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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2016
2 For some of the extensive legal literature on Antarctica over the last twenty years, see Guyer, , “The Antarctic System,” 138 II Recueil des Cours 151 (1973)Google Scholar; Taubenfeld, , “A Treaty for Antarctica,” 531 Int. Cone. 245 (1960)Google Scholar; Hayton, , “The Antarctic Settlement of 1959,” 54 A.J.I.L. 349 (1960)Google Scholar; Auburn, , “The White Desert,” 19 I.C.L.Q. 229 (1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pallone, , “Resource Exploitation: The Threat to the Legal Regime of Antarctica,” 12 Int. Lawyer 547 (1978)Google Scholar; Kish, , The Law of International Spaces (1973)Google Scholar; Burton, , “New Stresses on the Antarctic Treaty,” 65 Virginia L. Rev. 421 (1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and generally issue No. 2, 33 U. of Miami L. Rev. 285 (1978).
3 Washington, December ι, 1959, 402 UNTS 71.
4 London, June 1, 1972, reproduced in 16 Polar Record 435 (1972), for comment see 21 I.C.L.Q. 806 (1972).
5 As to which see Roberts, , “International Cooperation for Antarctic Development: The Test for the Antarctic Treaty,” 19 Polar Record 107 (1978).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Roberts identifies several outstanding issues at 110 and 116: mineral exploration and exploitation, disposal of nuclear and other toxic wastes, icebergs as a source of fresh water, and man’s impact on the environment.
6 The states with territorial claims are the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, France, Norway, Chile, and Argentina. The sector claim to sovereignty is peculiar to the polar regions. For a classic discussion see Smedal, , The Acquisition of Territory in Polar Regions (Oslo, 1931).Google Scholar
7 For an account of conflicting claims in Antarctica after World War II and developments leading to the signing of the Treaty see Hanessian, , “The Antarctic Treaty 1959,” 9 I.C.L.Q. 436 (1960).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 In practical terms, however, the construction and maintenance of expensive bases within claimed areas may, in the long run, effectively usurp the claims of states such as Norway and New Zealand.
9 Antarctic Treaty, Preamble and Articles 1, 2, and 3.
10 Antarctic Treaty, Article 9 (1).
11 Antarctic Treaty, Article 9 (4). The Recommendations of the Consultative Meetings are reproduced in the appropriate volumes of the “Polar Record.” See Hanevold, , “The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings: Form and Procedure,” 6 Cooperation and Conflict 183 (1971).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12 See Anderson, , “The Conservation of Wildlife under the Antarctic Treaty,” 14 Polar Record 25 (1968).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
13 For the Sealing Convention see Recommendations III-XI and IV-21, 22 and for the Marine Living Resources Convention see Recommendations VII-10 and IX-2.
14 See Mitchell, , “Resources in Antarctica,” [1977] Marine Policy 91 CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Anon., , “Thaw in International Law? Rights in Antarctica under the Law of Common Spaces,” 87 Yale L.J. 804 (1977–78).Google Scholar Early proposals for internationalizing the region are referred to in Hanessian, supra note 7 at 437–38 and 448–52.
15 Antarctic Treaty, Article 9 (2).
16 Supra note 4.
17 Sealing Convention, Article 1 (1).
18 See Guyer, supra note 2, at 191.
19 See, for example, the SCAR report (ed. Zumberge, J. H.), Possible Environmental Effects of Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica (Cambridge, 1979).Google Scholar This report was written in response to Recommendation VIII-14 of the Eighth Antarctic Treaty Meeting (Oslo, 1975).
20 The Ninth Meeting was held in London, October 1977. The Recommendations are reproduced at 19 Polar Record 85 (1978).
21 Recommendation VI–10.
22 The program was known as BIOMASS, Biological Investigation of Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks, reported in SCAR Bulletin No. 55, 18 Polar Record 418 (1976). For progress reports see SCAR Bulletin No. 64, 20 Polar Record 100 (1980) and Bulletin No. 68, 20 Polar Record 500 (1981). A joint UNDP/FAO fisheries research program for the region was also launched about this time. FAO COFI/78/7 (April 1978).
23 Canberra, February 1978 for the statement of the U.K., see 49 B.Y.I.L. 393 (1978).
24 The original parties were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and the U.K. Poland was granted consultative status by virtue of “conducting substantial scientific research activity.”
25 Everson, “Antarctic Fisheries,” 19 Polar Record 233 at 244 (1978). Everson notes the involvement in the fishery of Taiwan and Korea, although the main participants are the U.S.S.R., Japan, and Poland.
26 Manne Resources Convention, Article 7 (2) (a), emphasis added. Quaere whether signatory states are obliged to attend Commission Meetings once the Treaty is ratified?
27 Roberts, supra note 5, at 117. A party that fails to fulfil its budgetary contributions for two consecutive years loses the “right to participate in the taking of decisions of the Commission” (Article 19 (6)) but probably not any other rights.
28 For the purpose of fulfilling its functions the Commission is granted both international (legal) personality and the necessary domestic legal capacity (Article 7). The Commission is also empowered to enter into agreements with other organizations (Article 23 (4)).
29 Marine Resources Convention Article 9(5). It is unclear which fish species this article refers to. Johnston, , The International Law of Fisheries (New Haven, 1965) at 396 et seq.Google Scholar refers only to whales by name in Antarctica. Everson, supra note 25, mentions several species of fish.
30 Marine Resources Convention, Article 12, decisions on matters of substance are to be taken by consensus and on any other matter by simple majority.
31 The steps which a party has to take to implement the obligations flowing from these conservation measures is a purely domestic question: Marine Resources Convention, Article 21 (1).
32 Antarctic Treaty, Article 9 (4).
33 Guyer, supra note 2 at 186. The process of arriving at unanimity is lengthy. The important Agreed Measures (supra text at note 12) were still not effective by the time of the Tenth Consultative Meeting in 1979, 20 Polar Record 87 (1980).
34 Marine Resources Convention, Article 10; compare Artide 10 of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 22, Marine Resources Convention.
35 Antarctic Treaty, Article 7. Many of the principles are the same.
36 Sealing Convention, Article 6 (1) (a).
37 See also Marine Resources Convention, Article 23 (1) (2) and (3).
38 And see Marine Resources Convention, Article 2 (3) (c).
39 France could gain sovereign rights over some marine resources otherwise covered by the Convention by virtue of the continental shelf doctrine.
40 See passim the draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3, August 27, 1980, reprinted in 19 Int’l Leg. Mat. 1129 (1980).
41 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, A/CONF. 39/27, Article 2(1) (d) defines a reservation as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state.”
42 On unilateral interpretative declarations see McRae, , “The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations,” 49 B.Y.I.L. 155 (1978).Google Scholar