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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2015
London and New York: Routledge, 1992; 258 pages; ISBN 0-415-04149-X.
1. In this review, all citations in parentheses are to this book.
2. It is from an article by the author. Cragg, “Violence, Law, and the Limits of Morality” (1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 301.
3. This interpretation is confirmed by Cragg’s 1989 article, where he concludes by saying:
We have a moral obligation to defer to a system of resolving disputes that cannot be resolved through moral argument. The law itself is such a system. Thus legal systems provide a mechanism for avoiding violence. Deferring to the law under these circumstances must have a high moral claim on us. It is this high moral claim on which the moral force of legal obligation rests. (Ibid, at 318)
4. Surprisingly, there is no entry for “restorative justice” in the index. It is listed within an entry for “sentencing,” but the indicated pages are simply those for all of Chapter 7.