Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-5r2nc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-05T11:40:01.907Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

CONSTRUCTIVIST AND ECOLOGICAL MODELING OF GROUP RATIONALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2012

Gerald Gaus
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

These brief remarks highlight three aspects of Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents that illustrate its constructivist nature: (i) its stress on the discursive dilemma as a primary challenge to group rationality and reasoning; (ii) its general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation; and (iii) its account of rational agency and moral responsibility. The essay contrasts List and Pettit's constructivist analysis of group rationality with an ecological approach, inspired by social theorists such as F A. Hayek, Vernon L. Smith and Gerd Gigerenzer.

Type
Symposium on Christian List and Phillip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 245 - 254
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Cummins, D. 1996. ‘Evidence for the Innateness of Deontic Reasoning.’ Mind and Language, 11 (June): 160–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Estlund, D. 2008. Democratic Authority. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Freeden, M. 1996. Ideologies and Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Gaus, G. 2006. ‘The Evolution of Society and Mind: Hayek's System of Ideas.’ In Feser, E. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek, pp. 232–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Gaus, G. 2011. The Order of Public Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Gaus, G. 2013. ‘The Turn to Political Liberalism.’ In Mandel, J. and Reidy, D. (eds), A Companion to Rawls. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Gaus, G. and Thrasher, J. 2013. ‘Social Evolution.’ In Gaus, G. and D'Agostino, F. (eds), The Routledge Companion of Social and Political Philosophy. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Gigerenzer, G. 2000. Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. 1973. Rules and Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. 1979. The Counter-Revolution in Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar
List, C. and Pettit, P. 2011. Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Manktelow, K. I. and Over, D. 1995. ‘Deontic Reasoning.’ In Newstead, S. E. and Evans, J. St. B. T. (eds), Perspectives on Thinking and Reasoning: Essays in Honor of Peter Wason, pp. 91–114. Lewes: Lawrence Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Rawls, J. 1996. Political Liberalism, paperback edn. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Rousseau, J.-J. 1973. The Social Contract in The Social Contract and Discourses, tr. Cole, G. D. H.. London: Dent.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 2002. ‘Maximization and the Act of Choice.’ In his Rationality and Freedom, ch. 4. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Shoemaker, D. W. 2011. ‘Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction.’ Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49, special supplemental: 99–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, V. L. 2008. Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar