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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2015
It is a commonplace that liberalism appears to be in crisis. While the tragedy of German liberalism consists above all in its collapse into National Socialist dictatorship, at present one often speaks of liberalism's final victory. There is no alternative, it appears, to the constitutional state. Liberal constitutional principles have been so fulfilled that no political goals and lessons seem left beyond their global self-affirmation.
Translated by Dr. Joel Golb.
1. Bahners, Cf. Patrick, “Alle Mann nach vorn. Der Parteitag der FDP” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (6 12 1995) 27.Google Scholar
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11. On the “situation-bound” significance of Schmitt’s ideas, see Huber, Ernst Rudolf, ‘“Positionen und Begriffe ’. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Carl Schmitt” (1941) 101 Zeitschrift fur die gesammten Staatswissenschaften 1 at 2-4.Google Scholar
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13. Mehring, Reinhard, Carl Schmitt zur Einführung (Hamburg: 1992).Google Scholar
14. Until now scant attention has been paid to the split in Schmitt's analysis of the disintegration of the "bourgeois Rechtsstaat", between a focus on the disintegration of the organizational principle, on the one hand, and his legal-theoretical focus on the fundamental distinction between law and means, on the other. The legal-theoretical perspective is more essential. Since the distinction between law and means evaporates, we also find, according to Schmitt, a breakdown of the constitutional state's organized separation of powers. As a consequence, the Reichsprasident granted "power of rule by decree as the delegate of the law" becomes a supreme legislator and dictator, uniting legislative and executive authority in his one role. (This is a process that Schmitt in no way approves from the perspective of legal theory: Schmitt, cf. Carl, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: 1931) at 125f; “Legalität und Legitimität”, supra note 7 at 327f. As Schmitt puts it, "from the perspective of constitutional theory, the real basis of this political confusion, and of this confusion in constitutional law, lies in the debasement of the concept of law" (ibid, at 331). Schmitt sees the source of the breakdown of the distinction between law and means in the absence of a "normal" situationߝthat is, in the collapse of the relation of normality and normativity accompanying Weimar's state of emergency.Google Scholar
15. E.g., Schmitt, Carl, “Der Weg des deutschen Juristen” (1934) 39 Juristen-Zeitung, Deutsche at 695; “Die Rechtswissenschaft im Fuhrerstaat” (1935) 2 Zeitschrift der Akademie fur Deutsches Recht at 439; “Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit des deutschen Rechtsstandes” (1936) 6 Recht, Deutsches at 184. On Schmitt's role in National SocialismGoogle Scholar, see Koenen, Andreas, Der Fall Carl Schmitt. Sein Aufstieg zum ‘Kronjuristen des Dritten Reiches’ (Darmstadt: 1995).Google Scholar
16. Schmitt, Carl, Der Nomos der Erde (Köln: 1950) at 13ff; cf. Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung(Berlin: New Impression, 1991) at 81.Google Scholar
17. See e.g., Neumann, Franz, “Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft” in Neumann, Franz, Demokratischer und autoritarer Staat. Studien zur Politischen Theorie (Frankfurt: 1967) at 31-81.Google Scholar
18. Forsthoff, Cf. Ernst, Rechtsstaat im Wandel. Verfassungsrechtliche Abhandlungen 1954-1973 (München: 1976) at 105ffGoogle Scholar; also noteworthy is Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, Gesetz undgesetzgebende Gewalt von den Anfdngen der deutschen Staatsrechtslehre bis zur Hohe des staatsrechtlichen Positivismus (Berlin: 1958)Google Scholar; in taking issue with such literature (see the last cited work for additional references), Hofmann, Hasso insists upon a “postulate of the generality of law”, Die Allgemeinheit des Gesetzes, (Gottingen: Chr. Starck, 1987) at 9-48 Google Scholar; on developments in the debate over constitutional theory after Schmitt, see Mehring, Reinhard, “Carl Schmitt und die Verfassungslehre unserer Tage” (1995) 120 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts at 177-204.Google Scholar
19. Schmitt, Cf. Carl, “Nationalsozialistisches Rechtsdenken” (1934) 4 Deutsches Recht at 225: “Today we are experiencing the bankruptcy of idées générales.”Google Scholar
20. Schmitt, Carl, “Was bedeutet der Streit urn den ‘Rechtsstaat’?” (1935) 95 ZgStW at 189-201;Google Scholar Schmitt, Carl, “Der Rechtsstaat” in Schmitt, Carl, Nationalsozialistisches Handbuch für Recht und Gesetzgebung (München 1935) at 24-31 Google Scholar; see Ule, Carl Hermann, “Carl Schmitt, der Rechtsstaat und die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit” (1991) 81 Verwaltungs-Archiv 1.Google Scholar
21. In order to locate Schmitt's essay in relation to other critiques of parliamentarism of the time, it is above all worth comparing it with Smend, Rudolf, “Die Verschiebung der konstitutionellen Ordnung durch die Verhältniswahl” (1919) in Smend, Rudolf, Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen und andere Aufsätze (Berlin: 1955) at 60-67.Google Scholar
22. Schmitt's sense of a link between legal form and the type of rationality characterizing an epoch may have been influenced by Max Weber's sociology of law, which emphasizes the “formal qualities of modern law.” See Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th ed., (Tübingen: 1980) at 387-513.Google Scholar
23. The Verfassungslehre (supra note 12 at 307ff) here speaks of “ideal foundations.”Google Scholar
24. Supra note 9 at 6, 9, 11.Google ScholarPubMed
25. Ibid, at 45.
26. Schmitt's (previously developed) critique of romanticism informs his critique of liberalism, in so far as he understands parliamentarism as an institution for romantic dialogue. Despite this juxtaposition of critiques, Schmitt still distinguishes (in ibid, at 58ff.) classical liberalism from the “organic” liberalism of the period in Germany before the revolution of March, 1848. But in contrast to Huber or Böckenförde, he has no particular historical interest in German liberalism, deeming it already politically exhausted in that period.
27. Schmitt, Carl, “Rechtsstaatlicher Verfassungsvollzug” in Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954 (Berlin: 1958) at 452-88.Google Scholar
28. Weber, Max, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 7th ed. (Tübingen: 1978) at 510ff.Google Scholar
29. Supra note 12at79ff.Google Scholar
30. Schmitt, Carl, Der Begriffdes Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien (Berlin: 1963) at 50.Google Scholar
31. Ibid. at 69.
32. Ibid. at 70f, 76f.
33. Among many articles cf. Schmitt, Carl, “Völkerrechtliche Formen des modernen Imperialismus” in Schmitt, Carl, Positionen und Begriffe im Kampfmit Weimar-Genf-Versailles (Hamburg: 1940) at 162-80;Google Scholar see Huber, , supra note 11 at 25ff.Google Scholar
34. See Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, “Der Begriff des Politischen als Schlüssel zum staatsrechtlichen Werk Carl Schmitts” in Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, Recht, Staat, Freiheit. Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und Verfassungstheorie (Frankfurt: 1991) at 344-66. (This essay appears in translation in this volume, ed.)Google Scholar
35. Supra note 9 at 29, 62.Google ScholarPubMed
36. Ibid, at 39.
37. Ibid, at 35ff.
38. Ibid, at 37.
39. Schmitt, Carl, “Diktatur und Belagerungszustand” (1916) 38 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft at 138-62; Schmitt, Carl, Die Diktatur (München & Leipzig: 1921).Google Scholar
40. An exploration of Schmitt's sketchy remarks (supra note 9 at 58ff) is found in Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, Die deutsche verfassungsgeschichtliche Forschung im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: 1961).Google Scholar During the National Socialist period, an engagement with “organic” liberalism was particularly manifest in the work and influence of Gierke. See e.g., Höhn, Reinhard, Otto von Gierkes Staatslehre und unsere Zeit (Hamburg: 1936);Google Scholar Schmitt consistently traced a line from Gierke to Gierke's student Hugo Preuβ and on to Rudolf Smend, criticizing this strand of comradely liberalism more vehemently than the liberal legal positivism of Laband. See Schmitt, Carl, Hugo Preuβ. Sein Staatsbegriff und seine Stellung in der deutschen Staatslehre (Tübingen: 1930);Google Scholar Mehring, Reinhard, “Geist gegen Gesetz. Carl Schmitts Destruktion des positiven Rechtsdenkens” in Wacker, Bernd, ed., Die eigentlich katholische Verschärfung… Konfession, Theologie undPolitik im Werk Carl Schmitts (München: 1994) at 229-45Google Scholar.
41. A lecture which Schmitt gave in 1932 on the 100th anniversary of Hegel's death has now been published from Schmitt's literary remains; Tommissen, Piet, ed., Schmittiana-IV (Berlin: 1994).Google Scholar The lecture focuses on Hegel's dialectical position using the tools of the Concept of the Political.
42. Supra note 9 at 80.Google ScholarPubMed
43. Ibid, at 88.
44. Ibid, at 89.
45. Schmitt, Carl, Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, 3rd ed. (Berlin: 1979).Google Scholar
46. Ibid, at 59-60; see the distinctions drawn by Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang in “Politische Theorie und politische Theologie. Bemerkungen zu ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältnis” in Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, Kirchlicher Auftrag und politisches Handeln (Freiburg: 1989) at 146-58.Google Scholar
47. Schmitt, Carl, Hauptprobleme der Soziologie. Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber (München: 1923).Google Scholar
48. Schmitt, thus refers in his postwar diary (Glossarium. Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951 (Berlin: 1991) at 107, entry of 2.3.1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar to the “conceptual realism” of his essay “Legalität und Legitimität” as constituting an adequate insight into the “model-character of German developments 1929-33.”
49. Huber, Cf. Ernst Rudolf, “Vom Sinn verfassungsgeschichtlicher Forschung und Lehre” in Huber, Ernst Rudolf, Bewahrung und Wandlung (Berlin: 1975) at 11-17;Google Scholar cf. also Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, “Zum Verhältnis von Geschichtswissenschaft und Rechtswissenschaft” in Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft und Praxis des Geschichtsunterrichts (Stuttgart: Werner Conze, 1972) at 38-44.Google Scholar
50. For a development of this argument see Mehring, Reinhard, Pathetisches Denken. Carl Schmitts Denkweg am Leitfaden Hegels (Berlin: 1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
51. For an attempt to clarify the dogmatic content of Schmitt's confession and Christianity see Wacker, Bernd, ed., Die eigentlich katholische Verschärfung… (München: 1994).Google Scholar The need for a detailed examination of Schmitt's confessional stance is not recognised in Meier, Heinrich, Die Lehre Carl Schmitts (Stuttgart: 1994).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
52. Supra 28 at 150f.Google Scholar
53. Leibholz, Gerhard already noted this connection in Die Auflösung der liberalen Demokratie in Deutschland und das autoritäre Staatsbild (München: 1933).Google Scholar
54. Schmitt, contests, in a fundamental way, the theory of “constitution as contract” (supra note 12 at 61ff;Google Scholar Der Hüter der Verfassung, supra note 14 at 52ff, 60ffGoogle Scholar), as it was inherited from the “constitutional monarchy, German style.” He understands this theory as veiling the subject of sovereignty and legitimacy, which unveils itself in emergencies. The Prussian constitutional struggle between 1862 and 1868 was decisive for Schmitt's view of “constitutional monarchy”: it made clear that the latter actually was already equal to a “parliamentary legislative state” ( supra note 7 at 274; in 1931 (in Der Hitter der Verfassung, supra note 14 at 135)Google ScholarPubMed Schmitt still maintains the distinction between “parliamentary” and “constitutional” monarchy.) The memory of this struggle certainly plays a role in Schmitt's granting the Reichspräsident in 1931 the right to “emergency decrees applying to the finance laws,” in spite of legal-theoretical reservations (ibid, at 128ff.; cf. 28f, 123ff).
The question of the political significance of constitutional compromises was taken up after Schmitt, most significantly in a debate between Ernst Rudolf Huber and Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde concerning the position of the Bismarkian Reich's constitution in relation to German constitutional history. Huber emphasized the inherent legitimacy of the monarch's regulative power within that constitution, while Böckenförde emphasized (like Schmitt) the transitory character of the Second Reich. Huber's critique of Schmitt's view of “constitutional monarchy” was made explicit in Heer und Staat in der deutschen Geschichte (Hamburg: 1938) at 224ff, 232f, 236, 239Google Scholar. It was directed at Schmitt's, Staatsgefüge und Zusammenbruch des Zweiten Reiches (Hamburg: 1934)Google Scholar, commenting in particular on the settlement of the constitutional conflict through the 1866 “indemnity bill.” The latter controversy is documented in Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, ed., Moderne deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 1815-1914, 2d. ed. (Königstein: 1981).Google Scholar
55. Smend, Rudolf, “Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht” (1928), in Smend, Rudolf, ed., Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen (Berlin: 1955) at 153.Google Scholar
56. Mehring, Cf. Reinhard, Carl Schmitt zur Einflihrung, supra note 13 at 72ff.Google Scholar
57. Popper, Karl, Das Elenddes Historizmus, 5th. ed. (Tübingen: 1979)Google Scholar in contrast, describes historicism as a process of predicting the future through the social-scientific assertion of certain developmental laws, whose possibility Popper denies. Danto, Arthur, (Analytische Philosophie der Geschichte (Frankfurt: 1980)Google Scholar endows the philosophical-historical tradition—to a large extent erroneously—with a similar futuristic sense. In fact, far more characteristic for that tradition, as for Schmitt, is the “sense of a historical ending” (phrase from K. Löwith), of a closure of history in the present.
58. Habermas', Jürgen reference to Europe's “second chance” (Habermas, Jürgen, Vergangenheit als Zukunft (Zürich: 1990) at 97ff)Google Scholar marks a break with a historico-philosophical idealism that is heavily in debt to Hegel.
59. In opposing Schmitt's thesis of the primacy of the political “normal situation” over questions of legal validity, Jürgen Habermas now stresses the priority of the postulate of an “ethical-political self-understanding” of the normative basis of a republic over its political normalization; see his latest collection of political essays, Habermas, Jürgen, Die Normalität einer Berliner Republik (Frankfurt: 1995).Google Scholar
60. Contra: Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, “Freiheit und Recht, Freiheit und Staat” in supra note 34 at 42-57.Google Scholar
61. Schmitt nowhere explicated his concept of Metaphysik more clearly than in Geistesgeschichtliche Lage. On metaphysics in the above sense see Gadamer, Hans-Georg, “Hermeneutik als praktische Philosophie” in Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Vernunft im Zeitalterder Wissenschaft (Frankfurt: 1976) at 78-109;Google Scholar Henrich, Dieter, “Was ist Metaphysik—was Moderne? Zwölf Thesen gegen Jürgen Habermas” in ibid. Konzepte, Frankfurt 1987, 11-43.Google Scholar
62. Max Weber saw in parliamentary democracy little more than a “future abode of servitude” that at least left open the question of how “in face of the dominance of the trend towards bureaucratization it still will be possible to save some scrap of freedom of action that is in some sense ‘individual’”; Weber, Max, “Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland” in Weber, Max, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, 4th ed. (Tübingen: 1980) at 333.Google Scholar
63. Schmitt, Cf. Carl, Staatsgefüge und Zusammenbruch des Zweiten Reiches (Hamburg: 1934) at 43:Google Scholar “The Weimar constitution offered an answer to a defunct question, one that the authentic present no longer asks. The victory of liberal democracy announced by the Weimar constitution was merely posthumous. It was futile, directed towards a past, without a present or future, the victory that a ghost carries away from the shadow of his opponent.”
64. Kelsen's chief state- and political-theoretical writings of the interwar period usually conclude with identical expositions treating the relation between “state-form and world-view,” and with expressions of fidelity to a “critical-relativistic” world-view as a prerequisite for a “democratic” position; see Kelsen, Hans, Sozialismus und Staat. Eine Untersuchung derpolitischen Theorie des Marxismus, 3rd ed. (Wien: 1965) at 160ffGoogle Scholar; Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: 1925) at 368ffGoogle Scholar; Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (Tübingen: 1929) at 98ffGoogle Scholar; Staatsform und Weltanschauung (Tübingen: 1933) at 28ffGoogle Scholar). It is not clear whether Kelsen is arguing as a democrat for “relativism” or as a relativist for democracy (i.e., whether the world-view determines the state-form or vice versa). “Relativism” is here a blanket term for a “world-view of critique and positivism,” its stance emerging from “mutable and ever-changing experience.” In democracy Kelsen sees “simply a form, simply a method, for producing social order”; he disputes the conceptual certainty of fixed systems of value and designates the assertion of such certainties as “metaphysics.” He thus distinguishes between “world-view” and “metaphysics” and so understands his relativism as a postmetaphysical world-view. But, in contrast to Schmitt, Kelsen does not understand the state's legal form as the historical outcome of a rational process; he thus does not adequately discuss the rational form of his own concept of law.
65. Already in 1914, Gustav Radbruch—not least under Max Weber's influence—proposed a “legal-philosophical relativism”; Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie (Leipzig: 1914) at 24ff. In apparent agreement with Kelsen, he writes the following in the foreword to the book's revised edition (1928, 6th ed. (Stuttgart: 1963))Google Scholar: “For relativism is the conceptual postulate of democracy: it declines to identify with a specific political position, being ready, on the contrary, to grant state power to any political position that can form a majority, since it is not aware of any unambiguous criterion for evaluating the correctness of political views” (84). In its rejection of relativism in regard to practice, however, Radbruch's approach is very different than Kelsen's: “The method I have described here can be called relativism, because its chief task is to ascertain the correctness of every value judgment only in relation to a specified supreme value judgment, only in the framework of a specified sense of values and world-view, and not to ascertain the correctness of the value judgment, the sense of values and the world-view, themselves. Relativism, however, belongs to the realm of theoretical and not practical reason. It signifies an abandonment of a scientific grounding of final positions—not abandonment of the positions themselves” (102ff). Radbruch here justly evokes Max Weber. With Kelsen as his starting point, he summarizes his position in 1934 with the maxim: “Relativism is general tolerance—only not tolerance of intolerance”; Kelsen, Hans, “Der Relativismus in der Rechtsphilosophie” in Kelsen, Hans, Der Mensch im Recht (Göttingen: 1957) at 86.Google Scholar
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68. Supra note 62 at 12; cf. e.g. at 176f., 440, 549.Google ScholarPubMed
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72. Stemberger, Dolf, Verfassungspatriotismus (Frankfurt: 1990).Google Scholar