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Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Alastair Lain Johnston
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In this article I argue that China currently has the technical capacity to increase the size of its nuclear forces by about two to three times and to improve its operational flexibility.1 Whether it does so or not will depend primarily on four variables or constraints: trends in thinking about nuclear doctrine that justify these sorts of changes; the economic and technological resources available; China′s commitment to nuclear arms-related arms control conventions; and strategic and arms control decisions by the United States. I suggest that for the foreseeable future the variables relating to doctrine, economics/technology and Chinese arms control preferences are all relatively fixed or constant. That is, present trends in all three suggest a continuing will and ability to modernize Chinese nuclear forces. The last variable is somewhat less fixed, and thus may be the one that is most amenable to external manipulation.

Type
Doctrine, Training and Capabilities
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 146 , June 1996 , pp. 548 - 576
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1996

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References

1. The magnitude of error in estimates of China′s nuclear warhead stockpile is very high. I use a rough estimate of 300 strategic nuclear warheads. See Norris, Robert S.et ai, British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994)Google Scholar and Robert Sutter, “Chinese nuclear weapons and arms control policies: implications and options for the United States,” Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 25 March 1994. I got the impression from conversations with some Chinese arms control experts associated with the nuclear weapons programme that this may be a relatively accurate number, though possibly on the high side. For a recent estimate put out by the Natural Resources Defense Council see Figure 1.Google Scholar

2. On traditional China′s realpolitik discourse see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)Google Scholar; on Maoist China′s realpolitik see Alastair Iain Johston, “Cultural realism and strategy in Mao′s China,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar. For more contemporary realpolitikanalysis of the nature of international politics and economics see Li Shisheng “Guanyu guoji xin zhixu ji ge wenti de tan tao” (“Discussion of several questions relating to the new international order”), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), No. 10 (1992), pp. 43–44; Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang “Quanli zhengzhi yu xianghu yicun” (“Power politics and interdependence”) in Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, No. 7 (1993), pp. 36–41; Gu Yan, “Duli zizhu shi Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang de linghun” (“Independence and self-reliance are the spirit of Mao Zedong′s foreign policy thinking”) Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, No. 2 (1994), pp. 30–33Google Scholar; Gao Jintian (ed.), Guoji zhanluexue gailun (General Discussion of International Strategic Studies) (Beijing: National Defence University, 1995), pp. 68–69Google Scholar; Wang Pufeng et al. (eds.), Xiadai guofanglun (On Modern National Defence) (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1993), p. 64Google Scholar; and Huang Yasheng, “China in the new international political economy: perspectives and problems,” unpublished paper, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, May 1995.Google Scholar

3. On the characteristics of realpolitik world views see John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (London: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Martin Wight (ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter), International Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; and Mearsheimer, John, “The false promise of international institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 9–12. I suspect that were one to conduct a comparative study one would find a lot of the similarities in the worldviews of Chinese realpoliticians, French Gaullists and American Republican isolationists.Google Scholar

4. See Song Shilun Mao Zedong junshi sixiang de xingchengji qifazhan (The Formation and Development ofMaoZedong′s Military Thought) (Beijing: Academy ofMilitary Sciences Press, 1984). See also Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization andSino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming), ch. 6.

5. Cited in Huang Cisheng and Wang Lincong “Shilun Mao Zedong de he zhanliie sixiang” (“Preliminary discussion of Mao Zedong′s thinking on nuclear strategy”) in Quanjun Mao Zedong junshi sixiang xueshu taolun wen jing xuan (Selected Essays from the All-Army Academic Meeting on Mao Zedong′s Military Thought) (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1992), p. 602.Google Scholar

6. See, for instance, Allen Whiting, “New light on Mao: Quemoy 1958: Mao′s miscalculations,” The China Quarterly, No. 62 (June 1975).Google Scholar

7. Zhenwu, Liu and Shaoying, Meng, Xiandai jundui zhihui (The Command of Modern Military Forces) (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1993), p. 391. See also Su Qianming, “Shilun changgui liliang yu zhanliie he weishe liliang xiang jiehe” (“Preliminary discussion of the linkages between conventional power and strategic nuclear deterrence power”) in Quanjun Mao Zedong junshi sixiang, p. 566; and Yang Xuhua and Cai Renzhao Junshi weishe xue gailun (Introduction to Military Deterrence) (Taiyuan: Ocean of Books Press, 1989), p. 303. Chinese analysts have also argued that status is a reason India has little interest in joining substantive regional nuclear arms control processes. Of course, this argument about Indian motives also justifies Chinese sceptism about the value of China′s participation in South Asian regional nuclear arms control.Google Scholar

8. See, for instance, Xu Baoshan, “We must prepare to fight a nuclear war in the first stage of any future war,” Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), 16 September 1979, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, No. 88 (4 June 1980); and Zhou Shizong “Kangji Sulian shou ci tu ji de ji ge wenti” (“Several questions on resisting the first Soviet surprise attack”) Junshi xueshu (Military Studies), No. 6 (1982) in Junshi xueshu lun xuan (Selected Essays from Military Studies) (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, Vol. 2, 1984).Google Scholar

9. Liang Minlun and Zhao Youzi, “Shilun wo jun weilai hetong zhanyi zuozhan de zongti gouxiang” (“Preliminary discussion of the comprehensive notion of our military′s future co-ordinated warfighting campaigns”), in National Defence University Research Department (ed), Gaojishujubu zhanzheng yu zhanyi zhanfa. (Campaign Methods and High Tech Limited War) (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1994), p. 88. See also Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandai jundui zhihui, p. 391; General Staff Department Chemical Defence Department (ed.), Fang hua bing shi (The History of the Chemical Defence Troops) (Beijing: People′s Liberation Army Press, 1990), p. 182; Hu Yanlin “Weilai zhanzheng hen keneng shiyi chang you xian he zhanzheng” (“The future war could very well be a limited nuclear war”) in National Defence University Curriculum Research Office (ed.), Junshi sixiang luncong (Essay Series on Military Thought) (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1988), p. 373; Su Qianming, “Shilun changgui liliang yu zhanliie he weishe.”Google Scholar

10. Lewis, John Wilson and Litai, Xue, China Builds the Bomb(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), and China′s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994) esp. ch. 10Google Scholar; Lewis, John Wilson and Hua, Di, “China′s ballistic missile programs: technologies, strategies, goals,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 5–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For other analyses trying to make sense of the limited materials on Chinese nuclear doctrine see Jencks, Harlan W., “PRC nuclear and space programs,” in Yang, Richard (ed.), Yearbook on PLA Affairs 1987 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, 1988)Google Scholar;Chong-pin LinChina′s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988)Google Scholar; Arthur S. Ding, “PLA in the year 2000: nuclear force and space program,” in Richard Yang (ed.), Yearbook on PLA Affairs 1988–89 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, 1989)Google Scholar; J. Mohan Malik “Chinese debate on military strategy: trends and portents,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (Summer 1990).Google Scholar

11. This political image role played by the “people′s war” and active defence discourse is revealed to some extent in Peng Dehuai′s report to the National Defence Commission in July 1957, “Junshi jianshe gaikuang” (“The general situation in military construction”) in Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Peng Dehuai) (Beijing: People′s Liberation Army Press, 1988), pp. 588–591. Fora more recent discussion of the political value of the language of the defence see Zhang Jing and Yao Yanjin, Jijifangyu zhanliie qianshuo (An Introduction to the Active Defence Strategy) (Beijing: Peoples Liberation Army Publishing House, 1985), p. 137.

12. This opens up a very difficult topic about whether Mao had a clear understanding of the role of nuclear weapons beyond a simple view of their status and deterrent value. Lewis and Xue argue that Mao′s few vague guidelines and axioms about nuclear weapons had a defining effect on the operational and doctrinal parameters of the programme. See Lewis and Xue, Strategic Seapower, pp. 232–33. Thus Mao expressed a preference for small, counterforce capabilities - essentially a minimum deterrent. The problem here is that it may attribute too much causal effect to Mao′s ambiguous comments on nuclear weapons and too little on the political image constraints imposed by the “people′s war” and active defence discourses.

13. There is some inconsistency between the claim made by some Chinese specialists that China never had an articulated doctrine and that China has practised deliberate ambiguity. If the latter were true, especially in the first 30 years of China′s nuclear weapons programme, one might have expected to see relatively frequent and systematic discussion in materials that foreigners had no access to, such as Junshi xueshu. This appears not to have been the case. In the last few years as Chinese strategists have indeed produced more scholarship and analyses of nuclear doctrine, the deliberate ambiguity claim is more credible, as relatively few of these analyses are in open circulation materials. A number of Chinese scholars, long associated with China′s nuclear weapons programme, have claimed that the lack of doctrinal transparency today is deliberate. See also the quotation from one Chinese military officer that retaliation could take place over days, weeks or months after an initial strike. This is cited by both Avery Goldstein, “Robust and affordable security: some lessons from the second-ranking powers during the Cold War,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1992), and Chong-pin Lin, Nuclear Weapons Strategy.

14. From 1974 to 1987 there are very few articles on nuclear strategy - except for those on how China might deal with a Soviet blitzkrieg across the northern border - in Junshi xueshu, an authoritative journal published by the Academy of Military Sciences and restricted to officers at the regiment and above. See Zhao Qinde and Wu Xianshun (eds.), Junshi xueshu suoyin 1974–1987 (Index to Military Studies) (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences, 1988).

15. The minimum deterrence argument appears in Sutter, “Chinese nuclear weapons and arms control policies,” in my earlier work (e.g. “Chinese nuclear force modernization: implications for arms control,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 1983), and also in Wu Zhan, “Shilun zhanliie jingong wuqi” (“Preliminary discussion of strategic offensive weapons”) in Meiguo yanjiu cankao ziliao (Reference Materials on American Studies), No. 7 (1985) and “He weishe” (“Nuclear deterrence”) Meiguo yanjiu (American Studies), No. 1 (1988), pp. 42–43. See also Lewis and Hua, “China′s ballistic missile program,” p. 21.

16. The limited warfighting argument appears in Jencks, “Nuclear and space programs” and Malik, “Chinese debate.”

17. The hybrid argument is made by Chong-pin Lin, China′s Nuclear Strategy. Chinese writings have in the past variously described China′s deterrent as minimum (zui di), defensive (fang yu), self-defensive (zi wei), anti-deterrent (fan weishe) and eclectic (zhe zhong). The inconsistency among Chinese analysts even over the suitability of the term deterrence to describe the role of Chinese nuclear forces contributes to the confusion. At the most public level, in the Conference on Disarmament for instance, and sometimes in exchanges with foreigners, Chinese officials will denounce the concept of deterrence. See CD/NTB/W.121 (10 June 1994) and Goldstein “Robust and affordable security.” In a recent internal study of the U.S.-Soviet arms control process, however, deterrence is considered to have no political character. Capitalist and socialist states both rely on deterrence. See Wang Yang (ed.), Mei Su junbei jingsai yu kongzhi yanjiu (Research in the U.S.Soviet Arms Race and Arms Control) (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1993), p. 172; see also Chen Weimin, “Weishe lilun yu guofang jianshe” (“Deterrence theory and national defence construction”), in Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, No. 3 (1989).

18. Liu Tieqing, Rong Jiaxin and Chang Jinan, “Zhanliie daodan budui zhanyi lilun tixi chuyi” (“Our views on the structure of the campaign theory of the Strategic Missile Forces”), in National Defence University Research Department (ed.), Zhanyi jiben lilun xintan (New Explorations of the Basic Theory of Campaigns) (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Jiang Shenggong, “Dui haijun zhanyi xue lilun tixi de sixiang” (“Thinking about the structure of the theory of naval campaigns”), in Ibid. Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandai zhihui. I do not want to leave the impression that all writings that touch on nuclear doctrine clearly endorse the notion of limited deterrence. There are some who doubt, for instance, whether nuclear weapons can deter conventional or limited wars. See for instance Fang Min and Fan Gongsong, Da guofang (Grand National Defence) (Shanghai: People′s Publishing House, 1994), p. 106. But I have not found among the numerous internal circulation (neibu) and military circulation (junnei) sources cited here any explicit rejection of limited deterrence or endorsement of minimum deterrence. These sources are a level of authoritativeness that outside analysts have rarely accessed, but I fully recognize the possibility that even these sources may not fully reflect doctrinal ideas at formally classified levels.

19. Zhaochong, Lin “Xiandai weishe zhanliie man tan” (“Informal discussion of modern deterrence strategy”), in Academy of Military Sciences Strategy Department (eds.), Hua shuo zhanliie (Talking about Strategy) (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 1987), p. 50Google Scholar; Guangqian, Peng and Guangxu, Wang, Junshi zhanliie jianlun (A Brief Discussion of Military Strategy)(Beijing: People′s Liberation Army Press, 1989), p. 160; Wu Zhan, “He weishe,” pp. 42–43.Google Scholar

20. Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandai zhihui, p. 409. See also Zhang Jianzhi, “Dui caijun jiben lilun wenti de tantao” (“Preliminary investigation of questions concerning the basic theory of disarmament”), in Guoji caijun douzheng yu Zhongguo (China and the International Disarmament Struggle) (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 1987), pp. 56–57.Google Scholar

21. See Peng Guangqian and Wang Guangxu, Junshi zhanlue, p. 161; Zhang Jianzhi “Dui caijun jiben lilun,” pp. 56–57. 22. These are explored more fully in Alastair Iain Johnston, “China′s new ‘old thinking’: the concept of limited deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/6).Google Scholar

23. Zhao Fusheng and Zhang Chengliang, “He zhanzheng yu zhengzhi guanxi de sikao” (“Thoughts on the relationship between nuclear war and politics”) in Quanjun Mao Zedong junshi, p. 592. See also Hu Guangzheng and Xiao Xiandu, Yingxiang dao ershiyi shiji de zhengming (Contention That Will Have Influence into the 21st Century) (Beijing: People′s Liberation Army Press, 1989), p. 143; Wang Wenrong, Ma Baoan and Liu Hongji, “Mudi, fangshi, liliang: wo guo xin shiqi junshi zhanlue de san ge jiben wenti” (“Goals, methods and strength: three basic questions in our country′s military strategy in the new period”), Guofang daxue xuebao (National Defence University Journal), No. 1 (1989), in Renmin daxue, Fuyin baokan ziliao -junshi (People′s University Reproduced Periodical Materials - Military Affairs), No. 4 (1989), pp. 47–48Google Scholar; Peng Guangqian and Wang Guangxu, Junshi zhanliie, pp. 84–85,160; Guan Jixian, Gaojishu jubu zhanzheng zhanyi (Campaigns in High Tech Limited Wars) (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1993), p. 43; Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandai zhihui, p. 410Google Scholar; Lin Zhaochong “Xiandai weishe zhanliie man tan” (“Informal discussion of modern deterrence strategy”) in Academy of Military Sciences Strategy Department (eds.), Hua shuo zhanliie (Talking About Strategy) (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 1987), pp. 59–60; Wang Jianguo, “Gaojishu zhanzheng zhong de he yinying bu rong hushi” (“The nuclear shadow in high tech wars cannot be easily ignored”), Zhongguo junshi kexue (Chinese Military Science), No. 4 (Winter 1995), p. 109; Liu Longguang et al. (eds.), Gao jishu junshi shijie (The World of High Tech Military Affairs) (Beijing: National Defence University, 1993), pp. 258–287.Google Scholar

24. Hu Wenlong and Cha Jinlu (eds.), Xiandai jundui bingzhong zhanshu (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1991), p. 245.

25. See Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandai zhihui, p. 405; Yang Xuhua and Cai Renzhao, Junshi weishe pp. 304–305; Guan Jixian, Gaojishu zhanzheng, p. 112Google Scholar; Liu Tieqing etal, “Zhanliie daodan budui zhanyi lilun,” pp. 322,328Google Scholar; Academy of Military Sciences (ed.), Junshi zhanliie (Military Strategy) (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1987), p. 235Google Scholar. On this score Lewis and Xue underestimate the degree to which Chinese nuclear thinking has gone beyond “area targeting theory.” See Lewis and Xue, Strategic Seapower, p. 233 and Xue Litai, “Evolution of China′s nuclear strategy,” in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu (eds.), The View from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of Britain, France and China (San Diego: Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1994), p. 180.Google Scholar

26. On the technological requirements of limited deterrence see Liu Mingshou and Yang Chengjun, Gaojishu zhanzheng zhong de daodan zhan (Missile Warfare in High Tech Wars) (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1993), pp. 170–71Google Scholar; Liu Jixian, Wang Tangying and Huang Shuofeng, Guofang fazhan zhanliie gailun (Introduction to National Defence Development Strategy) (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1989), p. 161; Liu Tieqing et al., “Zhanliie daodan budui zhanyi lilun,” p. 330; Song Zhi, “Ben shijie mo ge zhuyao guojia de junshi zhanliie he women de duice” (“The military strategy of each major state at the end of this century and our countermeasures”) in Academy of Military Sciences Operations Analysis Research Department (ed.), Guoji xingshi, p. 73Google Scholar; Zhang Jinxi and Wang Xiancun, “Mao Zedong junshi sixiang yu wo guo de he zhanliie lilun” (“Mao Zedong military thought and our country′s theory of nuclear strategy”) Junshi zhishi (Military Knowledge), No. 5 (1988), reprinted in Renmin daxue, Fuyin baokan -junshi, p. 18.Google Scholar

27. For discussions on how theatre and tactical nuclear weapons enhance the ability to deter the escalation of conventional and nuclear war see Li Baiheng and Gao Guofeng, “Mogu zhuangyun xia de xin kangzheng” (“The new resistance beneath the mushroom cloud”) Jiefangjun bao, 27 January 1984; Hu Yanlin, “Weilai zhanzheng,” p. 376; Wang Huaizhi, “Faguo de junshi zhanliie ji qishi” (“French military strategy and its inspiration”) in Academy of Military Sciences Operations Analysis Research Department (ed.), Guoji xingshi, pp. 128–29; Sang Zhonglin and Xiao Kaishi, “Wo jun zhanyi Iilun de yanjiu ying zeng qiang ‘heguannnian’ ”(“We must strengthen the ‘nuclear concept’ in ourarmy′s campaign theory”) in National Defence University Research Department (ed.), Zhanyi jiben Iilun, pp. 804–805; Su Qianming, “Shilun changgui liliang yu zhanliie he weishe,” p. 117. For a non-Chinese perspective of this argument see Malik, “Chinese debate.”

28. “If a state not only has multi-level, multi-method nuclear attack power, and at the same time can basically protect itself from direct strike, then it has a wide range of strategic choices.” Hu Yanlin, “Weilai zhanzheng,” p. 375. See also Liu Mingshou and Yang Chengjun, Gao jishu zhanzheng, pp. 179–180; Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandai zhihui, p. 400, 415–16; Liu Tieqing et al., ′Zhanliie daodan budui,“ pp. 329–330.Google Scholar

29. See for instance, Zhongxing, Bao, ”Jianshe tian jun gouxiang“ (”The notion of building a space army“) in National Defence University Research Department, Military Construction Research Institute (ed.), Jundui xiandaihua jianshe de sikao (Thoughts on the Building of a Modernized Military) (Beijing: National Defence University, 1988), pp. 431–442Google Scholar; Zhang Baotang, ”Dui xin shiqi zhanliie daodan budui zhanliie jianzhe ji ge wenti de chutan“ (”Initial exploration of several questions relating to the strategy for building the Strategic Missile Forces in the new period“) in Ibid. p. 417; Hu Guangzheng and Xiao Xiandu, Yingxiang dao ershiyi shiji, pp. 144–145.

30. Bao Zhongxing, ”Jianshe tianjun,“ p. 426.

31. On the development of civil defence plans in China, including discussions of plans for the deconcentration, dispersion and protection of a large portion of the Chinese urban population see General Staff Department, Fanghua bing shi, pp. 230–32; Zhangqi, Cui, Xiandai fang kong (Modern Air Defence)(Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1989) pp. 379,382–401; Xiao Guangbo, He zhanzheng yu renfang (Nuclear War and Civil Defence) (Beijing: People′s Liberation Army Press, 1989), pp. 37, 253–301.Google Scholar

32. Liu Tieqing et al., ”Zhanliie daodan budui zhanyi Iilun,“ pp. 328–29. For other discussions which implicitly hint at the problems NFU may present for deterrence see Sang Zhonglin and Xiao Kaishi, ”Wo jun zhanyi Iilun de yanjiu,“ pp. 806–807; Guan Jixian, Gao jishu, pp. 110–11. For a discussion of how China′s no-first-use and negative security assurances may cause problems for preserving a nuclear deterrent against high-tech conventional strikes, see Liu Longguang, Gao jishu junshi shijie, p. 281.Google Scholar

33. Academy of Military Science (ed.), Junshi zhanliie (Military Strategy) (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1987), pp. 115–16,235. See also Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandai zhihui, p. 400.1 have found no confirmation of the quotation from a Chinese strategist, cited by both Avery Goldstein and Lin Chong-pin, suggesting that Chinese strategists might envisage retaliation over days, weeks or months after a nuclear attack. Discussions of LOW, or the ambiguous attitude towards NFU suggest that Lewis and Xue overestimate Chinese strategists′ contentedness with NFU. See Xue Litai, ”Evolution“ p. 180, and Lewis and Xue, Strategic Seapower, p. 232.Google Scholar

34. Guan Jixian, Gaojishu, pp. 112–13.

35. Chen Huibang, ”Guanyu xin shiqi zhanlue fangzhen he zhidao yuanze wenti“ (”Concerning questions relating to the guiding principles and strategic policies of the new period“) in Guofang daxue xuebao (National Defence University Journal) in Renmin daxue, Fuyin baokan ziliao -junshi (1989)Google Scholar, p. 28. See also Wang Xiancun, ”Mao Zedong renmin zhanzheng sixiang zai zhanlue daodan budui zuozhan zhong de yunyong“ (”The application of Mao′s thinking on people′s war in the operations of the Strategic Missile Forces“) in Quan jun Mao Zedong junshi sixiang, p. 593Google Scholar; Guan Jixian, Gaojishu, pp. 141, 23–24.Google Scholar

36. Wu Zhan has argued that Chinese capabilities may not be able to inflict what the superpowers consider as unacceptable damage, though it could inflict “great losses.” See his “He weishe,” p. 45. Other experts associated with the nuclear weapons programme doubt China even has a minimum deterrent, particularly vis-a-vis the U.S., and claim that the lower end of Western estimates of Chinese capabilities (200 warheads) overestimates the number of deliverable (if they survive a first strike) warheads.

37. It has the rudiments of a triad, with landbased missiles, a bomber force and a small number of submarine launched ballistic missiles, but the latter two legs of the triad are extremely underdeveloped.

38. Sang and Xiao claimed at that time of writing that China had not yet equipped the PLA with theatre and tactical nuclear weapons.“Wo jun zhanyi lilun de yanjiu,” pp. 806, 811.

39. General Staff Department, Fanghua bingshi, pp. 226–28.

40. Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandai zhihui, pp. 404–407; Liu Tieqing et ai, “Zhanlue daodan budui zhanyi lilun,” p. 327; Zhang Baotang, “Dui xin shiqi zhanliie daodan budui zhanliie jianzhe ji ge wenti de chutan” (“Initial exploration of several questions relating to the strategy for building the Strategic Missile Forces in the new period”) in National Defence University Research Department, Military Construction Research Institute (ed.), Jundui xiandaihua jianshe de sikao (Thoughts on the Building of a Modernized Military) (Beijing: National Defence University, 1988), p. 419.Google Scholar

41. From about 1980 on, all PLA units have had to set aside a specific time for ABC training, and Chinese sources have reported on exercises under atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) conditions by motorized infantry units, coastal defence units and border defence units. From at least the mid-1980s Strategic Missile Forces have also conducted launch exercises under ABC conditions. See Sang Zhonglin and Xiao Kaishi, “Wo jun zhanyi lilun de yanjiu,” pp. 813; General Staff Department, Fanghua bing shi, pp. 215–17; Chong-pin Lin, China′s Nuclear Strategy, pp. 77, 90, 93; Sha Li and Min Li, Jianguo hou Zhongguo guonei 10 ci junshi da xingdong (Ten Major Military Actions Within China since the Establishment of the State) (Chengdu: Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1992), p. 257.

42. General Staff Department, Fanghua bingshi, p. 184.

43. This is a critical assumption, and its validity rest on the degree to which those in charge of the allocation of state resources are receptive to the interests of the PLA. I have not come across any sources that indicate how the individuals and units who think about nuclear doctrine relate to those who make military budget, R“China′s ballistic missile programs,” Table 1.

45. A t-test shows this difference is not statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Some have suggested that the current test series in China is designed to develop a new warhead design for the DF-31 and JL-2 in anticipation of a test ban at the end of 1996. This is no doubt one of the motivations for the tests over the last couple of years, but the slight increase in the frequency of tests appears to have started at least a year prior to the autumn of 1993 when the comprehensive test ban moved onto the Conference on Disarmament agenda. Given, however, the difficulties in determining when a test series begins and ends, and what a logical temporal division in the testing programme might look like, one could argue that China′s testing frequency appears quite consistent across time, oblivious certainly, to the informal, unilateral moratoriums adopted by the other Perm-5 from 1993 on.

46. Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Chinese perspectives on nuclear arms control: nascent ‘security interdependence′?” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/6).

47. There is a third, less tangible technical constraint, namely, human talent. As one former member of the nuclear weapons community told me, the bomb labs are no longer acquiring the quality of scientists that they could in the past. Due to economic reforms, many talented scientists and technicians are seeking work in more lucrative pursuits in the booming economy. The opportunities to “jump into the sea” (xia hai) and get rich are quite constrained for those working in the weapons labs. Conversation, September 1995.

48. Interview, July 1995.

49. See Albright David, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). The estimates are based on a rough estimate of total HEU and PU output from the reactors at Jiuquan, Guangyan and Heping, minus an estimate of the amount used in a single warhead (20 kg HEU, 4–5 kg PU) times an estimate of 300 warheads. The evidence suggests that China stopped uranium enrichment for military purposes in 1989, and ended military PU production in 1991. But this doesn′t mean it cannot be started up again if existing stockpiles are considered inadequate. There is also some interest in PU reprocessing and in fast-breeder reactors to meet the growing civilian energy needs. Both processes, however, produce fissile material, which could, if necessary, be used for military purposes. A Japanese press report in March 1995 stated that China plans to build a commercial reprocessing plant by 2015 to produce plutonium to fuel fast breeder reactors. I thank Harlan Jencks for bringing this report to my attention. See also Liu Yong, “China′s civilian plutonium separation program,” Union of Concerned Scientists, draft ms, 20 June 1995, and Liu Chengan and Song Jiashu “Comments on the development of breeder reactions and the problem of international security,” unpublished ms. January 1995.

50. Roger C. Molander and Peter A. Wilson, The Nuclear Asymptote: On Containing Nuclear Proliferation (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1993), Table B. 1, p. 78.Google Scholar

51. Lewis and Xue, Strategic Seapower.

52. On the question of Chinese missile accuracy I benefited greatly from discussions with Chris Lanzit.

53. On GPS technology see Irving Lachow, “The GPS dilemma: balancing military risks and economic benefits,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 126–148.

54. This assumes that the U.S. and Russia deployed forces drop from about 20,000 strategic warheads to about 6,000 under the START II timetable, and Chinese forces increase from 300 to 900.

55. The concept of a risk fleet deterrent is hinted at in Wu Zhan, “He weishe,” p. 45. He notes that the number of superpower warheads needed against China is greater than that needed against Britain and France, leaving the attacking power - the USSR in this case - very much weaker in relation to the U.S. “Risk fleet” refers to the German plans prior to the First World War to build a navy large enough to inflict enough damage on the British navy to make it weaker than some potential third navy, but not large enough to provoke or defeat the British outright. The British saw this risk fleet precisely as a challenge to British security and this prompted a destabilizing naval arms race. “Risk fleets” are risky.

56. Cited by Richard A. Bitzinger and Chong-pin Lin, “Off the books: analyzing and understanding Chinese defense spending,” paper presented to the 5th Annual AEI Conference on the People′s Liberation Army, Staunton Hill, VA, 17–19 June 1994, p. 6.

57. Interview, October 1995.

58. Based on various interviews with members of this community. For an earlier defence of a minimum deterrence-like doctrine see Wu Zhan, “Shilun zhanlue.”

59. The recent American nuclear posture review does not provide grounds for early optimism on this score. However, there is increasingly serious attention being paid within the Pentagon to zero-nuclear or extremely low nuclear worlds in which traditional warfighting concepts are unrealistic. This is not an entirely altruistic vision, of course: anon- or low nuclear world would eliminate a great equalizer for poorer states in the face of America′s overwhelming advantages in high tech conventional warfare.

60. See Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 31 (21 August 1995).

61. See Chen Xueyin′s remarks in June 1993 on a CTB in JPRS-TND-93–026 (10 August 1993).Google Scholar

62. See the Chinese working paper on wording for an article on security assurances, CD/NTB/WP.122 (20 June 1994). See also CD/NTB/WP.124 (20 June 1994) for a proposal about the language of the CTBT preamble.

63. Acronym Booklet, No. 2 (May 1994); Acronym Booklet, No. 3 (September 1994).

64. On this point there does not appear to be a clear consensus in the Chinese strategist or arms control community on the value or function of an NFU. Some argue an NFU is un verifiable, but could have a moral suasion effect by delegitimating nuclear use, like the 1925 Geneva convention “taboo-ized” the use of chemical weapons. Some imply that, in essence, that NFU is cheap talk, doubting for instance the credibility of the Russian bilateral NFU pledge towards China. Some arms controllers in China have argued that an NFU can be verified through, for instance, the separation of warheads from delivery vehicles, by the revision of nuclear doctrines, no-targeting agreements, zero-alerts etc. See Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese perspectives on nuclear arms control”; plenary discussions of NFU at ISODARCO Beijing Arms Control Seminar, May 1994.

65. For the Chinese position on PNEs see CD/NTB/WP. 167 (23 August 1994); Garrett and Glaser “Chinese perspectives on nuclear arms control”; Interview, December 1994.

66. Acronym Booklet, No. 3 (September 1994).

67. “CTBT Negotiations Geneva Update No. 13,” Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 11 (16 September 1994).

68. “Working Paper on the CTBT Verification,” CD/NTB/WP.78 (2 June 1994).

69. Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese perspectives on nuclear arms control.” The expense of the Chinese-proposed verification regime was also prohibitively high and its scope unnecessarily comprehensive, according to some delegations.Google Scholar

70. Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 32 (8 September 1995). Most other CD delegates, and certainly the other members of the Perm-5, accept some role for NTM as long as it is not used in a discriminatory way. It is possible that the final text may reflect some compromise from China on this issue, according to one observer (correspondence with Rebecca Johnson, 27 May 1996).

71. See the Chinese working paper, “Entry into force of the CTBT,” CD/NTBAVP. 123 (20 June 1994).Google Scholar

72. Xinhua, 22 October 1994, FBIS-CHI94–205 (24 October 1994). See also Glaser and Garrett, “Chinese perspectives on nuclear arms control.”

73. These concerns were reported on Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 32 (5 September 1995).Google Scholar

74. China initially took a tough position on the scope of the treaty, opposing any tests that result in the release of nuclear energy. This was aimed, presumably, at the U.S. ability to conduct hydro-nuclear and in-lab tests that could help with new warhead designs. This was consistent with the interest in maximizing constraints on other states. After the U.S. and France committed themselves to zero-yield - essentially the Chinese position - there was some suspicion in the CD that in reality the Chinese were hoping that the CTBT would allow yields up to 500 tons, as this would allow China to test new designs. These suspicions were reinforced by the failure of the Chinese head of delegation, ShaZukang, to reaffirm China′s commitment to a zero yield in a major speech to the CD in early September 1995. Observers from non-governmental organizations report that the majority of CD delegations believed China was holding up negotiations. Indeed, China opposed intersessional negotiations between CD plenaries, even though these negotiations could speed up the drafting process. Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 32 (8 September 1995). China was the only state to abstain in a consensus resolution calling for the conclusion of a CTBT by June 1996 passed by the United Nations First Committee in November 1995. In March 1996 China finally agreed to the term “zero yield.” See Rebecca Johnson, “CTB negotiations - Geneva update No. 27,” Disarmament News, 9 April 1996.

75. For more formal analysis of image costs in Chinese diplomacy see Alastair Iain Johnston “Defective cooperation: China and international environmental institutions,” paper presented to “Reconciling Economic Growth and Environmental Protection in China: Domestic Challenges, Global Concerns and Prospects for Cooperation” sponsored by the University Committee on the Environment, Harvard University, Cambridge MA, 1–3 June 1995.

76. At the ISODARCO Beijing Arms Control Seminar in May 1994 it was clear at that time Chinese scientists had not really discussed much what a fissile material production ban might mean to China.

77. At the ISODARCO seminar in May 1994, this was the position a Chinese arms control scientist guessed the Chinese government would take on the issue once it faced it. See also Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright and Yong Liu, “Chinese participation in fissile material cutoff convention,” Union of Concerned Scientists, unpublished ms, June 1995, pp. 9–10.

78. This is explained in Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, Beyond Safeguards: A Program for More Comprehensive Control of Weapons-usable Fissile Material (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, May 1994). See also Gronlund, Wright and Liu, “Chinese participation,” pp. 12–14.Google Scholar

79. Gronlund, Wright and Liu “Chinese participation,” p. 2.

80. On this history of the 50% figure, see Alastair Iain Johnston “Learning versus adaptation: explaining change in Chinese arms control policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” The China Journal, No. 35 (January 1996).

81. See Wu Zhan “prospects of nuclear disarmament,” paper presented to ISODARCO Beijing Arms Control Seminar, Beijing, October 1992, p. 12, and Wu Zhan “Some thoughts on nuclear arms control,” paper presented to Workshop on Possible Interlinked South Asia and Worldwide Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Initiatives, sponsored by the Federation of American Scientists, Shanghai, February 1994, p. 10. This is a somewhat curious position for one who has in the past come closest to advocating minimum deterrence.Google Scholar

82. For one vision of a very deep cuts regime see Molander and Wilson, The Nuclear Asymptote, pp. 47–55.Google Scholar

83. Interview with a researcher at the Federation of American Scientists, July 1995.

84. See FAS Public Interest Report, Vol. 45, No. 3 (May/June 1992); J. Jerome Holton, Lora Lumpe and Jeremy J. Stone, “Proposal for a zero-ballistic missile regime,” in American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1993 Science and International Security Anthology (Washington, 1993), pp. 379–396; and Lora Lumpe, “A flight test ban as a tool for curbing ballistic missile proliferation,” Washington, unpublished ms., January 1995.

85. The Chinese reaction was evidently mixed. One participant objected that this would prevent China from deploying in areas with caves useful for basing and protecting Chinese missiles. Another, however, expressed somewhat more interest. Interview, June 1994.

86. Zhan Boke, “A concept of ballistic missile non-proliferation,” unpublished paper, April 1995. While many of these are eminently reasonable from the perspective of global order, they also clearly serve the Chinese interest in preserving its ballistic missile capabilities, in preventing the U.S. from transferring F-16s to Taiwan, and in preventing the U.S. from testing TMD systems. Molander and Wilson also suggest that a deep cuts regime would require monitoring nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. The Nuclear Asymptote, p. 53.

87. See for instance the House of Representatives′ National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Subtitle C - Ballistic Missile Defence Act of 1995; and the Heritage Foundation′s Missile Defence Study Team, Defending America: A Near- and Long-term Plan to Deploy Missile Defenses (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1995).Google Scholar

88. Arms controllers with the Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology and the China Aerospace Corporation recently termed the ABM “the most important U.S.-Russian arms control agreement in force at present.” The treaty is “indispensable” for nuclear stability and for further reductions in nuclear arsenals below START I levels. Liu Erxun and Huang Zuwei, ′TMD and the ABM Treaty,“ unpublished paper, August 1995.

89. Lisbeth Gronlund, George Lewis, Theodore Postol and David Wright, ”Highly capable theater missile defence and the ABM treaty,“ Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 83 (April 1994), pp. 3–8.

90. See the commentary by various COSTTND arms control specialists: Li Bin, The effects of ballistic missile defence on Chinese attitudes towards arms control,” SSRCMacArthur Newletter, No. 7 (May 1995), p. 18; Liu Huaqiu, “Zhongguo he junkong zhengce pingxi” (“Commentary on China′s nuclear arms control policies”), Xiandai junshi, Vol. 19, No. 11 (November 1995), pp. 15–18Google Scholar; Qin Zhongmin, “Caijun jincheng zhong de niliu: ping Meiguo fazhan he bushu xianjin fan zhanqu daodan xitong jihua” (“An adverse current in the disarmament process: a critique of American plans to develop and deploy advanced theatre missile defence systems”), in Ibid. pp. 12–14. Liu noted that U.S. TMD was clearly directed at China. Liu Er-xun and Huang Zuwei remarked somewhat more indirectly that if TMD goes forward, “it is entirely possible that the small nuclear powers will seek to offset the threat posed by TMD deployments to increase the size of their existing strategic forces. They might also decide to upgrade their nuclear warheads and go so far as to require nuclear testing to improve their nuclear warheads in order to counter advanced TMD systems.” Liu Er-xun and Huang Zuwei, “TMD and the ABM Treaty.”

91. “Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other … The Presidents … will consider expanding cooperative efforts in theater missile defense technology and exercises, study ways of sharing data obtained through early warning systems, discuss theater missile defense architecture concepts, and seek opportunities for joint research and development in theater missile defense.” Joint Statement, 10 May 1995. Such language is hardly likely to assuage Chinese concerns that U.S. TMD will be aimed primarily at China.

92. This point is made by Gronlund, Wright and Liu, “Chinese participation,” pp. 7–8.

93. It is not entirely clear why China is so sensitive to image costs and benefits. One argument comes from the literature on rational bargaining: actors prefer good reputations so as to increase the credibility of their commitment to co-operation in other issue areas. See Kreps, David M., “Corporate culture and economic theory,” in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 90–143, and Charles Lipson, “Why are some international agreements informal?” International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 511–12. This applies mostly, however, to co-operative bargaining situations in which players seek joint gains, or care about absolute rather than relative gains. For actors who believe they are in a highly competitive bargaining situation, e.g. a prisoner′s dilemma, or who prefer to freeride, the concern about reputation has less to do with the credibility of future commitments (since they would prefer to defect in the future) and more to do with deception, convincing other players that they are not a defector and that the others should continue to co-operate, or support their interests in other policy areas, even though in the end they do not co-operate. An alternative explanation has to do with self-legitimation: Chinese leaders and attentive elites may actually believe China is unlike other major powers, that is positions are morally principled and that it does not practise power politics. See Shih Chih-yu, China′s Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) pp. 3, 33, 35). When its behaviour leads to criticisms that it is acting contrary to its self-identification, China is compelled to act in ways to minimize these criticisms. A third, and related, identity explanation is that China′s leaders hold self-identities as members of the developing world. As social psychological literature suggests, the urge to belong to an “in-group” is deeply rooted in individuals and groups. See Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and identity,” International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 229–252. Thus actors are especially sensitive to audience reactions that imply the in-group doubts the genuineness of the identity of an actor. Peter Van Ness, however, suggests there is less than meets the eye to China′s claims to be a member of the Third World. See his “China as a Third World state: foreign policy and official national identity,” in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (eds.), China′s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Sorting through these alternative explanations deserves to be the subject of a whole different article.Google Scholar