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Democratization and the Environment: Entrepreneurial Politics and Interest Representation in Taiwan*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Shui-Yan Tang  and
Ching-Ping Tang
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Extract

How does democratization affect environmental politics and policy? While some scholars have cited empirical evidence showing that democratic countries tend to have better environmental records than their authoritarian counterparts, others have debated the compatibility between democracy and sustainable environmental management. One may, for example, note that many environmental problems involve large numbers of individuals who suffer from spill-over effects of actions by small numbers of individuals or firms. Many serious water and air pollution problems, for instance, are caused by a few industrial plants, yet their effects are suffered by many people. Although popularly elected officials may have an incentive to develop policies to protect the environmental welfare of the many, these officials may also be influenced by a few polluters who are better organized and more resourceful in pressing their case in the policy process. Following this logic, one cannot definitely predict, at least in the short term, that democratization will help improve the environment.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 158 , June 1999 , pp. 350 - 366
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1999

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