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Constitutional Influences on State and Territory Lawmaking: An Empirical Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Anna Olijnyk  and
Gabrielle Appleby
Anna Olijnyk
Affiliation:
Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide
Gabrielle Appleby
Affiliation:
The Judiciary Project, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law
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Abstract

This article focuses on an under-studied aspect of the constraints emerging from ch III of the Australian Constitution: the effect of those constraints on law- and policy-making within the executive. Drawing on interviews with key actors in state and territory lawmaking, this article uses three case studies to examine the way in which ch III constraints have influenced the development of law and policy. The actions of governments in each case study are evaluated against a normative model of constitutional deliberation by the executive. The article concludes by identifying the legal, political and personal factors that influence the way in which state and territory executives engage with constitutional issues.

Type
Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 231 - 258
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

The research in this article is supported by Australian Research Council Discovery Project 140101218, ‘Law, Order and Federalism’.

References

1 See, eg, International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319; Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 (‘Kirk’); Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1; South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 (‘Totani’); Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 (‘Wainohu’); Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38; Kuczborski v Queensland (2014) 254 CLR 51.

2 See, eg, Stellios, James, The Federal Judicature (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010)Google Scholar; Appleby, Gabrielle and Williams, John M, ‘A New Coat of Paint: Law and Order and the Refurbishment of Kable’ (2012) 40 Federal Law Review 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ratnapala, Suri and Crowe, Jonathan, ‘Broadening the Reach of Chapter III: The Institutional Integrity of State Courts and the Constitutional Limits of State Legislative Power’ (2012) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 175Google Scholar; Roos, Oscar I, ‘Accepted Doctrine at the Time of Federation and Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 781Google Scholar; Murray, Sarah, The Remaking of the Courts: Less-Adversarial Practice and the Constitutional Role of the Judiciary in Australia (Federation Press, 2014)Google Scholar; Irving, Helen, ‘State Jurisdictional Residue: What Remains to a State Court when its Chapter III Functions are Exhausted?’ (2014) 42 Federal Law Review 121CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ananian-Welsh, Rebecca, ‘Kuczborski v Queensland and the Scope of the Kable Doctrine’ (2015) 34 University of Queensland Law Journal 47Google Scholar; Wheeler, Fiona, ‘Constitutional Limits on Extra-Judicial Activity by State Judges: Wainohu and Conundrums of Incompatibility’ (2015) 37 Sydney Law Review 301Google Scholar.

3 For the exceptions, see our own previous work, including Appleby, Gabrielle and Olijnyk, Anna, ‘Parliamentary Deliberation on Constitutional Limits in the Legislative Process’ (2017) 40 University of New South Wales Law Journal 976CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Appleby, Gabrielle and Olijnyk, Anna, ‘Constitutional Deliberation in the Legislative Process’ in Levy, Ron et al (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2018)Google Scholar; Appleby, Gabrielle, ‘Institutional Costs of Judicial Independence’ in Ananian-Welsh, Rebecca et al (eds), Judicial Independence in Australia: Contemporary Challenges, Future Directions (Federation Press, 2016) 141Google Scholar; Appleby, Gabrielle and Olijnyk, Anna, ‘The Impact of Uncertain Constitutional Norms on Government Policy: Tribunal Design after Kirk’ (2015) 26 Public Law Review 91Google Scholar; Appleby, Gabrielle and Olijnyk, Anna, ‘Parliament's Role in Constitutional Interpretation’ (2013) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 255Google Scholar.

4 Further details of the methodology are provided in the Appendix to this article.

5 Flyvbjerg, Bent, Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Murphy, Brendon and McGee, Jeffrey, ‘Phronetic Legal Inquiry: An Effective Design for Law and Society Research?’ (2015) 24 Griffith Law Review 288CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Appleby and Olijnyk, ‘Constitutional Deliberation’, above n 3; Appleby and Olijnyk, ‘Parliamentary Deliberation’, above n 3.

7 Our observations in this regard point to the dangers of adopting entirely ‘red light’ or ‘green light’ perspectives on the relationship between law and government actions, to refer to the terms that are more familiar in the administrative law arena. For the classic statements of these theories, see Harlow, Carol and Rawlings, Richard, Law and Administration (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1st ed, 1984) chs 1–2Google Scholar.

8 Consider, for example, the effect on Australian constitutional law of Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, and other landmark constitutional cases considering laws that press at the previously understood boundaries of constitutional power.

9 Tushnet, Mark, ‘Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty’ (1995) 94 Michigan Law Review 245, 247CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 See Department of Justice (Victoria), Protocol for Briefing the Solicitor-General (28 July 2011) [3]–[4]; Tasmania, Attorney-General, Guidelines for Seeking Advice from the Office of the Solicitor-General (The Hon Brian Wightman MP, February 2012) [3]; Appleby, Gabrielle, The Role of the Solicitor-General: Negotiating Law, Politics and the Public Interest (Hart Publishing, 2016) 180Google Scholar.

11 See, eg, at the Commonwealth level, Parliamentary Counsel, Drafting Direction (June 2015) <:https://www.opc.gov.au/about/docs/drafting_series/DD4.2.pdf>.

12 Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW); Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2010 (NSW); Serious Crime Control Act 2009 (NT); Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld); Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA); Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (Vic); Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (WA).

13 (1996) 189 CLR 51 (‘Kable’).

14 The distinction between rights determination and rights creation is central to the concept of judicial power in Australia: see, eg, Stellios, above n 2, 117 [4.16], 133 [4.47], 207 [4.162].

15 See Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 596–7 [34] (McHugh J); Kuczborski v Queensland (2014) 254 CLR 51, 118–19 [224]–[227].

16 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 97–8 (Toohey J), 106–7 (Gaudron J), 122–3 (McHugh J), 132–4 (Gummow J).

17 See, eg, Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 588–90 [7]–[14], 592 [20] (Gleeson CJ), 609–14 [70]–[84] (Gummow J), 654 [216]–[217] (Callinan and Heydon JJ).

18 See, eg, Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) s 14(1) (as originally enacted).

19 See Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Legislative Arrangements to Outlaw Serious and Organised Crime Groups (2009), 19 [2.52], 56 [4.16].

20 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501; Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (WA) (2008) 234 CLR 532.

21 See, eg, Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 122 (McHugh J), 108 (Gaudron J); Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 592 (Gleeson CJ).

22 Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA).

23 Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW).

24 Such as the limitation of the principle to cases in which a state court was exercising federal jurisdiction (Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 94–5 (Toohey J)) and the reliance on public confidence in the courts as an indicator of invalidity (Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 98 (Toohey J), 107 (Gaudron J); cf Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 617–18 [102] (Gummow J).

25 See Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 76 [63] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ).

26 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513; Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501; Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45; Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (WA) (2008) 234 CLR 532; Silbert v DPP (WA) (2004) 217 CLR 181.

27 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1; Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181.

28 Interview with Participant B.

29 Interview with Michael Atkinson, former South Australian Attorney-General (Croydon, 5 June 2015); Interview with Chief Justice Chris Kourakis, former South Australian Solicitor-General (Adelaide, 20 March 2015); Interview with Justice Greg Parker, former South Australian Crown Solicitor (Adelaide, 20 March 2015); Interview with Participant A; Interview with Participant B.

30 The Magistrates Court was, under s 14(1) of the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA), required to make a control order if the defendant was a member of a criminal organisation.

31 Interview with Participant A.

32 The retired judge option was the preference of then-Crown Solicitor, Greg Parker: Interview with Justice Greg Parker, former South Australian Crown Solicitor (Adelaide, 20 March 2015).

33 Ibid.

34 Interview with Michael Atkinson, former South Australian Attorney-General (Croydon, 5 June 2015).

35 Interview with Chief Justice Chris Kourakis, former South Australian Solicitor-General (Adelaide, 20 March 2015).

36 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 April 2009, 14440 (Nathan Rees, Premier).

37 Interview with Michael Sexton, New South Wales Solicitor-General (Sydney, 15 September 2015).

38 Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) s 5.

39 Cf Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (WA) (2008) 234 CLR 532 and K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501.

40 Participant D.

41 Totani v South Australia (2009) 105 SASR 244. The provision held invalid was Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) s 14(1), which required the Magistrates Court to make a control order if satisfied the defendant was a member of an organisation that was the subject of a declaration by the Attorney-General.

42 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1.

43 International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319 (‘IFTC’).

44 (2011) 243 CLR 181.

45 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 535 [54] (Kirby J).

46 See, eg, Sean Fewster and Adam Todd, ‘High Court Throws Out South Australian Government's Anti-Bikie Laws’, The Advertiser (Adelaide), 12 November 2010; South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 11 November 2010, 2031 (Isobel Redmond, Leader of the Opposition).

47 See, eg, Appleby and Williams, above n 2.

48 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 47–8, quoting Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 618 [104] (Gummow J).

49 Interview with Participant S.

50 Appleby, Gabrielle ‘The High Court and Kable—A Study in Federalism and Human Rights Protection’ (2014) 40 Monash University Law Review 673Google Scholar.

51 Northern Territory, Parliamentary Debates, 11 June 2009, 3191 (Delia Lawrie, Attorney-General).

52 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 29 October 2009, 3030 (Cameron Dick, Attorney-General).

53 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 15 February 2012, 78 (John Rau, Attorney-General).

54 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 15 February 2012, 8279 (Greg Smith, Attorney-General).

55 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 November 2011, 9678 (Christian Porter, Attorney-General).

56 Interview with Participant B.

57 Interview with Michael Grant (Darwin, 13 August 2015).

58 Interview with Participant C.

59 Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 220 [72] (French CJ and Kiefel J), 230 [110]–[111] (Gummow, Hayne Crennan and Bell JJ).

60 Interview with John Rau, South Australian Attorney-General (Adelaide, 6 August 2015).

61 Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (WA) s 26.

62 Interview with Participant F.

63 Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2012 (SA) s 16, as repealed by Serious and Organised Crime (Control) (Declared Organisations) Amendment Act 2013 (SA) s 13.

64 Interview with Participant C.

65 Ibid.

66 Interview with Michael Grant (Darwin, 13 August 2015).

67 Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) s 18(1).

68 Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (Vic) s 43.

69 These included, for example, Queensland's Criminal Organisation Public Interest Monitor (Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) pt 6 div 7) and Victoria's ‘special counsel’ (Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (Vic) ss 71, 79).

70 See Stephenson, Scott, ‘Federalism and Rights Deliberation’ (2014) 38 Melbourne University Law Review 709, 743–4, 734–5 n 160Google Scholar.

71 Interview with Robert Clark, former Victorian Attorney-General (Box Hill, 25 August 2015).

72 Ibid.

73 Interview with Participant G.

74 See, eg, Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 November 2012, 5284–5, 5287, 5290.

75 Interview with Peter Garrisson, ACT Solicitor-General (Canberra, 29 September 2015); Interview with Leigh Sealy, former Tasmanian Solicitor-General (Hobart, 3 February 2016).

76 (2013) 252 CLR 38 (‘Pompano’).

77 Serious and Organised Crime (Control) (Declared Organisations) Amendment Act 2013 (SA); Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Amendment Act 2013 (NSW).

78 For example, that members of the organisation associate for the purposes of organising serious criminal activity and pose a risk to public safety.

79 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336.

80 Interview with Michael Grant (Darwin, 13 August 2015); Interview with Participant J.

81 Interview with Michael Grant (Darwin, 13 August 2015).

82 Ibid.

83 Interview with Participant J.

84 Interview with John Rau, South Australian Attorney-General (Adelaide, 6 August 2015).

85 Interview with Martin Hinton, South Australian Solicitor-General (Adelaide, 20 April 2015); Interview with Participant D.

86 Interview with Michael Mischin, Western Australian Attorney-General (Perth, 28 October 2015); Interview with Participant F.

87 Interview with Participant L.

88 Interview with Martin Hinton, South Australian Solicitor-General (Adelaide, 20 April 2015).

89 Pompano (2013) 252 CLR 38, 115 [212].

90 Interview with Michael Grant (Darwin, 13 August 2015).

91 See, eg, Bagaric, Mirko, ‘Separation of Powers Doctrine in Australia: De Facto Human Rights Charter’ (2011) 7 International Journal of Punishment and Sentencing 25Google Scholar.

92 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 93X, as inserted by Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Act 2012 (NSW) item 9; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) pt 14A, as inserted by Statutes Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2012 (SA) item 48; Criminal Organisations Control Amendment (Unlawful Associations) Act 2015 (Vic).

93 For an account of these events, see Taskforce on Organised Crime Legislation, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Qld), Report of the Taskforce on Organised Crime Legislation (2016), 93–5.

94 Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld) s 7(1) (‘VLAD Act’).

95 Ibid s 5(1).

96 Interview with Walter Sofronoff, former Queensland Attorney-General (Brisbane, 7 July 2015).

97 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch1 (‘Queensland Criminal Code’) s 60A.

98 Ibid s 60B.

99 Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) ss 43–7.

100 Ibid pt 2.

101 Ibid sch 1 item 2.

102 Ibid s 41, amending Queensland Criminal Code s 1 (definition of ‘criminal organisation’).

103 Kuczborski v Queensland (2014) 254 CLR 51 (‘Kuczborski’). The plaintiff was held not to have standing to challenge the validity of the VLAD Act, the bail provisions or the aggravating circumstance legislation.

104 This is not the only instance in which ch III limitations have led to powers being conferred on the executive rather than courts, to the detriment of individual rights: see Ananian-Welsh, Rebecca, ‘Extraordinary Powers Without Judicial Oversight: A Separation of Powers Dilemma’ (2016) 27 Public Law Review 249Google Scholar.

105 King, Michael et al, Non-Adversarial Justice (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2014) ch 9Google Scholar.

106 See, ibid 239–44; Freiberg, Arie, ‘Problem-Oriented Courts: Innovative Solutions to Intractable Problems?’ (2001) 11 Journal of Judicial Administration 8, 23Google Scholar.

107 Duffy, James, ‘Problem-Solving Courts, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Constitution: If Two is Company, is Three a Crowd?’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 394, 406–19; Murray, above n 2, 181–97Google Scholar.

108 Murray, above n 2, 175–6; Duffy, above n 107, 397–401; Little, Laura E, ‘Adjudication and Emotion’ (2002) 3 Florida Coastal Law Journal 205, 212Google Scholar.

109 Duffy, above n 107, 395.

110 Bennett, Paul, Specialist Courts for Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders (Federation Press, 2016) 49–51Google Scholar.

111 Ibid 51–3 (characterising the process as ‘collaborative’ rather than ‘power-sharing’); Luke McNamara, ‘The Locus of Decision-Making Authority in Circle Sentencing: The Significance of Criteria and Guidelines’ (2000) 18 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 60, 102–7 (on similar issues in Canadian Indigenous Circle Courts).

112 King et al, above n 105, 257. Murray argues that a constitutional challenge by a participant who receives unfavourable treatment in a specialist court is possible, notwithstanding their consent to the process: Murray, above n 2, 179–80.

113 Interview with Michael Atkinson, former South Australian Attorney-General (Croydon, 5 June 2015); Interview with Participant D; Interview with Participant G.

114 Interview with Michael Mischin, Western Australian Attorney-General (Perth, 28 October 2015); Interview with Justice Greg Parker, former South Australian Crown Solicitor (Adelaide, 20 March 2015); Interview with Participant G; Interview with Participant L.

115 Interview with Jim McGinty (Fremantle, 28 October 2015); Interview with Participant L.

116 Interview with Peter Garrisson, ACT Solicitor-General (Canberra, 29 September 2015); Interview with Participant F.

117 Interview with Peter Garrisson, ACT Solicitor-General (Canberra, 29 September 2015).

118 Interview with Participant Q. Rod Welford also noted the consensual nature of the process: Interview with Rod Welford, former Queensland Attorney-General (by telephone, 29 June 2015).

119 Interview with Rod Welford, former Queensland Attorney-General (by telephone, 29 June 2015).

120 Interview with Participant M.

121 Interview with Michael Atkinson, former South Australian Attorney-General (Croydon, 5 June 2015).

122 Ibid.

123 Interview with Rod Welford, former Queensland Attorney-General (by telephone, 29 June 2015). The Fundamental Legislative Principles are contained in the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4.

124 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) ss 4(2)(a), 4(3)(b).

125 Interview with Matt Foley, former Queensland Attorney-General (Brisbane, 6 July 2015).

126 Interview with Tom Pauling, former Northern Territory Solicitor-General (Darwin, 12 August 2015).

127 Interview with Participant F.

128 Creyke, Robin, ‘Tribunals: Divergence and Loss’ (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 403, 406–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

129 See, eg, Hill, Graeme, ‘State Administrative Tribunals and the Constitutional Definition of “Court”’ (2006) 13 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 103Google Scholar; Rowe, David, ‘State Tribunals Within and Without the Integrated Federal Judicial System’ (2014) 25 Public Law Review 48, 49–54Google Scholar.

130 See, eg, K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501, 528–9 [80]–[86] (French CJ), 535–9 [113]–[131] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).

131 Interview with Matt Foley, former Queensland Attorney-General (Brisbane, 6 July 2015); Interview with Participant L; Interview with government legal advisers Participant M, Participant N and Participant S.

132 Interview with Participant M.

133 Interview with Participant D.

134 Interview with government legal advisers Participant D and Participant M.

135 One participant who had been involved in the creation of a generalist tribunal (Participant T) recalled a strong view that, if the tribunal was not to have a judge as President, it should not be a court.

136 Interview with Participant M.

137 Interview with Martin Hinton, South Australian Solicitor-General (Adelaide, 20 April 2015); Interview with John Rau, South Australian Attorney-General (Adelaide, 6 August 2015); Interviews with government legal advisers Participant D, Participant P and Participant S; Interview with Participant O.

138 Interview with Participant J. Government legal adviser Participant P expressed a similar view.

139 See, eg, A-G (NSW) v 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd (2006) 226 FLR 62; Qantas Airways Ltd v Lustig (2015) 228 FCR 148; Burns v Corbett [No 2] [2017] NSWCA 36 (7 March 2017) (at the time of writing on appeal to the High Court).

140 Constitution s 75(iii); see, eg, Commonwealth v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (Tas) (2008) 169 FCR 85.

141 Constitution s 75(iv).

142 Constitution s 76(ii); Qantas Airways Ltd v Lustig (2015) 228 FCR 148; Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Skiwing Pty Ltd (2006) 66 NSWLR 77.

143 Constitution s 76(i); Owen v Menzies [2013] 2 Qd R 327; Sunol v Collier (2012) 81 NSWLR 619; A-G (NSW) v 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd (2006) 226 FLR 62.

144 Burns v Corbett [2018] HCA 15.

145 Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Skiwing Pty Ltd (2006) 66 NSWLR 77; A-G (NSW) v 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd (2006) 226 FLR 62; Commonwealth v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (Tas) (2008) 169 FCR 85, 119–50 [161]–[263] (Kenny J); Sunol v Collier (2012) 81 NSWLR 619; Owen v Menzies [2013] 2 Qd R 327; Qantas Airways Ltd v Lustig (2015) 228 FCR 148; Burns v Corbett [No 2] [2017] NSWCA 36 (7 March 2017).

146 See, eg, Sunol v Collier (2012) 81 NSWLR 619, 623–4 [12]–[20]; Owen v Menzies [2013] 2 Qd R 327, 365 [140]–[141].

147 See, eg, Hill, above n 129, 114; Rowe, above n 129, 58–67; Kennett, Geoffrey, ‘Fault Lines in the Autochthonous Expedient: The Problem of State Tribunals’ (2009) 20 Public Law Review 152Google Scholar; Villar, Gim Del and Nagorcka, Felicity, ‘“Confusion Hath Now Made His Masterpiece”: Federal Jurisdiction, State Tribunals and Constitutional Questions’ (2014) 88 Australian Law Journal 648Google Scholar.

148 Interview with Peter Garrisson, ACT Solicitor-General (Canberra, 29 September 2015).

149 Interview with Participant M.

150 Interview with John Rau, South Australian Attorney-General (Adelaide, 6 August 2015).

151 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 11 September 2013, 6849 (John Rau, Attorney-General).

152 These included the power to punish contempt, the enforcement of orders by registration in the District Court, and the power to issue declarations (see South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 11 September 2013, 6857–60 (John Rau, Attorney-General)). For a further example of constitutional issues influencing SACAT's design, see Appleby and Olijnyk, ‘The Impact of Uncertain Constitutional Norms’, above n 3.

153 Interview with John Rau, South Australian Attorney-General (Adelaide, 6 August 2015).

154 Interview with Justice Greg Parker, former South Australian Crown Solicitor (Adelaide, 20 March 2015).

155 Ibid.

156 The following participants, who had been involved with the creation of generalist tribunals, reported no constitutional issues arising: Grant; McGinty; Mischin; Sofronoff; Participant G; Participant N; Participant T.

157 Although Participant P, asked about this, did not think Totani had had this effect. Cf interviews with Participant B and Participant O, who both thought Totani changed things; but they were speaking in relation to organised crime.

158 Law Society of South Australia, Submission to Attorney-General's Department, South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Bill Consultation, 16 August 2013, 39–41.

159 Flyvbjerg, above n 5.

160 Australian Research Council Discovery Project 140101218, ‘Law, Order and Federalism’. The interviews were conducted pursuant to University ethics approvals at all participating institutions.