For the past several decades, jurists have invested significant efforts in developing the law in general—and private law in particular—in terms of pluralism. However, the conceptualization of corporate law and governance according to pluralist principles rarely exists. This Essay is the first in the legal literature to address this deficiency by providing a unique pluralist theory of corporate governance regimes. It distinguishes between the plurality of corporate law’s sources, values, and principles, and discusses the implications for governance. Moreover, based on the social systems’ thinking and the framework of complexity, this Essay provides theoretical grounds for skepticism about any policies or structures applicable to all times and contexts. Therefore, rather than perceiving corporate governance as being identically applicable to all corporations, the law must meet the challenge of complexity by designing governance arrangements following a firm-specific perspective. Furthermore, I argue that in conditions of complexity, corporate governance eco-systems should be designed with a firm-specific view that incorporates the effect of the corporation participants’ heterogeneity, the heterogeneity of its internal power relations, and the heterogeneity of industries and markets. These novel arguments have profound implications for redesigning fundamental legal doctrines—such as fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders, regulation of related party transactions, the officers’ duty of care, and the company purpose.

The American Legal Realists offered several hypotheses about alternative drivers of official decision-making (i.e., considerations other than the rules on the books). This article identifies a tension between two of those hypotheses: the ‘extra-legal’ factors and ‘working’ rules. This tension gets exacerbated in Frederick Schauer’s account of Legal Realism, one which places his Dislocated Determinacy thesis—about working rules constituting an additional ground for the existence of ‘easy’ cases and determinacy across a legal system—into doubt.

This article provides a theoretical and doctrinal explanation of how the but-for test links gains to the wrong that produced them. Gain-based damages cases focus on the gain resulting from the defendant’s tortious behaviour. In these cases, the contrastive aspect of the but-for test, requiring the factfinder to consider the hypothetical result that would have occurred had the right thing happened instead of the defendant’s wrongdoing, is not confined to the question of reasonability, as it is in negligence cases. Rather, in gain-based damages cases, the factfinder faces the open-ended normative task of determining the hypothetically appropriate scenario that contrasts with the wrongdoing that happened in reality. For this reason, in gain-based damages cases, the normative sensitivity of the but-for test is revealed in full. The article explains how this sensitivity influences the result of the but-for test expressing the amount of gain causally attributed to the defendant’s wrongdoing.

Functionalist justifications for the consideration requirement, and the many criticisms of them, are well developed in the literature. But Peter Benson offers a different sort of justification. He argues that contracts are transfers of ownership, and he builds his transfer theory around the consideration requirement. He claims that a bilateral and mutual act is required for ownership to be transferred. Therefore, he argues that consideration is a central part of what a contract inherently is because it works to ensure that there is a bilateral and mutual relationship between the parties. In this article, I challenge this view. I accept for the sake of argument that contracts are transfers of ownership and that they must be bilateral and mutual acts. However, I argue that a sufficiently bilateral relationship can be established, even without consideration, through the acts of offer and acceptance. In doing so, I demonstrate that it is not necessary to view the doctrines of offer, acceptance, and consideration as being inextricably linked as Benson does. Moreover, drawing on insights from the civil law tradition, I show that a relationship of mutuality can be established in contracts that are not backed by consideration. Since I demonstrate that contracts can be seen as transfers of ownership even without consideration, I argue that the bulk of Benson’s transfer theory could remain intact if the consideration requirement were to be removed. Finally, I argue that, in light of recent developments in many common law jurisdictions, Benson’s transfer theory must be understood without the consideration requirement in order for it to withstand the test of time.

Employers seeking to control employee behavior outside of working hours is nothing new. However, recent developments have extended efforts to control employee behavior into new areas, with new significance. Employers seek to control legal behavior by employees outside of working hours, to have significant influence over employees’ health-related behavior, and to monitor and control employees’ social media, even when this behavior has nothing to do with the workplace. In this article, I draw on the work of political theorists Jon Elster, Gerald Gaus, and Michael Walzer, and privacy scholars Daniel Solove and Anita Allen, to show what is wrong with this extension of employer control of employees’ outside of work behavior. I argue that there are ethical limits on the controls that employers may put on their employees’ behavior outside of work, and that many of these limits should be enshrined into legal protections which would prevent employers from conditioning employment on the regulations criticized.

Essentialist legal theorists, represented by Raz, have depicted legal theory as a project of seeking necessary truths about law. They have, however, left the notion of necessity in their conception of legal theory largely unexplained. This paper explores four different notions of necessity in the philosophical literature and investigates two issues: first, what kind of necessity best fits the notion of necessity implicit in the essentialist conception of legal theory, and secondly, whether that notion of necessity is a coherent one that withstands philosophical challenges. I argue that the Putnamian notion of quasi-necessity best fits essentialist legal theorists’ self-understanding, but the notion of quasi-necessity does not withstand Ebbs’s two challenges. Meanwhile, although Plunkett’s theory of metalinguistic negotiation can be used to preserve a coherent notion of necessity that circumvents Ebbs’s two challenges, due to its broadly anti-essentialist underpinnings such a notion is unlikely to be congenial to essentialist legal theorists.

For obscure reasons, courts exclude some statutorily patentable inventions (‘judicial exceptions’) from patent protection. These exclusions have been criticized for impeding innovation, contrary to the purpose of patent law. I argue that freedom requires these exclusions even if they impede innovation. Patents, like property, can be unilaterally acquired, limiting others’ freedom without their consent. Kant explains why, to reconcile property with equal freedom, only rivalrous objects in acquirers’ first possession can be unilaterally acquired. States can rightfully authorize unilateral acquisition of only these objects. Drawing from Kant, I explain how patent protection conflicts with equal freedom unless patented inventions involve inventive uses of rivalrous objects external to human bodies. Enabled by inventive concepts, these uses would be impossible without these concepts, and are thus in the first possession of their inventors. I then show how the most recent United States Supreme Court judicial exception decisions limit patent protection to inventive uses of rivalrous external objects.

The idea that legal systems conditionally threaten citizens is taken by most legal and political philosophers as ‘reasonably uncontroversial,’ ‘obvious,’ or as portraying ‘a large part of how law operates.’ This paper clarifies and ultimately rejects this idea: our legal systems, it is argued, rarely address citizens via conditional threats. If correct, the conclusion defended in this paper might force us to re-examine core debates in legal and political philosophy that rely on the assumption that legal systems often threaten citizens: debates about the justification of the state, global justice, and the coerciveness of law.

This paper explores Peter Jaffey’s views on the trust and fusion and some aspects of his wider private law theory which impact on his view on trusts law. It shows that, although he is correct that the trust involves both proprietary and personal rights, in the end his theory is ahistorical and unDworkinian, despite his acceptance of a view of law based on Dworkin. His theory is also based on implausible views of the role of equity post-Judicature Acts and the ownership of value and does not adequately fit how trusts law works.