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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2015
Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr. was a professor of philosophy who taught at the University of Wisconsin—with a few leaves of absence to teach elsewhere—from 1961 until 1977. He taught a variety of undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy department there and he co-taught the jurisprudence course from time to time at the University of Wisconsin Law School.
* Edited by Singer, Marcus G. and Martin, Rex, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993, hereinafter Essays), xxxii + 277 ISBN 0-299-13860-7.Google Scholar
1. MacCallum, , Political Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987)Google Scholar
2. MacCallum’s first stroke destroyed his hearing in one ear and partially paralyzed one side of his body. The second stroke destroyed the hearing in his other ear, partially paralyzed the other side of his body and seriously affected his speech.
3. MacCallum, , “Legislative Intent” (1966) 75 Yale Law Journal 754–87.Google Scholar
4. See Addendum at the end of this review.
5. Ibid.
6. Although MacCallum did present versions of some of them in various academic settings, he apparently did not believe that they were ready for publication.
7. The most interesting examples of such footnotes occur at Essays at 3 and 12 where the editors report that MacCallum had told Professor Singer that the editors of the Yale Law Journal transformed a valid argument into an invalid one when “Legislative Intent” first appeared.
8. Essays at 5.
9. Essays at 110–13.
10. Essays at 72.
11. Essays at 121 at note 32.
12. For example, MacCallum was very interested in the subject of conscience. He discusses it in some depth in “Law, Conscience, and Integrity,” “The Extent To Which Legislators Should Serve Their Consc ences or Their Constituents” and “Violence and Appeals to Conscience.” However, I have chosen not to address this subject because I am more interested in other subjects about which MacCallum wrote.
13. Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 133.Google Scholar
14. Essays at 65.
15. Essays at 73.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, at 72–73.
19. See Reitcr, , unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Legal Reasoning As Applied To The Interpretation of Statutes at 90–100 (University of Wisconsin. Madison, 1969.)Google Scholar
20. Essays at 72.
21. Essays at 127 and 128. MacCallum’s use of the word ‘enjoin’ throughout this article is subject to confusion. The ordinary meaning of the word is “to order or direct a person to do something.” (Webster, The American College Dictionary, (1956) at 399.) However, in law, the term means “to prohibit or restrain by an injunction.” Ibid. MacCallum obviously had the first use in mind.
22. Ibid, at 138.
23. Because “Justice and Adversary Proceedings” was one of MacCallum’s unpublished papers, I feel a bit uncomfortable commenting upon it since undoubtedly he would have revised it before it was published. With this reservation in mind, 1 offer my comments.
24. Ibid, at 227.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, at 229.
28. Ibid, at 230.
29. Ibid, at 230–31.
30. Ibid, at 231.
31. Ibid, at 231–32.
32. Ibid, at 232.
33. Ibid, at 234.
34. Ibid.