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Freedom as Non-Domination in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2015

Eoin Daly
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Abstract

In recent decades, neo-republican philosophers have developed a theory of freedom as non-domination, which, they claim, is conceptually and analytically distinct from the “liberal” concept of freedom as non-interference. However, neo-republicans have intervened in constitutional debate almost exclusively in relation to structural issues of institutional competence, and have made little impact on the analytical jurisprudence of constitutional rights. While judicial review seems ill equipped to respond to the distributive dimensions of republican freedom, republicans like Richard Bellamy have argued that the whole edifice of countermajoritarian, strong-form judicial review is itself an affront to freedom as non-domination properly understood. Republican freedom, in this lens, is defined structurally, procedurally and politically rather than in relation to a definite set, concept or theory of rights that is put outside and beyond politics. And partly for this reason, there has been little commentary concerning how the theory of freedom as non-domination might inform constitutional-rights doctrine. This article will argue, first, that the neo-republican view can usefully inform constitutional-rights doctrine notwithstanding republican reservations concerning judicial power. Second, it will propose a number of specific ways in which the jurisprudence of constitutional rights might account for the central concerns of the republican idea.

Keywords

Richard Bellamyrepublicanismstrong judicial reviewconstitutional rightsliberalismfreedomnon-dominationPhilip Pettit
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , July 2015 , pp. 289 - 316
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2015 

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99. See the limiting provisos in Articles 8-11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See also DPP v Fagan [1994] 2 IR 265; Howard v Commissioners of Public Works [1994] 1 IR 101. Articulating a more general principle of legality, Justice Kearns stated: “every executive or administrative act which affects legal rights, interests or legitimate expectations must be legally justified.” Browne v Attorney General [2002] IEHC 47.

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