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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2015
This paper explores how an adequate understanding of legal relations can be aided by, and sometimes requires, returning to the foundations of our conception of legal relations.
The process of conceptualization is a process of revealing the form in legal relations. The two most fundamental forms of legal relations, first enunciated by Aristotle, are corrective justice and distributive justice. The thesis of this paper is that an analysis of legal relations can be coherent only if it is faithful to the form of justice appropriate to the particular legal relation under study.
1. “The existing system of privileges gives rise to far more criticism than praise .... The categories of privileges in the Civil Code would seem no longer to correspond to the demands of present day economic life.... There is no reason to retain the concept of privilege as a legal real right and it is recommended that it be simply abolished.” Civil Code Revision Office,Report on the Quebec Civil Code, vol. 2, t. 1 (Quebec: Editeur officiel, Quebec 1978) at 353–354.Google Scholar
2. Art.2013 C.C.Z.C.“The workman, supplier of materials, builder and architect have a privilege and a right of preference over all other creditors, on the immoveable, but only upon the additional value given to such immoveable by the work done or by the materials.”
3. Art.2013C.N.“Les créanciers privilégiés sur les immeubles sont:......4 Les architectes,entrepreneurs,niacins et autres ouvriers employés pour édifier, reconstruiré ou réparer des bàtiments, canaux, ou autres ouvragesquelconques, pourvu néanmoins que, par un expert nommé d'office par le tribunal de grande instance dans le ressort duquel les bàtiments sont situés, il ait été dressé préalablement un procès–verbal, a l’effet de constater l’état des lieux relativement aux ouvrages que le propriétaire déeclarera avoir dessein de faire, et que les ouvrages aient été, dans les six mois au plus tard de leur perfection, recus par un expert également nommé d’office; Mais le montant du privilege ne peut excéder les valeurs constatées par le second procès-verbal, et il se réduit à la plus-value existante à l’époque de l’alienation de l’immeuble et resultant des travaux qui y ont été faits”.
4. The Auger Act,1894, 57 Victoria, ch. 46.
5. Musson c. Salomon [1937] 62 R.J.Q. 50 (C.A.); Sirois c. Novis[1943] R.L. 418 (C.S.); Claude Gagnon c. Temisply Inc. [1976] CS. 1748; Claude Demers, , Traité de droit civil du Quebec, t. 14, (Montreal; Wilson&Lafleur, 1950) at 167;Google Scholar Leonard Flanz, , “The Law of Construction Privileges in Quebec” in Douglas Macklem, Mechanics Liens in Canada, 4th ed.chap. 14 (Toronto: Carswell, 1978);Google Scholar Jacques Deslauriers, Louise Poudrier-Lebel, Les sùretés: Notes de cours, (Québec: Università Laval, Faculté de droit, 1979) at 152; contra: Geo.Google Scholar Giroux, M., Le privilège ouvrier (Montreal: Editions Albert Lévesque, 1933) at 113 et seq.Google Scholar
6. At least one French writer has argued that the privilege should apply even to subcontractors. René Savatier writes: “Bien qu’on le conteste, le privilège doit appartenir non seulement à ceux ayant directement traité avec le propriétaire, mais encore aux sous-entrepreneurs et ouvriers de Ventrepreneur” [emphasis in the original]. Cours de droit, t. II, 2e ed. (Paris: Librarne generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1949) at 512. But this is a distinctly minority view.
7. Jurisprudence Express, 85-169 (C. A.).
8. Giroux, supra , note 5 at 32; see also Marler, William de Montmollin, The Law of Real Property (Toronto: Burroughs&Co, 1932) at 362;Google Scholar Claude Demers, supra , note 5 at 171 (althoughthe Quebec Court of Appeal in Modular Windows cites Demers to opposite effect and there is some ambiguity in his position, see infra, note 45; Mignault writes that only the formality for estimating the value-added was changed by the Quebec amendment, but he also quotes without comment Galarneau v. Tremblay (1902) 22 C.S. 143, the only case prior to Modular Windows to hold that “additionalvalue” refers to the value added at the time the work is done. Mignault, P.B., Droit civil canadien vol. 9 (Montreal: Théoret, 1901) at 65.Google Scholar
9. “Worker’s privilege” is used here by the court to refer generally to the privilege defined in art. 2013 C.C.L.C.(worker, supplier of material, builder and architect). In this paper, I use the term “construction privilege” to refer to this group of privileges.
10. Supra, note 7 at 6.
11. Aristotle, , The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, trans. by Sir David Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) v: 1132a.Google Scholar
12. Ibid at 1131a.
13. Supra, note 11 at 1131a, 1131b.
14. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the Dominican Province (1947), Pt II-II, Question61, art. 1,2. Rawls, John, in A Theory of Justice (Massachussets: HarvardUniversity Press, 1971)Google Scholar has shown that the concept of distributive justice also constrains the content of distributive schemes. This is required to accord with the concept of free and equal persons which underlies the first principle of justice. I have not discussed this elaboration of distributive justice because Aristotle's purely formal concept is sufficient for the purpose of this paper.
15. Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas identifies the nature of the equality articulated in transactions. The interpretation of corrective justice presented here is drawn from Benson, P., External Freedom According to Kant (1987), 87:3 Col. L. Rev. 559 at 572–575 Google Scholar and The Executory Contract in Natural Law: Theory ofthe Right in Contract (1987), unpublished manuscript referred to in Benson, idem at note 30, and from Weinrib, E., Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, (1987) 87:3 Col.L. Rev. 472 at 492–496.Google Scholar Both these authors base their interpretations on the modern natural law account as found in Kant and Hegel. This interpretation differsfrom the view of James Gordley, Equality in Exchange (1981), 9 Calif. L. Rev.1587who presents corrective justice as serving to protect an arbitrary but preexisting distribution.
16. Supra, note 11.
17. Planiol, M., Ripert, G., Trade pratique de droit civil francais,2nd ed., t. VI (Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1952) at 2.Google Scholar
18. Marty, G., Raynaud, P., Droit civil, t. II, V. 1 (Paris: Sirey, 1962) at 1.Google Scholar
19. Marler, supra, note 8 at para. 747; Deslauriers, supra, note 5 at 93; Battur, G.B., Traité des privileges et hvpothéques, t.1 (Paris: Guillaume, 1824) at 4, 121; Google Scholar Hamelin c. J.B. Tapiante Inc. (1958), B R. 395 al 397; Claude Gagnon. supra, note 5 at 1749; Lumberland v. Nineteen Hundred Tower Limited[1977] 1 S.C.R. 581 at 593; H. et Mazeaud, L. et Mazeaud, Jean, Legons de droit civil, t.III (Paris: Editions Montchrestien, 1960) at 134.Google Scholar
20. Except that it establishes the maximum amount which can be collected by the creditor. But in fact, this is merely an application of the original qualifying criterion. See Bousco Inc c. Motel St. Francois Inc. [1982] C.S. 287 at 296.
21. Marty, Gabriel et Raynaud, Pierre, Droit civil, t.III, vol.. 1 (Paris: Sirey,1971) at 150, 157.Google Scholar In a similar vein, see Pothier, J., Les traités du droit franáais, t. 8 (Paris: Pichón Bechet, 1827) at 566 Google Scholar and Baudry Lacantinerie, G., Précis de droit civil, 10th ed., t. 2 (Paris: Société du rccueil J.B. Sirey, 1909) at 906.Google Scholar
22. Verdun Industrial Building Corp. v. Regent Equipment & Paving Corp, [1968] C.S. 506 at 508.
23. Laurent, F. Principes de droit civil, 4th ed., t. 29 (Paris: Maresq, 1887) at 348.Google Scholar
24. Ibid. t. 30, at 6.
25. If he has, then compensation is governed by the rules of delict.
26. Challies, George S., The Doctrine ofUnjustified Enrichment in the Law of the Province of Quebec, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1952) at 150.Google Scholar
27. Supra, note 23, t. 30 at 47–48.
28. Supra, note 5.
29. Ibid In the same vein, see In re Letellier de Si Just v. Blanchette, 21 B.R. 1, cited in Masson, supra, note 5 at 59.
30. Seesupra, In the same vein, see Inre Letellier de Si Just v. Blanchette, note 19 and accompanying text, concerning the need to interpret any derogation from the rateable scheme as strict law.
31. In fact, Laurent, true to his unjust enrichment argument, suggests that the formulation ofarticle 2103 C.N. which implies that agricultural work does not give rise to a privilege is the result of negligent drafting and was not intended policy. Supra, note 23 at 38. Baudry-Lacantinerie, G. etLoynes, De, Droit civil, t. 1, 3ième ed. (Paris: J.-B. Sirey, 1906) at 570,Google Scholar at , also mention, with regret, that the extension of the law to include agricultural work was included in early drafts but was left out of the final version. They do not, however, go so far as to expressly attribute this to negligence.
32. In Quebec, the seller of an immoveable has no right of revendication unless the condition be express in the contract of sale (1536 C.C.).
33. Domat, Jean Les his civiles dans leur ordre naturel, 1st ed., t.l, (Luxembourg: Andre Chevalier, 1702) Liv. III, Tit. I Sec. V, para IV at221. Even in Domat’s time, this rule was modified in regard to immoveables for which the “droit de suite” was restricted..Google Scholar
34. Idem, para. VIII, at 222.
35. Idem, para. IX at 222.
36. See also, idem, para. XXX, at 225.
37. M. Le Baron Favard de Langlade, Traitt de privileges el hypothiques, (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1812) at 75.Google Scholar
37. *I have used the words “asset” and “obligation” to translate the French terms “actif” and “passif”, respectively. However, the French terms have a slightly more abstract sense than their English equivalents, and refer to the bundle of rights and obligations which constitute a person’spatrimony.
38. Bonnecase, supplément t. II, No. 176 at 352 of Baudry-Lacantinerie, Droit civil, (Paris: Sirey, 1926).
39. Briault, G. writes: “‖ on est droit de se demander si toutes les créances ne sont pas dignes de faveur, si toutes ne remplissent pas la condition qu’exige l’article 2095[C.N.] pour l’obtention d’un privilège ‖ puisqu'£ s’agit d’une appréciation de la qualité d’une creance, cette appreciation est essentiellement subjective et dépend d’un foule de facteurs indéterminables. De la notion du privilège en droit civil français (Paris: Giard&Briere, 1911) at 80.Google Scholar
40. Briault, supra note 38 at 54-55.
41. supra note 5 at 170.
42. supra note 8 at 145.
43. supra note 7 at 3, 6. Giroux, supra, note 5 at 32 implicitly adopts a similar position. He sharply criticizes Quebec’s extension of privileges to suppliers. In part, he argues that, unlike worker and architect contracts, supplier contracts are not by their nature credit contracts.Therefore, in his view, there shouldbe no reason to afford them extra protection. By implication, the rationale for the privilege is theprotection of builders and architects and not the restitution of any unjust enrichment.
44. Planiol, M., Ripert, G., Droit civil francais, 2nd ed., 1.12 (Paris: Pichon, 1953)at 18.Google Scholar
45. Demers, supra, note 5, at 168. Although cited as authority for this proposition in Modular Windows, Demers’ position is actually unclear. He does write: “la plus value est la valeur additionnelle donnée a l’immeuble parles travaux faits et les matériaux fournis au temps où ees travaux sont faits et où les materiaux sont fournis”. [emphasis added]. He then cites Galarneau c. Tremblay(1902) 22 CS. 143 as authority. Thatcase clearly held that value-added is calculated at the moment the work is done. However, Demers also writes: “La plus-value ne vaut que pour celui qui l’a occasionnée par ses travaux: c’est-à-dire que si deux ou plusieurs privilèges sont enregistrés ou valables contre la mème bátisse, chaqué privilège ne pourraètre exercé que sur la part deplus-value que ses propres travaux lui auront occasionnée.” If added value is calculated at the time the work is completed, then in a case in which thevalue no longer subsists at the time of the judicial sale, one creditor’s privilege, infact, would be exercised against the value-added by another creditor. Furthermore, Demers writes that the French law requiring the double reporting of value “ … justifie aussi notre jurisprudence que établit cette plus-value par la vente ou l’aliénation de l’immeuble.” (p. 171) Therefore, Demers’position seems internally inconsistent. As supportfor the Court of Appeal’s holding in Modular Windows his authority is, at best, equivocal.
46. supra, note 44 at 691.
47. Seesupra, text accompanying note 39.
48. See Briault’s interesting historical analysis, supra note 38, especially at 58-59, 78–89.
49. supra, note 5 at 68.
50. supra, note 19.
51. supra, note 5.
52. supra, note 7.
53. It is interesting that the court’s decision conformed entirely to Planiol’s argument, except that Planiol was forced to recognize the limits of his logic by the unambiguous words of the French Code. Supra, note 46.
54. [1977] 1S.C.R. 581.
55. Idem, at 590. Art. 2013e provides: “ The supplier of materials has a privilege on the immoveable in the construction of which thematerials supplied to the proprietor or builder have been used or for the construction of which they have been specially prepared.” [emphasis added] 56. Subject to the proviso, supra, note 14.
56. Subject to the proviso, supra, note 14.
57. supra, note 54 at 593.
58. supra, note 7 at 3.
59. supra, note 54 at 593.
60. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 12.
61. Munn & Shea v. Hague Ltee[1928] S.C.R. 398.
62. Supra, note 60 at 19, 26.
63. The impact of this is attenuated, however, by the fact that the privilege will eventually attach only to the additional value which is contributed. See Macdonald, R.A., annotation to Armor Ascenseur Québec Ltee c. Caisse de dépòt et placement du Quebéc, et al. RPR 139 at 142.Google Scholar
64. I wish to thank Peter Benson for his insightful comments concerning the issues of legal theory raised in this paper.
