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Towards a Definition of ‘Implementing Measures’ under Article 263, Paragraph 4, TFEU

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Camilla Buchanan  and
Luca Bolzonello
Camilla Buchanan
Affiliation:
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)
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Abstract

Case C-456/13 P, T&L Sugars Ltd and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 28 April 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:284

Article 263 TFEU allows applicants to challenge regulatory acts which are of direct concern to them and do not entail implementing measures. In this judgment the Court confirmed that the degree of discretion afforded to implementing authorities is irrelevant when determining the existence of implementing measures. This note explores some of the consequences of that finding on the structure of the system of remedies under the Treaties.

Type
Case Notes
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 671 - 676
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015

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References

1 That provision reads: “Any natural or legal person may … institute proceedings against … a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures”.

2 See P. Van Malleghem, Before the law stands a gatekeeper, or, what is a “regulatory act” in Article 263(4) TFEU?, 2014 CMLR 51(4), p. 1187-1216.

3 Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625.

4 Case T-262/10, Microban International Ltd and Microban (Europe) Ltd v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:623. See also C. Buchanan, Long Awaited Guidance on the Meaning of “Regulatory Act” for Locus Standi Under the Lisbon Treaty, 2012 EJRR 3(1) p. 115-122.

5 For example Case C-274/12 P, Telefónica v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, para. 27-31.

6 The same applicants also lodged several similar cases, which are still pending before the General Court: T-103/12, T-335/12, T-225/13 and T-411/13.

7 Commission Regulation (EU) No 222/2011 of 3 March 2011 laying down exceptional measures as regards the release of out-of-quota sugar and isoglucose on the Union market at reduced surplus levy during marketing year 2010/2011, OJ L 60/6, 05.03.2011, p. 7 (“Regulation No 222/2011”).

8 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 302/2011 of 28 March 2011 opening an exceptional import tariff quota for certain quantities of sugar in the 2010/11 marketing year, OJ L 81, 29.3.2011, p. 8–9 (“Regulation No 302/2011”).

9 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 293/2011 of 23 March 2011 fixing allocation coefficient, rejecting further applications and closing the period for submitting applications for available quantities of out-of-quota sugar to be sold on the Union market at reduced surplus levy, OJ L 79, 25.3.2011, p. 8 (“Regulation No 293/2011”).

10 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 393/2011 of 19 April 2011 fixing the allocation coefficient for the issuing of import licences applied for from 1 to 7 April 2011 for sugar products under certain tariff quotas and suspending submission of applications for such licences, OJ L 104, 20.4.2011, p. 39–40 (“Regulation No 393/2011”).

11 Judgment of the General Court of 6 June 2013 in Case T-279/11, T&L Sugars Ltd and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:299, para. 36.

12 Ibidem, at para. 52-53, citing Cases T-379/11, Hüttenwerke Krupp and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:272, para. 51, and T-381/11, Eurofer v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:273, para. 59.

13 Ibidem, para. 61-62.

14 Ibidem, para. 69-70, citing Cases C-263/02 P, Commission v Jégo-Quéré, ECLI:EU:C:2004:210, para. 33, and C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequenos Agricultores v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, para. 43.

15 Ibidem, para. 71 and 72, citing Jégo-Quéré, supra, note 14, para. 36, and Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, supra, note 14, para. 44.

16 Ibidem, para. 95. In consequence of the dismissal of the action for annulment any incidental pleas of illegality raised by the applicants were also dismissed.

17 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, delivered on 14 October 2014 in Case C-456/13 P, T&L Sugars Ltd and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:284, para. 19, citing Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council, supra, note 3, para. 57.

18 Ibidem, para. 30-31.

19 Ibidem, para. 42: “Ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione temporis”.

20 Ibidem, para. 42-46; “actes administratifs de gestion” in French.

21 Ibidem, para. 43.

22 Ibidem, para. 47.

23 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 28 April 2015 in Case C-456/13 P, T&L Sugars Ltd and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:284, para. 29-32, citing Telefónica, supra, note 5, para. 27.

24 Ibidem, para. 37; see Opinion of the Advocate General, supra, note 17, para 43.

25 Ibidem, para. 39.

26 Ibidem, para. 41-41.

27 Ibidem, para. 43-44.

28 Ibidem, para 48-50; citing Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, supra, note 3, para. 100-101.

29 Ibidem, para. 63-67. The Court also rejected a third ground of appeal, that the General Court was wrong to reject an incidental plea of illegality due to the inadmissibility of the action. That aspect, being purely procedural, is not discussed here.

30 The high note was struck by Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, supra, note 14; see also K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, Judicial Review as a Contribution to the Development of European Constitutionalism, 2003 YEL p. 1-43;

31 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:767.

32 Case T-268/10 RENV, PPG and SNF v. ECHA, ECLI:EU:T:2015:698.

33 “Mesures de nature décisionnelle” in French, at para. 49 of the Judgment of the General Court, supra, note 11.

34 See para. 49-50 of the Judgment of the General Court, supra, note 11, and para. 40 of the Judgment of the Court, supra, note 23.

35 C-132/12 P, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:100, para. 68. In his Opinion in the present case the Advocate General also uses the expression “intermediate measures”, supra, note 17, at para. 23.

36 The General Court considered that the interpretation of the words “direct concern” cannot be more restrictive under the third than under the second limb of Article 263, paragraph 4, TFEU (Microban, supra, note 4, para. 32). It has fully applied the pre-Lisbon case law on direct concern to the third limb of that provision, e.g. in Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v ECHA, ECLI:EU:T:2013:106, para. 37 and 65. The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Telefónica, supra, note 5, para. 59-62, suggests that the meaning should be the same in both limbs.

37 See also Case C164/14 P, Pesquerias Riveirenses and Others v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:111, para. 34-37.

38 See Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, supra, note 14, para. 44.

39 See Pesquerias Riveirenses, supra, note 37, para. 40.

40 See para. 46 of the Judgment of the Court, supra, note 23; see also, to that effect, the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, supra, note 3, para. 120-121; Case C-84/14 P, Forgital v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:517, para. 66 and case law cited; Case C-64/14 P, von Storch and Others v ECB, ECLI:EU:C:2015:300, para. 50 and case law cited.

41 See, mutatis mutandis, the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, supra, note 14.