Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T00:37:36.713Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Kevin J. O'Brien  and
Lianjiang Li
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

It all began when angry villagers accused the Party secretary of turning off the electricity to an ice lolly (binggunr or popsicle) factory whose owner had refused to pay bribes. The lolly maker had not been paying his rent but that was no reason, they said, to melt his stock and to cause the bank to foreclose on the village's most profitable enterprise.

Type
China, China Studies and The China Quarterly: A Symposium of Editorial Reflections on the Occasion of the 35th Anniversary of The China Quarterly
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 143 , September 1995 , pp. 756 - 783
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Interviews, Wangjiacun, 1993. Throughout this article, all personal and place names related to “Wangjiacun” have been altered. Wangjiacun is a middle-income, medium-sized, largely agricultural village in north China. For further information on our interviews and methodology see the appendix at the end of the article.

2 Interviews, Wangjiacun, 1994.

3 Interviews, Wangjiacun, 1993.

4 Interviews, Wangjiacun, 1994.

5 On “everyday resistance,” see James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Forrest D. Colburn (ed.), Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989); James C. Scott and Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South-East Asia (London: Frank Cass, 1986).

6 On “in-between forms of resistance,” see Andrew Turton, “Patrolling the middleground: methodological perspectives on ‘everyday peasant resistance’,” in Scott and Kerkvliet, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South-East Asia, p. 45. Several treatments of peasant rebellion in dynastic China include Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1913 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1976); Elizabeth J. Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China 1845–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980); Robert Marks, Rural Revolution in South China: Peasants and the Making of History in Haifeng County, 1570–1930 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); James Tong, Disorder under Heaven: Collective Violence in the Ming Dynasty (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). A useful analysis of millenarian, class conflict and local politics approaches to rebellion is available in Daniel Little, Understanding Peasant China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 145–186.

7 In Wangjiacun, one of the key activists retained the original complaint, while photocopies made in the county town were passed on to township and later county officials.

8 This is one reason that corruption charges are difficult to pursue; many cadre actions exist in a “grey area” and are subject to several interpretations. A pattern of mass letters “mirroring elite concerns” and helping policy implementation has also been identified for 1962–84. See Burns, John P., Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 151.Google Scholar On succeeding by arguing that “cadre behavior conflicted with the formal values or laws of the current regime,” see David Zweig, “Struggling over land in China: peasant resistance after collectivization, 1966–1986,” in Colbum, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, p. 170.

9 Tongshun, Cheng, “Dangqian Zhongguo nongmin de zhengzhi canyu” (“Political participation of current Chinese peasants”), pp. 11–12, unpublished Master's thesis, Nankai University, March 1994.Google Scholar

10 For an extended discussion of this topic, see Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, “Villagers and popular resistance in contemporary China,” Modern China, forthcoming.

11 Displacing dissatisfaction to an acceptable issue is a common tactic. In a township near Wangjiacun, villagers ousted a Party secretary who was a model implementer of the birth control policy by publicizing a retaliatory theft of another village's transformer he had organized, to most villagers' acclaim, several years before.

12 See Guomin, Fang, “Dui dangqian nongcun jiti shangfang qingkuang de diaocha fenxi” (“Investigation and analysis of the current situation of groups seeking audiences at higher levels”), Xiangzhen luntan, No. 12 (December 1993), p. 36.Google Scholar

13 These “hot topics” are drawn from Cheng Tongshun, “Dangqian Zhongguo nongmin,” p. 11. For a long but far from exhaustive list of forms of cadre corruption and abuse, see Oi, Jean C., “Market reforms and corruption in rural China,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 22, Nos. 2–3, (Summer 1989), pp. 221–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Interviews, Shandong, July 1994; Cheng Tongshun, “Dangqian Zhongguo nongmin,” pp. 11–12.

15 Fang Guomin, “Dui dangqian nongcun,” p. 36.

16 Surveying written channels of peasant participation in the commune era, John Burns, Political Participation in Rural China, (pp. 148, 151) concluded: “petitioning was not well developed or widely used by the peasants,” and “probably few peasants chose to participate in politics by writing to authorities.” More recently, Thomas P. Bernstein has argued that farmer grievances grew in the second half of the 1980s and into the 1990s. See Bernstein, “In quest of voice: China's farmers and prospects for political liberalization,” paper presented at the University Seminar on Modern China, February 1994. On a “high tide” of complaints in one Henan city, see Fang Guomin, “Dui dangqian nongcun,” p. 36.Google Scholar

17 Zuzhibu, Zhonggong Cixian Xianwei, “You zhuanggao zhibu shuji yinchu de sikao” (“Thoughts on lodging complaints against Party secretaries”), Ganbu yu rencai, No. 12 (December 1993), p. 36.Google Scholar

18 For the quoted text, see Cheng Tongshun, “Dangqian Zhongguo nongmin,” p. 11. For the original reference to 500 visits and a 28% increase, see Jinsu, Tang and Jianjun, Wang, “Nanyi huibi de redian: jinnian nongcun ganqun guanxi toushi” (“Hot issues that are hard to avoid: perspectives on rural cadre-mass relations in recent years”). Investigation report prepared for the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1989, p. 4.Google Scholar A shortened version of this article appeared in Difang zhengzhi yu xingzheng. No. 3 (March 1990), pp 15–20, No. 4, pp. 13–17 and No. 5, pp. 56–60. See also Ministry of Civil Affairs official, Zhenyao, Wang, “Woguo nongcun de lishixing biange yu cunmin zizhi de biran qushi” (“Ourcountry's historical reform and the inevitable trend of villagers' autonomy”), in Minzhengbu, Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshe Si Nongcunchu (ed.), Cunmin zizhi shifanjiangxi ban shiyongjiaocai (Teaching Materials for the Study Group on Villagers' Autonomy Demonstration), November 1991, p. 44.Google Scholar Anecdotal evidence of increasing numbers of shangfang gaozhuang also exists. In one village outside Shijiazhuang, in the years up to 1990, over 40 mass complaints were lodged with higher levels each year. Groups of villagers visited the township daily and one delegation even travelled to Beijing to seek an audience. See Yonghui, Bao and Xinrui, Li, “Cunmin zizhi shifou fuhe Zhongguo guoqing?” (“Does villagers' autonomy accord with China's conditions?”) in Minzhengbu jiceng zhengquan jianshe si, Cunmin zizhi banfa tansuo (An Exploration of Methods of Villagers' Autonomy), July 1991, pp. 49–50.Google Scholar A slightly shortened version of this report appeared in Xiangzhen luntan, No. 6, (June 1991) pp. 11–13. For information on rural complaints shortly after the Cultural Revolution, see Li, He, Beijing gaozhuangqun (Complainants to Beijing) (Hong Kong: Jingbao wenhua qiye youxian gongsi, 1991).Google Scholar

19 Interviews, Shandong, July 1994.

20 Fang Guomin, “Dui dangqian nongcun,” pp. 36–37.

21 These structural changes can also be considered changes in the “political opportunity structure.” See Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 17–18Google Scholar and ch. 5. See Zweig, “Struggling over land in China,” pp. 162–170, for an argument that increasing awareness of exploitation, weakening collective controls, and improved legal protection have made peasants more willing and able to protect their land.

22 In one wealthy Hebei village we were told that it was not uncommon for cadres to make ten visits to a family before the grain tax was paid. On 35 township representatives surrounding 78 family homes for three days in order to collect 5.5 yuan per household in fees for education and military dependents, see Diaochazu, Hebei Sheng Minzhengting, “Guanyu san lei cun guanche cunweihui zuzhifa de diaocha” (“An investigation of the implementation of the organic law of Villagers' committees in third class villages”), pp. 46–47, in Minzhengbu cunji zuzhi jianshe zhuangkuang diaochazu, Cunji zuzhi jianshe zhuangkuang diaocha xuanbian (Selection of Investigations of the Situation in Village Level Organizational Construction), December 1989.Google Scholar

23 A researcher associated with a prefectural Party organization department in Hunan defines dingzihu as “rural households which reject the guidance of national policy and refuse to carry out national, township and village tasks.” See Weiliang, He, “Jiceng dang lingdao bixu zhongshi zuo nongcun ‘dingzihu’ de zhuanhua gongzuo” (“Grassroots Party leaders must attach importance to transforming rural dingzihu into their opposite”), unpublished paper, April 1992, p. 2.Google Scholar He also cites estimates that 5% of rural households nationwide are dingzihu. The quotation cited in the text continues: “Whomever doesn't fulfil tasks provided for at higher levels has a large force bear down on them. Cadres seize their grain, confiscate their appliances, tear down their homes and surround their houses so pregnant women cannot escape.” For a discussion of dingzihu and their singularly disruptive form of resistance, as well as their relationship to so-called diaomin and shunmin, see Lianjiang Li and O'Brien, “Villagers and popular resistance.”

24 San yao ganbu are discussed in Kean, Wang, “Cunmin weiyuanhui de xianzhuang yu gaige” (“The present situation and reform of Villagers' committees”), in Zhang, Houan, Bai, Yihua and Wu, Zhilong (eds.), Zhongguo xiangzhen zhengquan jianshe (Power Construction of Chinese Towns and Townships) (Chengdu: Sichuan chubanshe, 1992), pp. 187–88.Google Scholar On village cadres who demand much but provide little, see Xuejun, Yang and Xinmin, Sun, “Lishun xiang zhengfu yu cunmin weiyuanhui zhijian de guanxi” (“Rationalize relations between township governments and Villagers' committees”), in Zhongguo, Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshe Yanjiuhui (eds.), Shijian yu sikao (Practice and Reflection) (Shenyang: Liaoning chubanshe, 1989), p. 114Google Scholar; Zhang Houan, “Cunmin weiyuanhui de xianzhuang, wenti yu duice,” (“The current situation of Villagers' committees, problems and policies”), in Zhang Houan, Bai Yihua and Wu Zhilong, Zhongguo xiangzhen zhengquan jianshe, pp. 204—205.

25 This argument is also suggested in Tang Jinsu and Wang Jianjun, “Nanyi huibi de redian,” pp. 3–6, and Zhiqiang, Duan and Jinsu, Tang, “Gansu sheng nongcun jiceng zuzhi zhuangkuang diaocha baogao” (“Investigation report on the current situation in grassroots rural organizations in Gansu province”), unpublished paper, 1989.Google Scholar

26 In the 15 villages we visited in coastal Shandong and coastal and inland Fujian, typically one-third of the villagers were said to be “away on business” at any given time.

27 Such measures may be unknown because township and village cadres have chosen to withhold documents or to ignore oral communications they have received from higher levels.

28 Tongshun, Cheng, “Dangqian Zhongguo nongmin,” pp. 12–13; Interviews, Beijing, 1994.Google Scholar Bao Yonghui and Li Xinrui (see nn. 18, 41) are Xinhua reporters.

29 Interviews, Wangjiacun, 1994.

30 Interview, township official, 1993.

31 Interview with a rural researcher, July 1994.

32 The extent of villager dependence on village cadres since reform has been a lively subject of debate. For several perspectives, see Oi, Jean C., State and Peasant in Contemporary China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Unger, Jonathan, “State and peasant in post-revolution China,” Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 17 (October 1989), pp. 133–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shue, Vivienne, The Reach of the State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Croll, Elisabeth J., “Reform, local political institutions and the village economy in China,” Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 3 (December 1987), p. 47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Unger, Jonathan, “The decollectivization of the Chinese countryside: a survey of twenty-eight villages,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 58 (Winter 1985–86), pp. 585–606.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On farmer “interest conflicts” with the state, see Thomas P. Bernstein, book manuscript, in progress.

33 For discussions of this concept, see Tarrow, Power in Movement, ch. 4; Kitschelt, Herbert P., “Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16 (1986), pp. 57–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34 On tactical innovation, see McAdam, Doug, “Tactical innovation and the pace of insurgency,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 48 (1983), pp. 735–754.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A recent discussion of “repertoires of contention” can be found in Tilly, Charles, “Contentious repertoires in Great Britain, 1758–1834,” Social Science History, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 253–80.Google Scholar

35 Interview, township official. 1993.

36 Interview, Shandong, 1994. In a paper compiled by the Party committee and people's government of Zhangqiu county, Shandong, recent efforts to reduce collective shangfang are discussed in a section focusing on “social stability.” See “Jiaqiang he gaishan dang dui nongcun gongzuo de lingdao shixing yi fa jianzhi, yi zhi zhicun, minzhu guanli” (“Strengthen and improve the Party's leadership of rural work, establish institutions according to law, use institutions to govern the village, and manage democratically”), paper presented at the National Conference on Ruling Villages According to Law, 1992, p. 15.

37 On village “compacts” of various kinds, see Anagnost, Ann, “Socialist ethics and the legal system,” in Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. and Perry, Elizabeth J., Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modem China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).Google Scholar The quoted text appears on p. 178. See also O'brien, Kevin J., “Implementing political reform in China's villages,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 32 (July 1994), pp. 43–44.Google Scholar

38 On the operation of Villagers' Committees and Villagers' Representative Assemblies, see O'Brien, “Implementing political reform,” pp. 33–59; Lawrence, Susan V., “Democracy, Chinese style,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 32 (July 1994), pp. 61–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39 Interview with a provincial and a municipal civil affairs official, July 1994. In the past few years, Xiangzhen luntan has reported many collective complaints concerning election irregularities. See Jianfeng, Wang, “Fa da? quan da'?” (“Which is bigger: law or power”), No. 10 (October 1992), p. 32Google Scholar; Yuan, Tian, “Zhongguo nongcun jiceng de minzhu zhilu” (“The path to grassroots democracy in rural China”), No. 6 (June 1993), pp. 3–4Google Scholar; Xingliang, Shao, Suozhi, Cui, Baolin, Meng and Xueliang, Sun, “Yi min wei tian” (“Regarding the people as sovereign”), No. 4 (April 1994), pp. 10–11.Google Scholar Complaints over election irregularities can also be found in Minzhengbu jiceng zhengquan jianshesi nongcunchu, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju yanjiu baogao – taolun gao (Draft Research Report on Rural China's Villagers' Committee Re-elections), August 1993. This report was published by Zhongguo shehui chubanshe in June 1994.

40 Interview with a Ministry of Civil Affairs official, Beijing, June 1994.

41 Yonghui, Bao and Xinrui, Li, “Shenhua nongcun dierbu gaige de qiji” (“The turning point in deepening the second stage of rural reform”), in Minzhengbu jiceng zhengquan jianshe si, Cunmin zizhi banfa tansuo (An Exploration of Methods of Villagers' Autonomy), July 1991, p. 44.Google Scholar A slightly different version of this article appeared in Xiangzhen luntan, No. 5 (May 1991), pp. 17–18; Interview, township official, 1993.

42 For western analysis of the Law, see Potter, Pitman, “The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: changing the relationship between the courts and administrative agencies in China,” Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 1991), pp. 3–21Google Scholar; Finder, Susan, “Like throwing an egg against a stone? Administrative litigation in the People's Republic of China,” Journal of Chinese Law, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 1–28Google Scholar; Wood, Stephen G. and Chong, Liu, “China's Administrative Procedure Law: an English translation with comments,” Administrative Law Review, Vol. 43 (Winter 1991), pp. 89–111.Google Scholar

43 For citations to rural lawsuits, see Cheng Tongshun, “Dangqian Zhongguo nongmin,” pp. 14–15.

44 Interviews, township officials, 1993 and 1994.

45 Interview, township official, 1994.

46 Bums, Political Participation in Rural China, pp. 139–152; Falkenheim, Victor C., “Political participation in China,” Problems of Communism, Vol. 27 (May-June 1978), pp. 18–32Google Scholar; Townsend, James R., Political Participation in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).Google Scholar For a nuanced treatment of peasant participation in the Maoist era and an argument that current “peasant discontent is unlikely to be canalized in the service of broader goals,” see Blecher, Marc, “The contradictions of grass-roots participation and undemocratic statism in Maoist China and their fate,” in Brandy, Womack (ed.), Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 129—152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a contrasting perspective on “peasant democratic potential,” see Friedman, Edward, “Deng versus the peasantry: recollectivization in the countryside,” Problems of Communism, Vol. 39 (September-October 1990), pp. 30–43.Google Scholar

47 Burns, John, “Political participation of peasants in China,” in Falkenheim, Victor C. (ed.), Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1987), pp. 113–15Google Scholar; Falkenheim, “Political participation in China,” pp. 27–29.

48 Shi, Tianjian, “Political participation in Beijing: a survey study,” Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1992Google Scholar; Tang, Wenfang, “Workplace participation in Chinese local industries,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August 1993), pp. 920–940CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tang, Wenfang, Parish, William L. and Yang, Guansan, “Interest articulation and political participation in urban China,” unpublished paper, September 1993.Google Scholar More generally, on political culture, see Nathan, Andrew J. and Shi, Tianjian, “Cultural requisites for democracy in China: findings from a survey,” Daedalus, Vol. 122, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 95–124.Google Scholar

49 All the information on Wangjiacun in the remainder of this account is drawn from interviews conducted in 1993 and 1994.

50 Bao Yonghui and Li Xinrui, “Shenhua nongcun dierbu,” p. 48.

51 The role of demobilized soldiers in rural political action deserves more attention. It is worth noting that a retired soldier also initiated the complaint against the cadres in Liang village, Hebei that was discussed above. See ibid. Reports also suggest that a PLA veteran was instrumental in leading the 1993 unrest in Renshou county. Bernstein, “In quest of voice,” pp. 67–72.

52 A Ministry of Civil Affairs official also emphasized the importance of political campaigns for combating cadre corruption, Beijing, July 1994. Older cadres may not have prospered as much as younger ones, but cadres who retired before decollectivization have often received even less. See Yan, Yunxiang, “The impact of rural reform on economic and social stratification in a Chinese village,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 27 (January 1992), pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

53 Wangjiacun interview, 1994.

54 Chao, Yue, “Diaomin yu diaoguan” (“Shrewd and recalcitrant peasants and officials”), Xiangzhen luntan, No. 8 (August 1993), p. 21Google Scholar; also interview, township official, 1993. While many officials and analysts use the terms diaomin and dingzihu (see above) interchangeably, several township leaders and rural experts we have spoken to make a further distinction. They point out that although many dingzihu or diaomin are lawless near-rebels, others are defiant yet law-abiding. For further analysis of the distinction between dingzihu and diaomin, see lianjiang Li and O'Brien, “Villagers and popular resistance.”

55 Avoiding illegal acts is so important that one activist even gave up gambling once the complaint was filed. Interview, Wangjiacun, 1994.

56 Interview, Wangjiacun, 1994.

57 Interview, township official, 1993.

58 Interview, Wangjiacun, 1994.

59 For villagers, to gaozhuang can mean to lodge a complaint or to file a lawsuit. On the aversion of pre-1949 peasants to songshi (litigation-mongers) and lawsuits, see Xiaotong, Fei, “A society without litigation,” in From the Soil (a translation of Xiangtu Zhongguo) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 101–107.Google Scholar For a recent explanation of why many Chinese “dread” or “find lawsuits disgusting,” and how officials discourage lawsuits (e.g. call the complainant a diaomin and the lawyer a litigation-monger, return the complaint to the charged party, disguise retaliation such as being sent to a frontier area as an honour, countersue, and so on), see Leshan, Dong, “Wei ‘daguansi’ jiaohao” (“In praise of lawsuits”), Suibi, No. 4 (1993), pp. 23–28.Google Scholar

60 As above, all the following information on Wangjiacun is drawn from interviews conducted in 1993 and 1994.

61 That complainants frequently become corrupt soon after they replace incumbents, and that this commonly leads to another round of complaints, is discussed in Fang Guomin, “Dui dangqian nongcun,” p. 37.

62 Interviews, Wangjiacun, 1993 and 1994.

63 Interestingly, the original leader of the activists in Wangjiacun, Zhang, dropped out as soon as Wang offered him a sufficient bribe.

64 A Ministry of Civil Affairs official explained: “when 50 or 60 villagers have signed a gaodiuang that has reached the Centre, it's invariably a justified complaint.” This official also added the appearance of groups of farmers at the Central Discipline Inspection Committee in Beijing (there were three ongoing cases from one province in 1994) made it easier for him to urge attention to Villagers' rights. He explained that he used large, collective complaints to convince cadres in other “systems” and at lower levels of the dangers of ignoring farmer's interests and failing to implement the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees. Interview, Beijing, 1994.

65 In this vein, Moore, Barrington has written, “A very small degree of social support … is sufficient to shatter the mystique of oppression and deception and permit a critical response to surface.” Moore, Barrington, Inequality: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), p. 116.Google Scholar

66 To this day, the activists do not know how much Wang received from the prospecting team. Wang claims that the records have been lost.

67 This is also a common tactic used by complainants in Hebi city, Henan. See Fang Guotnin, “Dui dangqian nongcun,” p. 36. Wang is particularly vulnerable to financial scrutiny because he has bought an urban household registration, has no land, and has no visible income from fanning or any other source, save his small cadre subsidy.

68 Interviews, Wangjiacun, 1994.

69 Interviews, township officials, 1993.

70 See Chenggong, Zhang, “Cunzhang si yu chunjie” (“Village heads die at Spring Festival”), Landun, No. 3 (March 1993), pp. 23–27.Google Scholar

71 Interview, township official, 1993.

72 On cadres abandoning their positions, see Hebei sheng minzhengting diaochazu, “Guanyu sanlei cun,” pp. 45–49. The quotation appears on p. 48. On “paralysed villages” more generally, see O'Brien, “Implementing political reform,” pp. 51–53.

73 On using public funds to entertain higher-level officials, and bribing them to become “protective umbrellas,” see Fang Guomin, “Dui dangqian nongcun,” p. 36.

74 Interviews, Wangjiacun and township officials, 1994.

75 Interview, township official, 1993.

76 Interviews, Wangjiacun, 1994.

77 Interview, Wangjiacun, 1994. In Hebi city, Henan, in 1993, about 60% of the shangfang resulted in villagers demanding an audit of the village's books – sometimes up to ten years of records. Fang Guomin, “Dui dangqian nongcun,” p. 36.

78 The information in this paragraph is drawn from Fang Guomin, “Dui dangqian nongcun,” pp. 36–37.

79 Interview, township official, 1993.

80 Interview, 1993. On the practice of “sitting quietly” (jingzuo) at the gate of a county government, see Wang Zhenyao, “Woguo nongcun,” p. 44.

81 Fang Guomin, “Dui dangqian nongcun,” p. 36. On yuesu in the Qing Dynasty, see Ocko, Jonathan, “I'll take it all the way to Beijing,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 47, No. 2 (May 1988), pp. 291–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

82 For one of many versions of this saying, see Houan, Zhang and Guilan, Meng, “Wanshan cunmin weiyuanhui de minzhu xuanju zhidu, tuijin nongcun zhengzhi wending yu fazhan” (“Perfect the democratic electoral system of Villagers' committees, advance rural political stability and development”), Shehuizhuyi yanjiu. No. 4 (August 1993), p. 42Google Scholar; also interview with a rural researcher, 1994.

83 On villagers questioning Jiang Zemin about excessive fees during his tour of Hubei in December 1992, see Cheng Tongshun, “Dangqian Zhongguo nongmin,” p. 11. On whether grievants bypass local cadres because they trust the good intentions of higher levels or out of desperation, or both, see Bernstein, “In quest of voice,” p. 58.

84 Interview, township official, 1994; interview, Beijing, 1994.

85 Minzhengbu, Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshe Si (ed.), “Chengxiangjiceng zhengquan jianshe gongzuo jianbao” (“Briefings on urban and rural basic-level political power construction work”), 11 June 1991, pp. 1–16.Google Scholar Wan Li's words are followed by weaker recommendations from Peng Chong and Wang Hanbin to investigate the truthfulness of the reports and to consult Xinhua and the editorial board of People's Daily.

86 Sutang, Zhang and Guoji, Xie, “Shahai shangfang cunmin guofa nanrong, Henan siming cun ganbu bei chujue” (“National law does not tolerate murder of villagers who lodge complaints – Four village cadres in Henan are executed”), Renmin ribao (Haiwaiban) (People's Daily (Overseas Edition)), 29 March 1995, p. 4.Google Scholar

87 Zhonggong cixian xianwei zuzhibu, “You zhuanggao zhibu shuji yinchu de sikao,” p. 36.

88 For a discussion of “repertoires of contention,” see Tilly, Charles, The Contentious French (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

89 For definitions of “competitive,” “reactive” and “proactive” contention, see Tilly, Charles, “Rural collective action in modern Europe,” in Joseph, Spielberg and Scott, Whiteford (eds.), Forging Nations: A Comparative View of Rural Ferment and Revolt (East Lansing, ML: Michigan State University Press, 1976), pp. 9–40.Google Scholar These concepts have been applied to rural China in Perry, Elizabeth J., “Rural violence in socialist China,” The China Quarterly, No. 103 (September 1985), pp. 414–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Lianjiang Li and O'Brien, “Villagers and popular resistance.”