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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2020
In A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen maintains that the strongest version of John Rawls’s theory of justice is one that incorporates the luck egalitarian conception of fairness developed by G.A. Cohen. He also contends that, once the theory is modified in this way, it becomes clear that the original position doesn’t yield principles of justice but rather what Cohen calls ‘rules of regulation.’ I argue that the minimal conception of fairness that Rawls favours is the right one for his purposes, and that bringing in luck egalitarian fairness would render the outcome of the original position indeterminate.
Kyle Johannsen soutient que, pour être pleinement convaincante, la théorie de la justice de John Rawls doit incorporer la conception de l’équité associée avec l’égalitarisme des chances de G.A. Cohen. Il maintient également que, lorsqu’on modifie ainsi la théorie de Rawls, on voit que les principes choisis dans la position originelle doivent être ce que Cohen appelle des «règles de régulation». Je rétorque que la conception de l’équité qu’adopte Rawls est idéalement adaptée aux besoins de sa théorie, et que l’incorporation de la conception de l’équité que défend Cohen rendrait indéterminé le résultat de la position originelle.