; Crawford, ‘Who Decides the Validity of Executive Action’, above n 21.

178 Richard Walter (1995) 183 CLR 168, 205.

179 Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319, 325 (‘Plaintiff M61’). Graham [2017] HCA 33 (6 September 2017) and Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651 may appear to lend support to the more substantive conception of s 75(v) but both those cases were exceptional insofar as they concerned very specific and extreme restrictions on the Court's review jurisdiction rather than the scope of the conferral of power.

180 Plaintiff M61 (2010) 243 CLR 319, 347; see also Graham [2017] HCA 33 (6 September 2017) [106]–[107] (Edelman J).

181 (1945) 70 CLR 598, 618.

182 Crawford, ‘Who Decides the Validity of Executive Action’, above n 21, 98; see also Crawford, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution, above n 4, 125; Gouliaditis, Nicholas, ‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (2010) 34 University of Melbourne Law Review 870, 882Google Scholar.

183 See above nn 20–2 and accompanying text.

184 Cf Richard Walter (1995) 183 CLR 168, 222–3 (Toohey J), 240 (McHugh J).

185 See above nn 13–17 and accompanying text.

186 (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381.

187 Coldham (1983) 153 CLR 415, 418 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J).

188 Murray (1949) 77 CLR 387, 399.

189 See above nn 28–32 and accompanying text.

190 See above nn 59–63 and accompanying text.

191 Murray (1949) 77 CLR 387, 400 (Dixon J).

192 Ibid.

193 R v Metal Trades Employers’ Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1951) 82 CLR 208, 248 (Dixon J).

194 This is the language adopted by Kirby J to describe the unacceptable effect of the no-invalidity clauses in Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146, 183.

195 (1998) 194 CLR 355, 382.

196 See Murray (1949) 77 CLR 387, 400.

197 Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146, 167 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

198 Ibid 168.

199 Richard Walter (1995) 183 CLR 168, 179–80 (Mason CJ), 188, 193–9 (Brennan J), 210–13 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). But see Campbell, above n 121, 145 who suggests that although Mason CJ made reference to the Hickman approach, it was not operative in his conclusion.

200 (2008) 237 CLR 146, 167.

201 Ibid 164–5.

202 Ibid 157.

203 The Court, in fact, also held that the clause did not apply to tentative or provisional assessments: Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146, 162–4.

204 Coal Miners’ Industrial Union of Workers of Western Australia v Amalgamated Collieries of Western Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 437, 455 (Menzies J).

205 Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 1, 1066.

206 Wade and Forsyth, above n 60, 727.