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China's Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement and Power Projection*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

David Shambaugh
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International attention is increasingly focusing on the modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Discussions about the Chinese military have moved from intelligence circles and esoteric defence journals into the global media spotlight. Chinese moves in Burma and the South China Sea, continued nuclear testing, arms purchases and, exports, lack of budgetary transparency, increasing influence in elite politics and the political succession to Deng Xiaoping, and coercive pressure against Taiwan have all drawn attention to the PLA and have contributed to growing concerns about a muscular and assertive China.

Type
The People's Liberation Army Towards the 21st Century: Continuity and Change
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 146 , June 1996 , pp. 265 - 298
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1996

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References

1 See for example, Kristof, Nicholas, “The real Chinese threat,” New York Times, 27 August 1995Google Scholar; Strassner, Stephen, “Armed to the teeth,” Newsweek, 12 July 1995Google Scholar; Chanda, Nayan et al., “Fear of the dragon,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1995Google Scholar; Wain, Barry, “China tones up its military muscle,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 18 February 1995Google Scholar; Triplett, William C., “Inside China's scary new military industrial complex,” Washington Post, 8 May 1994Google Scholar; Walsh, James, “A leaner, meaner fighting machine,” Time, 10 May 1993Google Scholar; Mann, Jim and Holley, David, “China builds military: neighbors, U.S. uneasy,” Los Angeles Times, 13 September 1992Google Scholar

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5 Pentagon, 1995). 5. This view is commonplace in meetings with PLA officers and officials. See, for example, MacNamara, Robert S., Jeremiah, David E., McCarthy, James P.,Richardson, William R., Ross, Jimmy D., Lampton, David M., Shambaugh, David L. and Mei, June, Sino-American Military Relations: Mutual Responsibilities in the Post-Cold War World (New York: National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, China Policy Series No. 9, 1994).Google Scholar

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12 For two excellent assessments see Cheng, Li and Lynn T. White III, “The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping: familiar fealties and technocratic trends,” Asian Survey (August 1993), pp. 757–786Google Scholar; and Swaine, Michael D., The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1992).Google Scholar

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14 I have attempted to do this in a preliminary way elsewhere. See Shambaugh, David, “The building of the civil-military state in China, 1949–1965: bringing the soldier back in,” in Cheek, Timothy and Saich, Tony (eds.), The Construction of State Socialism in China, 1949–1965 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996). Hans van de Ven also attempts to do this in his “Militaries and militarism in Republican China,” The China Quarterly (June 1997), forthcoming.Google Scholar

15 This section draws upon my chapfer “China's commander-in-chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA,” in Mark Weisenbaum (ed.), Chinese Military Modernization (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1996).Google Scholar

16 For further biographical analysis of this cohort by demographic characteristics, militaryjjackground and career patterns, and level of education see Li Cheng and White, “The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping.”

17 Also see Mulvenon, James, “Education, retirement and functional specialization: evaluation of three professionalizing trends in the Chinese People's Liberation Army,” unpublished manuscript, November 1995.Google Scholar

18 Shambaugh, “China's commander-in-chief.” Also see Gause, Ken E., “Jiang Zemin and the PLA,” Jane's Intelligence Review (June 1995), pp. 277–281Google Scholar

19 I am grateful to John Corbett for pointing out these dates.

20 Among many such reports, see Huiwen, Ren, “CCP makes new policy decision on army participation in government and political affairs,” Xin bao (Hong Kong), 11 December 1992, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter FBIS-CHI), 14 December 1992, pp. 28–29.Google Scholar

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22 This is a personal impression gained during a meeting with Admiral Liu in May 1994

23 Interview with Japanese Foreign Ministry, April 1994.

24 This is not true of the PLA as a whole. Apparently a group of major generals and senior colonels support the publication of a Defence White Paper and increased transparency, but their proposals are being blocked by higher-ranking generals and the old guard who have an excessive and overly-protective sense of secrecy and suspicion of multilateral security regimes. Interviews with PLA officers, November 1993 and May 1994. In late 1995 China's State Council released a White Paper on China: Arms Control and Disarmament (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, November 1995), but this amounted to little more than a recapitulation of a familiar mantra and did little to alleviate foreign concerns.

25 See Ping, Lo, “Military attacks Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Zhengming, 1 July 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 26 July 1994, pp. 33–36Google Scholar; Lam, Willy Wo-lap, “Senior generals involved in foreign affairs,” South China Morning Post, 25 June 1994, p. 10.Google Scholar

26 While widely reported in the Hong Kong media, such PLA criticism of the Foreign Ministry has been confirmed in numerous interviews I have had with military and civilian personnel since 1991.

27 Discussions in Beijing, July 1995. Also see Shambaugh, David, “The United States and China: a new Cold War?” Current History (September 1995).Google Scholar

28 See Shambaugh, David, “Accommodating a frustrated power: the domestic sources of China's external posture,” paper presented at the 26th Sino-American Conference on Contemporary China, July 1995.Google Scholar

29 Zedong, Mao, “Problems of war and strategy,” Selected Works, Vol. II (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), p. 224.Google Scholar

30 The early stages of this campaign are traced in detail in Shambaugh, David, “The soldier and the state in China: the political work system in the People's Liberation Army,” The China Quarterly, No. 127 (September 1991), pp. 527–568Google Scholar

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32 See Shilong, Ning, Xin shiqi jundui dang de jianshe (Party Building in the Military During the New Era) (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1991)Google Scholar; Shikui, Lan, Dang dui jundui juedui lingdao lilun yu shixian (Theory and Practice of the Military's Absolute Loyalty to the Party (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1993)Google Scholar; Fangling, Gong and Xin, Du, Jundui dangwei gongzuo gailun (Survey of Party Committee Work in the Military) (Beijing: Junshi yiwen chubanshe, 1991)Google Scholar; Wu, Tang and Ruiqing, Zhu, “Central Military Commission promulgates decision on further augmenting Party building in the army,” Jiefangjun bao, 7 January 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 31 January 1995, pp. 15–18.Google Scholar

33 An excellent and comprehensive source is Yingyi, Deng , Jundui dang de jilu jiancha gongzuo gailun (Survey of Party Discipline Inspection Work in Military) (Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe, 1988 (neibu)).Google Scholar

34 Shambaugh, “The soldier and the state in China.” Despite this embryonic effort, given the plethora of materials now available (cf. nn. 30–31), the political work system in the PLA remains a subject ripe for research and a useful prism through which to view Party-army relations.Google Scholar

35 See Dreyer, June Teufel, “Corruption in the People's Liberation Army: for good or evil?” in Lilley, James (ed.), 5th Annual AEI Conference on the People's Liberation Army (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1994)Google Scholar; and Goodman, David S. G., “Corruption in the People's Liberation Army: structural imperatives in the transformation of the party-state,” paper presented to the conference on Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security Policy, Hong Kong, July 1994.Google Scholar

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37 See Bitzinger, Richard A. and Lin, Chong-Pin, The Defense Budget of the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: The Defense Budget Project, 1994); “World military expenditure: China,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 441–47; “China's military expenditure,” in International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance1995–1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 270–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lin, Chong-Pin, “Limits to professionalism: the extramilitary roles of the People's Liberation Army in modernization,” Security Studies (Summer 1992), pp. 659–689.Google Scholar

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39 See Folta, Paul Humes, From Swords to Plowshares? Defense Industry Reform in the PRC (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Gurtov, Mel, “Swords into market shares: China's conversion of military industry to civilian production,” The China Quarterly, No. 134 (June 1993), pp. 213–241Google Scholar; Cheung, Tai Ming, “Elusive ploughshares: Chinese defense plants turn to civilian production,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 October 1993, pp. 70–71.Google Scholar

40 “China New Model Army,” The Economist, 11 June 1994, pp. 71–72; and “Soldiering pays,” The Economist, 9 July 1994, pp. 69–70.

41 Directorate of Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency), China's Economy in 1992 and 1993: Grappling with the Risks of Rapid Growth (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), p. 9. Interestingly, an internal study conducted by the Military Development Institute of the PLA National Defence University in 1993 came up with the same figure for 1992 (converted to dollars). Interview with knowledgeable PLA officer, 29 October 1993.

42 Personal communication from knowledgeable Bermuda banker, 4 April 1995.

43 Cheung, Tai Ming, ‘The tainted millions: corruption raises its ugly head in the army,“ Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 August 1993, p. 13Google Scholar; Dobson, Chris, ”Beijing's enemy within the ranks,“ South China Morning Post Weekly, 30 April–1 May 1994, p. 11.Google Scholar

44 See, for example, Wen, Ji and Ruiqing, Zhu, ”Yu Yongbo stresses greater determination in pushing anti-corruption work in army at all-army conference on discipline inspection,“ Jiefangjun bao, 25 January 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 22 February 1995, pp. 28–30Google Scholar; Wen, Ji and Ruiqing, Zhu, ”Increase strength, perfect mechanisms-all-army conference on discipline inspection stresses further promoting the building of party style and clean administration in the army,“ Jiefangjun bao, 21 January 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 8 March 1995, pp. 42–43.Google Scholar

45 Mou, Leng, ”Central Military Commission strengthens management; Jiang Zemin calls for strict army administration,“ Guangjiaojing (Wide Angle)(Hong Kong), 16 October 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 4 November 1994, pp. 26–30.Google Scholar

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48 I am grateful to Col. Yao Yunzhu for helping to trace doctrinal evolution in the PLA over the last decade. See Yunzhu, Yao, “The evolution of military doctrine of the Chinese PLA from 1985 to 1995,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 57–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For Western analyses of the PLA's changing doctrine see Godwin, Paul H.B., “Changing concepts of doctrine, strategy, and operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, 1979–1987,” The China Quarterly,No. 112 (December 1987), pp. 572–576Google Scholar; Godwin, “Chinese defense policy and military strategy in the 1990s,” in Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991)Google Scholar; Godwin, “Chinese military strategy revised: local and limited war,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science(January 1992), pp. 191–201Google Scholar; Shambaugh, David, “The insecurity of security: the PLA's evolving doctrine and threat perceptions towards 2000,” The Journal of Northeast Asian Studies(Spring 1994), pp. 3–25Google Scholar; Shambaugh, “China's security in the post-Cold War era,” Survival(Summer 1992), pp. 88–106; and Shambaugh, “Growing strong.”Google Scholar

49 Zemin, Jiang, “Gaodu zhongshi he dali fazhan kexuejishu” (“High level advancement and great development of science and technology”), Jingji ribao,8 August 1991, p. 1.Google Scholar

50 Huaqing, Liu, “Unswervingly advance along the road of building a modern army with Chinese characteristics,” Jiefangjun bao,6 August 1993, in FBIS-CHI, 18 August 1993, p. 19.Google Scholar

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52 Ibid.p. 93.

53 Siyi, Jiang (ed.), Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun da cidian (Great Dictionary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army)(Tianjin: Tianjin People's Press, 1992), pp. 1809, 1827, 1843. Data on demobilizations to the PAP derive from U.S. Government sources.Google Scholar

54 International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1994–1995(London: Brasseys, 1995), p. 170.

55 China News Analysis(Hong Kong) No. 1511 (June 1994), p. 6.

56 “PLA officers, soldiers become better trained,” Xinhua Domestic Service, 24 September 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 29 September 1994, pp. 57–58.

57 “Veteran General Zhang Zhen's students are all over the three armed services,” Ming bao(Hong Kong), 9 November 1992, in FBIS-CHI, 13 November 1992, p. 40.

58 “PLA officers, soldiers become better trained,” p. 58.

59 “National Defence University reforms education,” Xinhua Domestic Service, 22 August 1992, in FBIS-CHI, 26 August 192, p. 42.

60 Ibid.

61 Xinhua Domestic Service dispatch, 17 July 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 19 July 1994, p. 32.

62 For an analysis of these and other changes in the organizational and command structure see Wang An, Jundui tiaoling yu guanli (Military Regulations and Management)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1992, junnei faxing).

63 Weike, Pan et al.,“New trail blazed in joint manoeuvres by land, sea and air forces,” Jiefangjun boo,26 August 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 30 September 1994, p. 51.Google Scholar

64 Cheung, Tai Ming, “Quick response,” Far Eastern Economic Review,14January 1993, pp. 19–20.Google Scholar

65 Jane's All the World Aircraft 1992–1993(Surrey, UK: Janes Information Group, 1993), pp. 201–202.

66 Donald, David and Lake, Jon (eds.), Encyclopedia of World Military Aircraft,Vol. 1 (London: Aerospace Publishing, 1994), p. 211.Google Scholar

67 See the assessment in MacNamara et ai, Sino-American Military Relations.

68 For general assessments of the PLA order-of-battle see United States General Accounting Office, Impact ofChina's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region;Caldwell, China's Conventional Military Capabilities, 1994–2004;John Caldwell and Paul H.B. Godwin, “China's force projection potential: an assessment of the PLA's conventional military capabilities, 1994–2005,” paper presented at the Fifth American Enterprise Institute Conference on the People's Liberation Army, June 1994; Godwin and Schultz, “Arming the dragon for the 21st century”; International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance,annual; Chong-Pin Lin, “Chinese military modernization”; Larry Wortzel, “China pursues traditional great power status,” Orbis(Spring 1994), pp. 157–175; and You Ji, “Chinese military modernization in the 1990s,” unpublished paper.

69 The best and most comprehensive source is Gill and Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions.

70 This assumes smooth development and production-an assumption which historically is not a safe one. The development of a variety of aircraft and guidance and propulsion systems, as well as submarine programmes have long been plagued by design and production difficulties.

71 General Jimmy D. Ross (U.S. Army Rtd.), lecture at the PLA National Defence University, 25 May 1994. This claim was not reassuring to the audience of PLA officers.

72 United States General Accounting Office, Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region,p. 16.

73 For explorations of the issues involved in calculating Chinese military expenditure and estimates of defence spending see International Institute of Strategic Studies, “China's military expenditure”; “World military expenditure: China”; Bitzinger and Chong-Pin Lin, Off the Books;Wang Shaoguang, “China's defence expenditure,” The China Quarterly,September 1996, forthcoming; Harris, James et al.,“Interpreting trends in Chinese defense spending,” in United States Congress Joint Economic Committee, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 676–677Google Scholar; and Shambaugh, David, “Wealth in search of power: the Chinese defense budget and revenue base,” paper presented at the conference on “Economic Reform and Chinese Security,” Hong Kong, July 1994.Google Scholar

74 Wortzel, ”China pursues traditional great power status,“ p. 167.Google Scholar

75 See Morgan, Joseph, Porpoises Among the Whales: Small Navies in Asia and the Pacific(Honolulu: East-West Center Special Reports No. 2, 1994). Also see John Downing, “China's evolving maritime strategy: parts I and II,” Jane's Intelligence Review(March and April 1996), pp. 129–133 and 186–191 respectively.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

76 Jingfu, Guan, “Commander of the PRC navy discloses latest movements of the PRC navy,” Guang Jiao Jing,16 November 1991, in Joint Publications Research Service, China Report,JPRS–CAR–92–013, 9 March 1992, p. 22.Google Scholar

77 No author, Defense Journal(No. 1–2, 1992), p. 57.

78 Jacobs, Gordon, “Chinese naval developments post-Gulf War,” Jane's Intelligence Review(February 1993), p. 84.Google Scholar

79 .The Military Balance, 1995–96,pp. 177–78.

80 Cowin, Hugh, Warships(London: Bloomsbury Books, 1986), p. 78.Google Scholar

81 No author, “New ships for the PLAN,” Jane's Defense Weekly,18 January 1992, p. 88; Caldwell, China's Conventional Military Capabilities,p. 7.

82 Acquired from Germany and the United States, respectively, prior to 1989.

83 Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992–93(Surrey, UK: Janes Information Group, 1993), p. 113.

84 China built 50 of the Dauphin-IIunder licence from France. The Chinese designation is Z-9 or Z-9A.

85 Cowan, Warships,p. 129.

86 “New ships for the PLAN,” p. 88.

87 “China's new naval missile,” International Defense Review(July 1992), p. 636.

88 Lennox, Duncan, “China's new anti-ship missile,” Jane's Intelligence Review(November 1992), pp. 512–513. Also see Gordon Jacobs, “China's naval missiles,” Asian Defense Journal(October 1990), pp. 65–74.Google Scholar

89 See Lewis, John Wilson and Litai, Xue, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).Google Scholar

90 The Military Balance 1995–96,p. 177.

91 “New variant of Chinese SSNs revealed,” World Aerospace & Defense Intelligence(8 October 1993), p. 17.

92 Janes Fighting Ships 1992–1993,p. 108.

93 Starr, Barbara, “USA keeps an eye on slow ‘Kilo’ to China,” Jane's Defense Weekly(25 February 1995), p. 3. Also see “Further on purchase of Russian submarines,” Asahi Shinbum,7 March 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 8 March 1995. p. 44.Google Scholar

94 Jordan, John, “The ‘Kilo’ class submarine,” Jane's Intelligence Weekly(September 1992), p. 429.Google Scholar

95 Richardson, Michael, “U.S. Admiral warns of China's big new navy,” International Herald Tribune,8 March 1995, p. 1.Google Scholar

96 See Mu, Lin, “The aviation dream of the Chinese people,” Shidian(Beijing), 8 July 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 24 August 1994, pp. 35–38; and You Ji, “Chinese military modernization in the 1990s,” citing unpublished Chinese sources.Google Scholar

97 See Allen, Kenneth W., People's Republic of China People's Liberation Army Air Force(Washington, D.C: Defense Intelligence Agency Report DIC-1300–445–91,1991)Google Scholar. For a more recent and definitive study see Allen, Kenneth W.,Krumel, Glenn and Pollack, Jonathan D., China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1995Google Scholar). For more dated assessments see Bueschel, R.M., Communist Chinese Air Power(New York: Praeger, 1968); and U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, The Chinese Armed Forces Today(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979).Google Scholar

98 Tyler, Patrick, “China to buy 72 advanced fighter planes from Russia,” New York Times, 1February 1996, p. 3.Google Scholar

99 Lake, John, Sukhoi Su–27 “Flanker”: The Most Complete Guide to Russia's Superfighter(London: Aerospace Publishing, 1994), pp. 23–24Google Scholar; Moeng, Sophearith(ed.), The Vital Guide to Military Aircraft(Shrewsbury, UK: Aerospace Publishing Ltd., 1994), p. 118.Google Scholar

100 See Allen el al., China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century,ch. 7.

101 Israel has continuously refused to comment on the issue. Among the numerous reports of Israeli assistance see Fulgham, David A., “New Chinese fighter nears prototyping,” Aviation Week and Space Technology,13 March 1995, pp. 26–27; and “China pursuing two fighter plan,” Aviation Week and Space Technology,27 March 1995, pp. 44–45Google Scholar; ann, Jim, “U.S. says Israel gave combat jet planes to China,” Los Angeles Times,28 December 1994, p. 1.Google Scholar

102 I am indebted to Michael Swaine for this information.

103 Quoted in “China to build new fighter by 2000,“ World Aviation, Space & Electronics Air Letter,No. 12,915, 20 January 1994, p. 1.

104 See also Shambaugh, David, ”Taiwan's security,“ The China Quarterly(December 1996), forthcoming.Google Scholar

105 Among many reports see Ashton, William, ”Chinese bases in Burma-fact or fiction?“ Jane's Intelligence Review(February 1995), pp. 84–87.Google Scholar