This article proposes that there is a general principle of international law concerning the humane treatment of animals. Preoccupation with “animal rights” has been associated with Western cultural imperialism masquerading as a universal ethic. Animal welfare is thus an instructive case study of what Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope have identified as the key challenge for international law, that of “construct[ing] normative institutions while admitting and upholding the diversity of peoples in international society.” This article applies the framework of interactional international law set out in Brunnée and Toope’s recent book Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, while raising questions about the weight that their analysis accords to practice and their willingness to conclude that widely recognized principles to which states fail to adhere in practice lack legal force. The article also examines how laws prohibiting cruelty to animals have emerged precisely from an interactive cultural exchange between East and West, in particular, between England and India. It concludes that Brunnée and Toope’s framework, although it does not deal at any length with general principles of law (a source of international law in which practice plays a relatively minor role), is nevertheless a useful tool for understanding how a culturally contested principle fits into international law and ultimately supports the view that there is a general principle of international law concerning animal welfare.

Between 2005 and 2011, there was much debate, both within Canada and at the United Nations (UN), over what role home states should play in the regulation and adjudication of human rights harms associated with transnational corporate conduct. In Canada, this debate focused upon concerns related to global mining that led to a series of government, opposition and multi-stakeholder reports and proposals. These culminated in 2010 with the appointment of an Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor and the defeat of Bill C-300, An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries. Meanwhile, at the UN Human Rights Commission/Council, John G. Ruggie was appointed Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights (SRSG). Ruggie’s work led to the 2008 Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights and the 2011 Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (the latter designed to “operationalize” the former). While both documents highlight state duties to protect against human rights violations by businesses and the need for access to remedies by victims, the role of home states in this regard was contested. This article compares the developments in Canada between 2005 and 2011 with the work of the SRSG in relation to the home state duty to protect human rights in the transnational corporate context. It also offers reflections on the implications of the inevitability of industry and industry lawyer participation for the development of home state legal obligations.

From its very inception, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has been a pioneer in addressing indigenous peoples’ issues, albeit initially from a culturally biased, integrationist perspective. Its contributions have progressed from the preparation of studies on the working conditions of indigenous peoples in the 1920s, to the elaboration of recommendations and conventions on indigenous labour rights in the early 1940s and 1950s, and most recently to the adoption of legally binding instruments recognizing a broader range of indigenous rights, such as those pertaining to land and resources, which are at the top of indigenous peoples’ agendas. This article reviews and assesses these developments with a particular focus on ILO Convention nos. 107 (1957) and 169 (1989). The author concludes that, setting aside its initially assimilationist orientation, the ILO has made invaluable contributions in partial satisfaction of indigenous demands and has succeeded in establishing a solid floor of basic, minimum prerequisites for the safeguarding of the dignity and rights of these most disadvantaged, both historically and presently, peoples.

Boundary disputes constitute one of the most delicate issues for states, such that it is not surprising that frontier issues are among the most recurrent before the International Court of Justice (IC J) and have given rise to a rich jurisprudence. This jurisprudence comprises traditional areas: consent in boundary treaties, the principle of uti possidetis juris, the notion of effectivités, and maritime delimitation. However, it also includes other topics that usually receive less attention, but which are nonetheless important to states and sometimes underlie their significant interest in boundary disputes. This article deals with such topics in order to show how the IC J has handled them in its boundary jurisprudence of the first decade of the new millennium. The author discusses IC J decisions addressing types of territory that cannot be appropriated, terra nullius, private rights, state succession, unilateral donations as sources of title to territory, irrelevant criteria in establishing title to territory (particularly historical consolidation), the use of maps, and state responsibility in connection with boundary disputes.

While the law of the sea is rightly viewed as the most suitable international legal regime for the settlement of disputes in the Arctic, the militarization of this region in an era of climate change is also observable. Yet curiously, scant attention has been paid to the constraints the international humanitarian law (IHL) would impose on armed conflict in the Arctic, as unlikely as such conflict may be. These constraints include the specific prohibition on causing widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions as well as the related obligation to have “due regard” for the natural environment, as referred to in, for example, the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea. Similarly, environmental factors must play into military assessments of targets based on the general principles of IHL related to targeting. The authors explore how these various legal obligations could be applied in the Arctic context. Referring to the scientific literature, they suggest that, due to the particularly vulnerable nature of this regional environment, many traditional war-fighting techniques would lead to damage that is not legally permissible. This conclusion should provide an additional incentive to policy makers to demilitarize the Arctic and to solve peacefully any disputes that may arise over sovereignty, navigation, or resources.

According to the International Court of Justice, any person through whom an international organization acts is an agent of that organization. However, this definition is too broad. Any participation in the fulfilment of the mission of an international organization does not necessarily make the person an agent of the international organization. After detailing the particularities of the status of international agents, this article considers the issue of accountability for wrongs attributable to them. It recommends in this respect the development of a system of accountability that combines national and international justice responses with priority to the former based on the location of the offence.

The history of European integration unmistakably shows that it has progressed step by step and is indeed an ongoing and irreversible process. One such step is the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December 2009, following negotiations spanning nearly a decade. The treaty aims, inter alia, at improving the functioning of the European Union (EU) and significantly amends the treaty basis of the EU as a supranational organization. It formally establishes the EU as a legal entity under public international law, strengthens the role of the European Parliament, and significantly reforms the role of the high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy. Moreover, the treaty has made the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights a legally binding and enforceable instrument and has expanded the competences of the EU in the fields of trade and other external commercial relations by providing it with exclusive competence to conduct the EU’s Common Commercial Policy. The author reviews these and other innovations of the Lisbon Treaty and briefly evaluates the treaty and its implications for the EU.