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The Status of Classical Natural Law: Plato and the Parochialism of Modern Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2016

Eric Heinze
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Extract

The concept of modernity has long been central to legal theory. It is an intrinsically temporal concept, expressly or implicitly defined in contrast to pre-modernity. Legal theorists sometimes draw comparisons between, on the one hand, various post-Renaissance positivist, liberal, realist or critical theories, and, on the other hand, the classical natural law or justice theories of antiquity or the middle ages, including such figures as Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine or Aquinas. Many theorists, however, while acknowledging superficial differences among the various classical theories, fail to appreciate the variety and complexity of pre-modern thought. Unduly simplifying pre-modern understandings of law, they end up drawing false distinctions between modern and pre-modern legal theory. The pre-modern example considered in this article is Plato. Unlike scholars within the Humanities, who have continued to revise their approaches to pre-modern thought (often reflecting changes in ethical or political thought today), legal theorists, including many who claim to challenge much of traditional positivism, have scarcely moved beyond traditional positivists’ ahistorical and reductionist views.

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Research Article
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Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , July 2007 , pp. 323 - 350
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Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2007

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References

I am grateful for comments provided by Peter Alldridge, Richard Bronaugh, Roger Cotterrell, Richard Nobles, David Schiff and Prakash Shah.

1. Citations of Plato are to the Stephanus system. Quotations refer to Cooper, John M., ed., Plato: Complete Works (Cambridge MA: Hackett, 1997)Google Scholar [Plato]. Citations of Aristotle are to the Bekker system. Quotations refer to Barnes, Jonathan, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984)Google Scholar [Complete Works]. Citations of Aquinas are to Summa Theologica, trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Random House, 2000).

2. See Plato, Collected Dialogues, ed. by Cairns, Huntington & Hamilton, Edith (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).Google Scholar

3. As Plato has figured more prominently in traditional philosophy than in legal theory, an age-old question emerges as to distinctions among such concepts as “legal theory”, “legal philosophy” or “jurisprudence.” Differences among those terms are not categorical, but more matters of emphasis and convention. Cf., e.g., Cotterrell, Roger, The Politics of Jurisprudence vol. 2, 2nd ed., (London: Butterworths, 2003)Google Scholar; Simmonds, Nigel, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002)Google Scholar. Accordingly, I shall not assume any points raised in this paper to be affected by possible distinctions among them.

4. See, e.g., Cotterrell, supra note 3 at 60-61; Morrison, Wayne, Jurisprudence: From the Greeks to Post-Modernism (London: Cavendish, 1997) at 218–23 Google Scholar.

5. Heinze, Eric, “Epinomia: Plato and the First Legal Theory” (2007) 20 Ratio Juris 97 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. See infra Part II.

7. For some recent approaches, see, e.g., Mitchell, Basil & Lucas, J.R., An Engagement with Plato’s Republic (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003)Google Scholar; Fine, Gail, ed., Plato: Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)Google Scholar; Ostenfeld, Eric Nis ed, Essays on Plato’s Republic (Aarhus, DK: Aarhus University Press, 1998)Google Scholar [Essays]; Theo Kobusch & Mojsisch, Burkhard, eds., Platon: Seine Dialoge in der Sicht neuer Forschungen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996).Google Scholar

8. See infra Section II.

9. The term “philosopher ruler” is better than “philosopher king”, since women can qualify for the role. See, e.g., Republic at 540c. Cf., e.g., Pappas, Nickolas, Plato and the Republic, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003) at 113.Google Scholar

10. See, e.g., Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th ed. by Winckelmann, Johannes (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1976)Google Scholar at chs. 7-9.

11. Cf., e.g., text accompanying infra notes 52-64.

12. See, e.g., Corcoran, Marlena G., “Last Judgment of Plato’s Gorgias: Mythos to You, Logos to Me” (1989) 74 Iowa L. Rev. 827 Google Scholar; J. Jacobson, Arthur, “Origins of the Game Theory of Law and the Limits of Harmony in Plato’s Laws” (1999) 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1335 Google Scholar; LaRue, L. H., “Suggestions toward Reading/Teaching Plato’s Gorgias ” (1994) 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 317 Google Scholar; Lear, Jonathan, “The Mythic Defense of Justice in Plato’s Republic” (2003) 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1549–63 Google Scholar; Moody, James E., “Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas: The Relationship Between Philosophy and Law” (1990) 1 J. Legal Stud. U.S. Air Force 105 Google Scholar; Weinrib, Ernest J., “Law as Myth: Reflections on Plato’s Gorgias” (1989) 74 Iowa L. Rev. 787 Google Scholar; White, James Boyd, “Ethics of Argument: Plato’s Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer” (1983) 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 849 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zoeller, Guenter, “Is the Life in the Law Worth Living: Some Critical Remarks on Plato’s Gorgias” (1989) 74 Iowa L. Rev. 815.Google Scholar

13. Cf., e.g. text accompanying infra note 25.

14. In Heinze, supra note 5, I argue that it is not through Plato’s theory of Forms that we find the best insights into his legal thought. It is telling that two other general attempts are now a half-century old. See Cairns, Huntington, “Plato’s Theory of Law” (1942) 56 Harvard L. Rev. 359 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hall, Jerome, “Plato’s Legal Philosophy” (1956) 31 Ind. L. J. 171 Google Scholar.

15. Davies, Howard & Holdcroft, David, Jurisprudence (London: Butterworths, 1991)Google Scholar at chs. 1-5.

16. Ibid. at 155-66.

17. Bix, Brian, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003).Google Scholar

18. See, e.g. Davies & Holdcroft, supra note 15 at chs. 1-5; Bix, supra note 17 at chs. 3-7; Penner, James et al, eds., Jurisprudence & Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2002)Google Scholar at chs. 3-5 [JLT]; McCoubrey, Hilaire & White, Nigel D., Jurisprudence 3rd ed. (London: Blackstone, 1999)Google Scholar at chs. 2 and 3. Within this category of ahistorical texts, we can distinguish a sub-group containing a distinctly thematic format—arranged according to concepts such as “Justice”, “Morality”, “Positivism”, and the like. See, e.g., Dias, R.W.M., Jurisprudence, 5th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1985)Google Scholar; Fletcher, George P., Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)Google Scholar. Such works, adhering even less to an overtly historical ordering, have been that much less inclined to examine ancient thought.

19. See, e.g., Davies & Holdcroft, supra note 15 at ch. 16; Bix, supra note 17 at ch. 19; JLT, supra note 18 at chs. 19-20; McCoubrey & White, supra note 18 at chs. 11 and 12.

20. See, e.g., Cartledge, Paul, The Greeks, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)Google Scholar (standard work drawing on post-structuralist insights to provide a critical account of Greek society and culture).

21. Aside from the standard student textbooks, some well-known studies include, e.g., Danielsen, Dan & Engle, Karen, eds., After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture (London: Routledge, 1995)Google Scholar; Norrie, Alan, ed., Closure or Critique: New Directions in Legal Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Delgado, Richard & Stefancic, Jean, eds., Critical Race Theory, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Delgado, Richard & Stefancic, Jean, eds., Critical White Studies (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Cornell, Drucilla et al, eds., Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (London: Routledge, 1992)Google Scholar; Becker, Mary et al, eds., Feminist Jurisprudence: Taking Women Seriously (St. Paul, MN: West, 1994)Google Scholar; Kelman, Mark, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Moran, Leslie, ed., Legal Que(e)ries: Lesbian, Gay and Transgender Legal Studies (London: Cassell, 1998)Google Scholar; Kairys, David, ed., The Politics of Law (New York: Random House, 1982)Google Scholar; Olsen, Frances E., ed., Feminist Legal Theory, vol. 1, 2 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1995)Google Scholar; Barnett, Hilaire, ed., Sourcebook on Feminist Jurisprudence (London: Cavendish, 1997).Google Scholar

22. See, e.g., Davies & Holdcroft, supra note 15 at 186-204, 268-308; Simmonds, supra note 3 at chs. 2, 7.

23. Cf. text accompanying infra note 70.

24. See generally, Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).Google Scholar

25. See David Schiff “Disobedience” in JLT, supra note 18 at 477, 483-92.

26. See Richard Nobles & David Schiff, “The Evolution of Natural Law” in JLT, supra note 18 at ch. 2.

27. Ibid. at 39.

28. Dias, supra note 18 at 74. Unlike Dias, then, Nobles & Schiff do not indicate whether they believe that Plato presents his “moral absolutes” as discoverable. In addition, Dias attributes the same belief in discoverable absolutes to Socrates. (He mentions only the historical Socrates, leaving unstated whether he assumes the views of the historical Socrates to be identical to, or in any respects different from, those of Plato’s Socrates. He cites only Crito, a Platonic source.) Of course, as Socrates left no written work, his beliefs must be reconstructed. Recourse to a “Socrates” figure became a stylistic convention in Athens, with any number of views attributed to him. There is good reason to believe Plato’s depiction when Socrates is engaged in elenchus— questions and answers eliciting contradictions in his interlocutors’ views, a process, however, that often yields no final answer to the question posed. It is far more questionable, however, whether Plato’s account is always reliable when he attributes to Socrates specific, affirmative views. See, e.g., Kniest, Christoph, Sokrates zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 2003)Google Scholar; Vlastos, Gregory, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29. “Gerechtigkeit ist das Zentralproblem [Platons] gesamten Philosophie. Und zur Lösung dieses Problems entwickelt er seine berühmte Ideenlehre. Die Ideen sind transzendente Wesenheiten, die in einer anderen als der unseren Sinnen wahrnehmbaren Welt existieren ….” Kelsen, Hans, “Das Problem der Gerechtigkeit” §25 in Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1960) at 355 Google Scholar, 398 (my translation) [“Problem”]. Cf. Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State, ed. by Trevi, A. Javierño (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2006) at 12 Google Scholar [General Theory].

30. “Von der Idee des absoluten Guten sagt [Platon] sogar ausdrücklich, dass sie jenseits aller rationalen Erkenntnis, das heisst allen Denkens liegt.” Kelsen, “Problem”, supra note 29 at 399 (my translation); Cf. Kelsen, General Theory, supra note 29 at 12.

31. Cf., e.g., Rafael Ferber, “Did Plato ever Reply to those Critics, who Reproached him for ‘the Emptiness of the Platonic Idea or Form of the Good’?” in Essays, supra note 7 at ch. 4.

32. Cf., e.g., Stalley, R.F., An Introduction to Plato’s Laws (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) at 21–22 Google Scholar.

33. See generally, e.g., Plato, supra note 1, Apology, Protagoras or Gorgias, in which Sophists are portrayed as teaching only the pursuit of individual advantage.

34. See, e.g., Plato, supra note 1, Republic 517b.

35. Kelsen, “Problem”, supra note 29 at 399.

36. Plato, supra note 1, Letter VII 344b.

37. Kelsen, “Problem”, supra note 29 at 399.

38. Plato, supra note 1, Letter VII344c.

39. See, e.g., Plato, supra note 1, Phaedrus 275e; Statesman 295c-e.

40. See infra Section II.

41. Cf. Heinze, supra note 5, sec. II.B. Cf., Kelsen’s theories of norms in Kelsen, Reine|Rechtslehre, supra note 29; Kelsen, General Theory, supra note 29.

42. Cf. Heinze, supra note 5, sec. II.B.

43. Ibid. at sec. I.B. That approach is commonly associated with communitarianism; however, com-munitarianism can encompass a variety of approaches that may not all be particularly “rule sceptical” in the sense I am using here. Cf. ibid. at sec. III.A.

44. Cf., e.g., Annas, Julia, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar at ch. 9 (arguing that, in the moral and political sphere, the Forms cannot be the objects of general and abstract propositions).

45. See, e.g., Plato, supra note 1; Republic 404e-405d; cf. generally, Heinze, supra note 5.

46. Affirming the diversity of approaches to legal theory, see, e.g., Bix, supra note 17 at chs. 1-2; Cotterrell, supra note 3 at ch. 1; JLT, supra note 18 at ch. 1; M.D.A. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at ch. 1.

47. Cf., e.g., Cotterrell, supra note 3 at ch. 9 (noting the anti-foundationalist claims of post-modern and deconstructionist theory).

48. See, e.g., Complete Works, supra note 1 Nicomachean Ethics II.1-2.

49. But, on Kelsen’s approach to Aristotle, see, e.g., Burns, Tony, “Aristotle” in Boucher, David & Kelly, Paul, eds., Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 73 Google Scholar, 83-87.

50. “[D]ie Idee des absolut Guten … spielt in der Philosophie Platons die gleiche Rolle wie die Idee Gottes in der Theologie irgendeiner Religion” [emphasis added]. Kelsen, “Problem”, supra note 29 at 398.

51. See Weber, supra note 10 at ch. 10. Similarly, a work like Herman Hesse’s Siddhartha from 1922 suggests how subtler appreciations of non-Western belief systems had long been penetrating educated Western European thought by the early 20th century. See Hesse, Herman, Siddhartha: Eine indische Dichtung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1953).Google Scholar

52. Bix, supra note 17 at 65-66 [emphasis added].

53. Ibid. at 66.

54. Ibid. at 68.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid. at 66, n. 3.

57. Laws 715b (Bix citing the Taylor translation). Cf., Laws 715b in Plato, supra note 1 (Trevor Saunders translating out orthous nomous as “bogus laws”).

58. Wacks, Raymond, Understanding Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 17 Google Scholar [emphasis added].

59. Ibid. at 19.

60. Ibid. at 17.

61. Ibid. at 19.

62. Bix, supra note 17 at 68.

63. Wacks, supra note 58 at 19, n. 14.

64. Finnis, supra note 24 at 363-66 (citing Laws 712e-713a, 715b; Statesman 293d-e; Republic 422e). Like Bix, Finnis, ibid. at 363, n. 8, follows Taylor’s translation of out orthous nomous in Laws 715b as “no true laws.” Cf. supra note 57.

65. Wacks, supra note 58 at 17.

66. Cf. infra Section II.

67. See, e.g., Aristotle and Modern Politics, ed. by Tessitore, Aristide (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).Google Scholar

68. Freeman, supra note 46 at 103.

69. Ibid.

70. See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 64 at 85-90, 223-26.

71. Cf., Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 94–95 Google Scholar (characterizing a “developed” legal system as “a union of primary rules of obligation with … secondary rules”). Similarly, in MacIntyre’s view, Ross’s 1908 translation of Aristotle belies misleadingly modernist, rule-bound assumptions, by translating kata ton orthon logon to mean “in accordance with the right rule” rather than “according to right reason.” MacIntyre, Alastair, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) at 152–53 Google Scholar.

72. Complete Works, supra note 1, Nicomachean Ethics v.2-5, 1130a12-1134a15.

73. See Complete Works, supra note 1, Nicomachean Ethics v.1; Politics vii.4-5, 1325b33-1327a12.

74. See, e.g., Stalley, supra note 32, at 23 (1983); Kraut, Richard, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 105.Google Scholar See also Ostwald, Martin, Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969) at 20–53 Google Scholar and passim.

75. See, e.g., Summa Theologica, supra note 1 at Part I-II, q. 95, art. 1, answer.

76. See, e.g., ibid. at q. 91, art. 1.

77. See, e.g., ibid. at art. 2.

78. See, e.g., ibid. at art. 3.

79. See, e.g., ibid. at art. 4.

80. Ibid. at question 96, article 2, reply to obj. 2.

81. See, e.g., ibid. at q. 95, art. 1, reply to obj. 2.

82. See, e.g., ibid. at principle reply, and at reply to obj.1.

83. See St. Augustine, The City of God, trans. by Bettenson, Henry (London: Penguin, 1984) at xix.Google Scholar

84. Kelsen, Hans, “Plato and the Doctrine of Natural Law” (1960) 14 Vand. L. Rev. 23 Google Scholar at 24.

85. Freeman, supra note 46 at 103.

86. Morrison, supra note 4 at 26-40.

87. Naucke, Wolfgang, Rechtsphilosophische Grundbegriffe, 4th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Luchterhand 2000) at 9–26.Google Scholar

88. Horn, Norbert, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie, 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: CF. Müller Verlag, 2001)Google Scholar at ch. 10.

89. Kaufmann, Arthur, “Problemgeschichte der Rechtsphilosophie” in Kaufmann, Arthur & Hassner, Winfried, eds., Einführung in Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart 6th ed. (Heidelberg: CF. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1994) at 30 Google Scholar, 33-40.

90. Kelly, J.M., A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 4 Google Scholar, 12, 15-16, 22, 31, 33-36, 64.

91. Davies, Margaret, Asking the Law Question (North Ryde, NSW: The Law Book Company, 1994) at 1.Google Scholar

92. Ibid. at 61-62.

93. Complete Works, supra note 1, Nicomachean Ethics V1.

94. Cf. text accompanying supra note 74.

95. Cf. text accompanying supra note 73.

96. Cf. text accompanying supra note 72.

97. Christie, George C. & Martin, Patrick H., Jurisprudence, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 1995) at 25–53 Google Scholar.

98. Ibid. at 29-117.

99. Ibid. at 127-92.

100. Again, I am using that term in a broad sense, to include theories critical of, but nevertheless generated within, and usually as a response to, modernity. Cf. text accompanying supra notes 19-21.

101. See, e.g., Cotterrell, supra note 3; Goyard-Fabre, Simone, Les principes philosophiques du droit politique moderne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997)Google Scholar. Despite occasional references to pre-modern thought, Simmonds’s work is situated firmly within the perspectives of modernity. See Simmonds, supra note 3.

102. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 4 at 15-74 (examining ancient and medieval approaches in greater detail).

103. For recent examples, see, e.g., Naucke, supra note 87 at 9-53 (examining approaches to law from Plato to Machiavelli); Horn, supra note 88 at §§ 10-14 (examining ancient Greek, ancient Roman, and medieval thinkers); Hoffmann, Hasso, Einführung in die Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000) at 67–53 Google Scholar (examining pre-modern concepts of justice); Villey, Michel, Philosophie du droit (Paris: Dalloz, 2001) at 40–53 Google Scholar (examining ancient concepts of justice). There are notable exceptions to that trend among Anglo-American texts, but very few. See, e.g., Christie & Martin, supra note 97 at 29-187. Cf. text accompanying supra notes 98-99.

104. See text accompanying supra note 89.

105. See, e.g., McCoubrey & White, supra note 18 at 50-52. Cf., e.g., Freeman, supra note 46, 367-91.

106. See, e.g., Plato, supra note 1, Republic, 338c-354c (rejecting Thrasymachus’ separation of law and morals). See also, generally, Gorgias. Cf. Heinze, supra note 5 at sec. II.A.

107. See text accompanying infra notes 72-74.

108. See supra note 106.

109. Cf. supra note 3.

110. See, e.g., McCoubrey & White, supra note 18 at 60-62.

111. Berlin, Isaiah, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958)Google Scholar, reprinted in Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) at 118 Google Scholar, 152 [original italics].

112. Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2002)Google Scholar [Open Society].

113. Cf. Popper’s preface to the seventh German edition of Open Society, “Vorwort zur siebenten deutschen Auflage 1992” in Popper, Karl, Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde, 8th ed. by Kiesewetter, Hubert (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 2003) at ix Google Scholar [Die offene Gesellschaft] (describing his effort in Open Society as going “auf Spurensuche in der Geschichte; von Hitler zurück zu Platon: dem ersten großen politischen Ideologen, der in Klassen und Rassen dachte und Konzentrationslager vorschlug” [“on an historical detective search; from Hitler back to Plato—the first major political ideologue who thought in terms of classes and races, and recommended concentration camps”—my translation]).

114. See, e.g., ibid. at 32 (ex Pressing admiration for Plato).

115. See, e.g., Hart, H.L.A., “Introduction” in Hart, H.L.A., Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) at 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 2-3 (explaining influences of analytic philosophy and philosophy of language on his thought).

116. See, e.g., Lesley Brown, “How Totalitarian is Plato’s Republic?” in Essays, supra note 7 at ch. 1; Bambrough, R., ed., Plato, Popper and Politics (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967).Google Scholar

117. See, e.g., Alfred Jules Ayer, “Editors Introduction” in Alfred Ayer, Jules, ed., Logical Positivism (New York: The Free Press, 1959) at 3 Google Scholar; Alfred Ayer, Jules, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952)Google Scholar. But, see, e.g., Quine, Willard van Orman, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, reprinted in Quine, Willard van Orman, From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961)Google Scholar at ch. 2 (early, influential critique of logical positivism).

118. See, e.g., Russell, Bertrand, History of Western Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000) at 123.Google Scholar

119. See, e.g., Rudolph Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” in Logical Positivism, supra note 117 at 60.

120. See, e.g., Safranski, Rüdiger, Ein Meister aus Deutschland: Heidegger und seine Zeit (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003) at 258–53 Google Scholar, 270-80, 392-410.

121. Goyard-Fabre, supra note 101 at 28-33, 145-53, 176-88, 199-203, 316-21, 337-40, 345-56. For similar approaches, see, e.g., Hoffmann, supra note 103; Horn, supra note 88; Naucke, supra note 87.

122. Russell, supra note 118 at 66. The word “now” in that sentence raises a question that Russell nowhere answers: under which circumstances would that present be said to have begun, and under which circumstances would it be said to come to an end?

123. Ibid. at 674 [emphasis added].

124. Ibid. at 660.

125. Ibid. Cf., e.g., Launay, Michel, “Introduction” in Launay, Michel, ed., La Nouvelle Héloïse (Paris: Flammarion, 1967) at xvi Google Scholar (arguing that Rousseau was hostile to mysticism).

126. Russell, supra note 118 at 701 [emphasis added]. Cf. Carnap, supra note 119 at 80.

127. Russell, supra note 118 at 123-24.

128. See, e.g., remarks on Apology, Protagoras and Gorgias from Plato in sec. I above.

129. It is arguably more precise to bestow that distinction upon Socrates. Nevertheless, it is through Plato that Socratic dialectic is commonly thought to inaugurate much of the Western rationalist tradition. See, e.g., Kniest, supra note 28 at 34-36. Cf. Zehnpfennig, Barbara, Platon zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 2nd ed., 2001)Google Scholar at ch. 3.

130. See, e.g., works cited in supra notes 117 and 119.

131. Russell, supra note 118 at 13.

132. See generally Berlin, supra note 111.

133. See, e.g., Safranski, supra note 120. See also, e.g., Safranski, Rüdiger, Nietzsche: Biographie seines Denkens (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2000) at 351–53 Google Scholar.

134. Kelsen, supra note 84.

135. Ibid. at 24 [original emphasis].

136. Cf., e.g., Thaeatetus (suggesting that knowledge cannot have an entirely empirical foundation). Indeed one can hardly overlook Kant, who is not easily dismissed as a mystic. Kant’s entire critical system departs from the famous claim, “Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung. Denn es könnte wohl sein, daß selbst unsere Erfahrungserkenntnis ein Zusammengesetztes aus dem sei, was wir durch Eindrücke empfangen, und dem, was unser eigenes Erkenntnisvermögen … aus sich selbst hergibt.” Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. by Weischedel, Wilhelm, Werkausgabe, vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968) at 45 Google Scholar [original emphasis]. [“But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience. For it could well be that even our experiential cognition is a composite of that which we receive through im Pressions and that which our own cognitive faculty … provides out of itself.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason trans. by Guyer, Paul & Wood, Allen W. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 136 Google Scholar]. Curiously, Popper waxes ebullient about that Kantian tradition, as appears particularly clearly in the German version of his Open Society. See Popper, “Immanuel Kant: Der Philosoph der Aufklärung” in Popper, Die offene Gesellschaft, supra note 113 at XX. Cf., ibid. at V (dedicating Die offene Gesellschaft to Kant).

137. Kelsen, supra note 84 at 24.

138. See Carnap, Rudolph, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998)Google Scholar. Cf. Quine, supra note 117 at 39-42 (challenging the logical positivism of Carnap’s earlier and subsequent writings). Some modern philosophers might, against Quine or other critics, seek to defend Carnap’s project. However, far more argument would be required than is provided by Kelsen.

139. Kelsen, General Theory, supra note 29 at 3-14.

140. See, e.g., Plato, supra note 1, Republic 338c-354c (rejecting Thrasymachus’ separation of law and morals).

141. Kelsen, General Theory, supra note 29 at 8.

142. The more detailed exposition in Kelsen, supra note 29 still fails to overcome the basic problem of unduly generalizing about natural law theories.

143. Kelsen, “Problem”, supra note 29 at 366-67; Kelsen, General Theory, supra note 29 at 10.

144. Cf. Heinze, supra note 5 at secs. II.A-II.B.

145. Cf. ibid. at sec. II.B.

146. Fletcher, supra note 18 at 92.

147. See, e.g., Complete Works, supra note 1, Politics II.1-6, 1260b28-1266a30.

148. Fletcher, supra note 18 at 88-92.

149. Cf. text accompanying infra note 73.

150. Horn, supra note 88 at 136.

151. See, e.g., Plato, supra note 1, Meno 81b-c; Phaedo 70a-106e; Phaedrus 245c-249c; Republic 608c-612a.

152. Plato, supra note 1, Republic 368e-369a.

153. McCoubrey & White, supra note 18 at 62.

154. Ibid. at 53.

155. Plato, supra note 1, Republic II, 375b-412b; K’ung Ch’iu, Lun-yü, trans. by Lau, D.C. (London: Penguin, 1979)Google Scholar. [Confucius, Analects] at III.3, VII.3, VII.6, XIII.27, XV13, XV30.

156. Note also that Confucianism gave birth to various, sometimes conflicting, interpretations. I shall focus on K’ung Ch’iu, supra note 155, and on the classic restatement of Confucian doctrine in Chu Hsi & Lü Tsu-Ch’ien, Chin-ssu lu [Reflections on Things at Hand] I.13, trans. by Chan, Wingtsit (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967)Google Scholar. But see, e.g., Chan, Wing-tsit, ed., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963)Google Scholar at chs. 3, 6, 14 (examining various ancient approaches).

157. Cf., e.g., Plato, supra note 1, Republic 368e-369a (proposing to imagine a model society).

158. Plato, supra note 1, Laws 702d.

159. Chu Hsi & Lü Tsu-Ch’ien, supra note 156 at I.13.

160. On jen, see, e.g., D.C. Lao, Introduction in K’ung Ch’iu, supra note 155 at 14. On arete, see, e.g., Roberts, J.W., City of Sokrates, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1998) at 67 Google Scholar, 184, 226-27, 242.

161. See, e.g., Plato, supra note 1, Republic V, 457c-471b (proposing the abolition of the family and community of wives and children).

162. Chu Hsi & Lü Tsu-Ch’ien, supra note 156 at VIII.1.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid. at VI.5.

165. Plato, supra note 1, Republic VI, 500b-c.

166. Chu Hsi & Lü Tsu-Ch’ien, supra note 156, at I.5.

167. Ibid. at VIII.23.

168. Ibid. at VII.18.

169. Plato, supra note 1, Republic II, 376c-398b. Cf. generally Ion.

170. K’ung Ch’iu, supra note 155 at XVII.10. Cf. Chu Hsi & Lü Tsu-Ch’ien, supra note 156 at VI.21 (explaining, “To stand with one’s face against the wall means that one cannot see anything in the place nearest to one and cannot go a step further.”).

171. Chu Hsi & Lü Tsu-Ch’ien, supra note 156 at VI.21.

172. K’ung Ch’iu, supra note 155 at XIV 14. Cf. ibid. at VI.27, I.9.