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Refining Quinean Naturalism: An Alternative to Kemp’s Stimulus Field Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 January 2025

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Tolgahan Toy*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Bartın University, Bartın, TR, Turkey
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Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

W. V. Quine suggests that meaning derives from the stimulus, the effects of the outside world on the subject’s nerve endings. However, the idiosyncrasy of the stimulus poses challenges to the intersubjectivity of meaning. Gary Kemp proposes the stimulus field approach as a solution. The stimulus field approach focuses on the forces affecting the subject, rather than the effects on the subject. In this article, I critique Kemp’s solution. Furthermore, I argue that the Quinean approach can be refined in a way that two agents may converge on the same meaning even without sharing the same stimuli or forces affecting them.

Résumé

Résumé

W. V. Quine suggère que la signification découle du stimulus, c’est-à-dire des effets exercés par le monde extérieur sur les terminaisons nerveuses du sujet. Cependant, l’idiosyncrasie du stimulus soulève des défis pour l’intersubjectivité du sens. Gary Kemp propose l’approche du champ de stimulation comme solution. Cette approche se concentre sur les forces qui influencent le sujet, plutôt que sur les effets qu’il subit. Dans cet article, je critique la solution de Kemp. De plus, je soutiens que l’approche quinéenne peut être affinée de manière à permettre à deux agents de parvenir à la même signification, même sans partager les mêmes stimuli ou sans être influencés par les mêmes forces.

Keywords

stimulus meaningnaturalistic semanticsQuinestimulus field approachpublic meaning
Type
Article
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , First View , pp. 1 - 18
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Canadian Philosophical Association/Publié par Cambridge University Press au nom de l’Association canadienne de philosophie

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