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Discussion Foucault, Agamben, and Arbour J.’s Dissent in Gosselin

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2015

Michael Plaxton
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In Gosselin v. Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the Quebec legislature violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by failing to provide unemployed adults under the age of 30 (young adults) with the level of social assistance provided to other unemployed adults. A majority of the Court concluded that the underinclusive legislation in question was not unconstitutional. The case gave rise, however, to one of the most progressive and intriguing dissenting opinions in Canadian constitutional history-a dissent made all the more interesting by the fact it was written by a judge who would later become the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Louise Arbour. Her dissent focused on the proper interpretive approach to s. 7 of the Charter, which states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” She argued that the “right to life” contained in s. 7 entails a number of positive rights, including the right to a minimum level of social assistance.This paper argues that Arbour J.’s dissent in Gosselin reveals an inherent flaw with the very concept of rights; namely, that they presuppose the state’s authority to exclude whole populations from the protection of law. The argument has four parts. Part I reads Arbour J.’s approach to the constitutional questions raised in Gosselin as broadly sympathetic to Foucault’s understanding of power in the modern era. Part II claims that Arbour J.’s judgment presumes that formal legal regulations, and not other, informal mechanisms of power, chiefly bear the burden of governing life. Part III examines Agamben’s critique of Foucault to show why Arbour J.’s privileging of state governance of well being is problematic; in particular, that the greater the formalization and centralization of the mechanisms by which life is governed, the greater the prospect of exclusion of groups and classes from rights regimes altogether. Finally, Part IV explains that Arbour J.’s concession to juridification is driven by an inherent problem with rights, and that the difficulties she runs into cannot be avoided; that exclusion from the rights framework is built into the very concept of rights.

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Discussions
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Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , July 2008 , pp. 411 - 428
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Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2008

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References

I am grateful to Richard Bronaugh, Barry Hoffmaster, John Paterson, Carissima Mathen, Tony Carty and Natalia Alvarez-Molinaro for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.

1. Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429.Google Scholar

2. Ibid. at para. 345.

3. Foucault, Michel, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. by Hurley, Robert (New York: Vintage, 1990)Google Scholar [Foucault, Sexuality].

4. Gosselin, supra note 1 at para. 342.

5. Note that Foucault does not claim that sovereign power has been entirely eclipsed. See Foucault, Michel, Security, Territory, Population, ed. by Senellart, Michel, trans. by Burchell, Graham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) [Foucault, Security].Google Scholar

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7. See Hunt, Alan & Wickham, Gary, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London: Pluto Press, 1994)Google Scholar, noting that this is consistent with the Austinian conception of law.

8. Foucault, Sexuality, supra note 3 at 94-95.

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16. Ibid. at para. 347.

17. Consider the comments of the Australian High Court in Roach v. Electoral Commissioner, [2007] HCA 43.Google ScholarPubMed

18. We can go further, and observe that the s. 8 right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the s. 10(b) right to counsel, also presuppose institutional frameworks; i.e., mechanisms by which warrants and counsel can be obtained. Thus, see R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26 Google ScholarPubMed, where LeBel J. noted that the Charter could not apply extraterritorially because many foreign states lack the appropriate infrastructure to give effect to ss. 8 and 10(b) rights.

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26. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12 [Quebec Charter].

27. Chaoulli, supra note 24 at para. 119.

28. Gosselin, supra note 1 at para. 370.

29. Ibid. at para. 372.

30. Ibid. at para. 375.

31. Ibid. at para. 378.

32. Ibid. at para. 380.

33. Ibid. at para. 381.

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38. Gosselin, supra note 1 at para. 382 [emphasis added].

39. Ibid. at para. 308.

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41. See especially Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Heller-Roazen, Daniel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).Google Scholar

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44. This is, of course, a recurring theme in the history of Western political philosophy at least since Hobbes.

45. See Hart, supra note 42 at ch. 5.

46. See Fitzpatrick, Peter, “Bare Sovereignty, Homo Sacer and the Insistence of Law” in Norris, Andrew, ed., Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005) at 56.Google Scholar

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48. Foucault, Sexuality, supra note 3 at 136.

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52. Ibid. at 8.

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58. See the discussion in Genel, supra note 10 at 46.

59. Foucault, Society, supra note 11 at 260.

60. Mills, Catherine, “Contingency, Responsibility, and the Law: A Response” (2004) 3 Google Scholar borderlands e-journal http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/v013n01_2004/mills_contingency.htm.

61. See Agamben, Homo Sacer, supra note 41 at 50-55.

62. See Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 at 1039Google Scholar, cited in Dunmore, supra note 20 at para. 23 [emphasis added].

63. See Dunmore, ibid. at paras. 20-22.

64. Thus, see the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Baier, supra note 35, where no mention is made of Arbour J.’s dissenting opinion, despite the fact that Baier turns on the underinclusiveness of legislation.

65. Gosselin, supra note 1 at para. 81.

66. 1 borrow the term from Torpey, supra note 12.

67. See Arbour, Louise, “In Our Name and On Our Behalf” (Paper presented at Chatham House, February 2006)Google Scholar, available online: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3375_ilparbour.pdf.

68. Ibid. at 10-11.

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