Joel Feinberg’s magnificent four volume work, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, represents a sustained and comprehensive argument regarding what conduct is appropriately regulated through criminal prohibitions and sanctions. Feinberg’s conclusions are essentially those of the Millian liberal: Conduct that causes harm or offense to others may be criminalized, but conduct that is harmful only to the actor or that is a harmless immorality may not be. Feinberg’s governing principle, however, is not Mill’s maximization of utility but is instead respect for individual autonomy. For Feinberg, respect for autonomy delimits the legitimate boundaries of concern with others’ conduct insofar as the concern is expressed through criminal prohibitions.

It has been argued that the difference between liberal states and theocratic, communist or fascist states is not that the liberal states promote different ideals of the good, but that they promote none. Unlike illiberal states, which regard it as a primary function of the state to prescribe the moral character of society, liberal states shun such attempts and allow freedom to citizens to develop their own conceptions.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the notions of “conception of the good” and “neutrality” and to suggest a perspective which provides a middle ground between strict perfectionism, on the one hand, and complete neutrality, on the other. This perspective would allow plurality and diversity without resorting to absolute neutrality. It would involve some form of perfectionism without resorting to coercion. I will assert that liberal states do resort to some forms of perfectionism in conducting their policies. I will further argue that the policy they should adhere to is one of impartiality rather than one of neutrality.

Despite the neglect by political liberals in the distant and recent past to take collective rights seriously, the problem of collective rights is beginning to capture the attention of an increasing number of philosophers. This new concern for collective rights seems to be “the result of a recent interest in the value of communities.” I shall clarify and assess some of the chief categories of collective moral rights talk and proffer some criteria of adequacy for a philosophical analysis of collective moral rights. Finally, I set forth and defend an analysis of justified collective moral rights.

Liberalism is often identified with the claim that individuals should have a large space for decisionmaking into which the state is not morally justified to intrude. On this “negative liberty” conception of liberalism, the boundaries of that space are or should be set by a package of rights against the majority. Individuals can appeal to such rights to override majority decisions that seek to intrude into the space of negative liberty. If this space of negative liberty is preserved, for example, through courts empowered to strike down infringing laws, such liberals suppose that a fundamental interest of all individuals is served. This is the interest in autonomy, in being able to make, revise and carry out decisions about how to live in accordance with one’s own preferences.

For those who believe in the values of liberalism and democracy the state is under a political obligation to seek the common welfare of its citizens. In furtherance of this domestic duty, it retains among its external rights and powers that right of self-defense which has been assigned to states under other ideologies.

Analyses of the social contract described by Thomas Hobbes have proceeded in three major directions. First, some readers naturally have felt that Hobbes viewed the primal charter as a genuine outcome of events which truly occurred. Other exegetes have contended that the story of the formation of the social contract was a deliberate fiction—either an artful narrative designed to elicit orderliness, or a heuristic model designed to spark hypothetical reasoning about what would have occurred in a primeval context with specified conditions. Still other analysts affirm that Hobbes used the tale of the social contract as a warning against the evils that plague a society which descends into civil strife.

Law is an interpretive enterprise. To grasp the meaning of any corpus of law, whether it is found in a statute, a series of common law decisions, or a constitution, requires an interpretation of the texts which comprise the law in question. The interpretation of legal texts is informed and disciplined by the principles which best support those texts as perceived by present day readers. The best interpretation is the one which both coheres with the body of law interpreted (fits the substance of past decisions), and is consistent with the most principled justification for those past decisions.

Anthony Kronman’s 1980 article “Contract Law and Distributive Justice” has become something of a classic in the philosophy of private law. Kronman argued that any theory of contract which relied upon voluntariness was necessarily concerned with distributive justice, since voluntariness was itself a distributive notion. The argument targeted libertarian accounts of contract. Given the distributive nature of voluntariness, the claim went, libertarians could not give an adequate account of contract without violating their own injunction against appeal to the “fair division of wealth among the members of society”(472). It is easy to see why Kronman’s article attracted so much attention. The idea that voluntariness is not distributive is central not just to libertarianism but to liberalism generally. Kronman’s critique, though targeting a not terribly common species of liberalism, threatens the genus itself.