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Public Accountability and Parliamentary Scrutiny in Finance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2019

Sean BARRETT ,
Shaen CORBET Open the ORCID record for Shaen CORBET [Opens in a new window]  and
Charles LARKIN
Sean BARRETT
Affiliation:
Trinity Business School, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland; email: [email protected]
Shaen CORBET
Affiliation:
DCU Business School, Dublin City University, Dublin 9, Ireland; email: [email protected]
Charles LARKIN
Affiliation:
Institute for Policy Research, University of Bath, UK; email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The purpose of parliament is to present a discussion of policy in a fashion that will bring about a consensus that results in collective action. Such a collective action serves the common good of the state, although second-order effects and Pareto optimality is difficult – if not impossible – to obtain. Parliament attempts to address the second-best world in a socially optimal fashion. As such, accountability and scrutiny are the key tools through which such a body can address the challenges faced by a financial sector confronted with profound difficulties. Such accountability is of paramount importance to provide sustainable public trust in parliament.

Type
Articles
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 2020 , pp. 94 - 108
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2019

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