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Better Ways to Study Regulatory Elephants

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Jonathan B. Wiener ,
Brendon Swedlow ,
James K. Hammitt ,
Michael D. Rogers  and
Peter H. Sand
Jonathan B. Wiener
Affiliation:
Duke Law School, Professor of Environmental Policy at the Nicholas School of the Environment, and Professor of Public Policy at the Sanford School of Public Policy, at Duke University and a University Fellow of Resources for the Future (RFF)
Brendon Swedlow
Affiliation:
political science and founding faculty associate of the Institute for the Study of the Environment, Sustainability, and Energy at Northern Illinois University, a research associate of the Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics, and a fellow of the Center for Governance at the University of California, Los Angeles
James K. Hammitt
Affiliation:
Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of Public Health, and at the Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA–INRA)
Michael D. Rogers
Affiliation:
Bureau of European Policy Advisers, at the European Commission
Peter H. Sand
Affiliation:
International Environmental Law at the University of Munich
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Abstract

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Type
Book Reviews
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , June 2013 , pp. 311 - 319
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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References

1 Vogel, David, The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety and Environmental Risks in Europe and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Wiener, Jonathan B., Rogers, Michael D., Hammitt, James K., and Sand, Peter H. (eds), The Reality of Precaution: Comparing Risk Regulation in the United States and Europe (Washington, D.C. and London: RFF Press/Earthscan/Routledge, 2011).Google Scholar

3 Weimer, Maria, “‘It's the Politics, Stupid’, Or is the Reality more Complex?”, European Journal of Risk Regulation (2013), this issue.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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6 Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, Chapter 20.

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9 Burgess, Adam, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, European Journal of Risk Regulation (2013), this issue.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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11 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9; Durodié, Bill, “Precautionary Tales – Missing the Problem and Its Cause”, European Journal of Risk Regulation, this issue.Google Scholar

12 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.

13 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9.

14 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.

15 E.g. Rose–Ackerman, “Precaution, Proportionality, and Cost/Benefit Analysis”, supra note 5.

16 Weimer, “‘It's the Politics, Stupid’”, supra note 3.

17 See Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, Chapter 20.

18 See Jonathan B. Wiener, “Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems”, 13 Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law (2003), pp. 207–262; and Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, Chapter 1 “The Rhetoric of Precaution”.

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21 Vogel, David, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, 7(2) Regulation & Governance (2013), pp. 271–277;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Vogel, “A More Sophisticated Understanding of the Politics of Precaution”, supra note 4.

22 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1, pp. 289–290.

23 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, supra note 21; Vogel, “A More Sophisticated Understanding of the Politics of Precaution”, supra note 4.

24 Brendon Swedlow, Denise Kall, Zheng Zhou, James K. Hammitt, and Jonathan B. Wiener, “A Quantitative Comparison of Relative Precaution in the United States and Europe, 1970–2004”, in Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, pp. 377–408.

25 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1.

26 Ibid, p. 5.

27 Ibid, p. 2.

28 Ibid, p. 5.

29 Ibid, p. 4 (footnotes omitted).

30 Ibid, p. 9.

31 Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2.

32 Swedlow, Kall, Zhou et al., “A Quantitative Comparison of Relative Precaution in the United States and Europe, 1970–2004”, supra note 24.

33 See also Hammitt, James K., Wiener, Jonathan B., Swedlow, Brendon, Kall, Denise, and Zhou, Zheng, “Precautionary Regulation in Europe and in the United States: A Quantitative Comparison”, 25(5) Risk Analysis (2005), pp. 1215–1228 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Swedlow, Brendon, Kall, Denise, Zhou, Zheng, Hammitt, James K., and Wiener, Jonathan B, “Theorizing and Generalizing about Risk Assessment and Regulation through Comparative Nested Analysis of Representative Cases”, 31 Law and Policy (2009), pp. 236–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1.

35 For comments on Vogel's attempts to explain his claimed shift, see Wiener, Jonathan B., “The Politics of Precaution, and the Reality” , 7(2) Regulation & Governance (2013), pp. 258–265.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

36 See Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, chapter 20; Wiener, Jonathan B., “The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight”, in Michael A. Livermore and Richard L. Revesz (eds), The Globalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Policy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 123–141. CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 For other examples of this pathology of catchy but faulty generalizations in research and public discourse, see Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, chapter 1.

38 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.

39 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1.

40 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9.

41 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.

42 David Vogel, “Ships Passing in the Night: The Changing Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States”, Working Paper 2001/16, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, available on the Internet at <http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/01_16.pdf> (last accessed on 18 April 2013); Vogel, David, “The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and Environmental Regulation in Europe”, 33 British Journal of Political Science (2003), pp. 557–580;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1.

43 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.

44 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9.

45 Durodié, “Precautionary Tales”, supra note 11.

46 See King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., and Verba, Sidney, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar on drawing inferences from case studies. For application of these standards to studies of regulation see Mazur, Allan, True Warnings and False Alarms: Evaluating Fears about the Health Risks of Technology, 1948–1971 (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2004)Google Scholar and Swedlow, Brendon, “Review of Allan Mazur's ‘True Warnings and False Alarms: Evaluating Fears about the Health Risks of Technology, 1948–1971”, 8(4) Environmental Science and Policy (2005), pp. 236–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

47 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, supra note 21.

48 Sand, Peter H., “The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective”, 6 Human and Ecological Risk Assessment (2000), pp. 445– 458;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Zander, Joakim, The Application of the Precautionary Principle in Practice: Comparative Dimensions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49 See Swedlow, Kall, Zhou et al., “Theorizing and Generalizing about Risk Assessment and Regulation through Comparative Nested Analysis of Representative Cases”, supra note 33; Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, chapter 15.

50 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.

51 Weimer, “‘It's the Politics, Stupid’”, supra note 3.

52 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, supra note 21; Vogel, “A More Sophisticated Understanding of the Politics of Precaution”, supra note 4.

53 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1, on p. 18.

54 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, supra note 21.

55 Ibid; see also Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1, p. 4.

56 Wiener, “The Politics of Precaution, and the Reality”, supra note 35.

57 See Table 15.2 in Swedlow, Kall, Zhou et al., “A Quantitative Comparison of Relative Precaution in the United States and Europe, 1970–2004”, supra note 24.

58 Vogel , “A More Sophisticated Understanding of the Politics of Precaution”, supra note 4.

59 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9.

60 Vogel, David, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

61 Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, supra note 19; La Porta, Lopez–de–Silanes and Shleifer, “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins”, supra note 20.

62 Kelemen, R. Daniel, “Commentary on Vogel's The Politics of Precaution” 7(2) Regulation & Governance (2013), pp. 266–270;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Wiener, “The Politics of Precaution, and the Reality”, supra note 35.

63 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, supra note 21.

64 Weimer, “‘It's the Politics, Stupid’”, supra note 3.

65 Swedlow, Kall, Zhou et al, “Theorizing and Generalizing about Risk Assessment and Regulation through Comparative Nested Analysis of Representative Cases”, supra note 33.

66 Lieberman, Evan S., “Nested Analysis as a Mixed–Method Strategy for Comparative Research”, 99 American Political Science Review (2005), pp. 435–452.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

67 Vogel, “A More Sophisticated Understanding of the Politics of Precaution”, supra note 4.

68 Rose–Ackerman, “Precaution, Proportionality, and Cost/Benefit Analysis: False Analogies”, supra note 5.

69 Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, chapter 20.

70 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9.

71 Durodié, “Precautionary Tales”, supra note 11.