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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 February 2019
This volume is an important contribution to a topic which has seen something of a resurgence lately and one from which both legal theorists and legal historians will greatly benefit. Some of the essays in this volume tackle questions on the ground floor, as it were, of interactions between legal theory and legal history. Others offer metatheoretical reflections on legal theory and legal history. Some combine the two. Given that the essays offer a rich variety of perspectives and do not unfold according to a master plan, it would be ill advised for a reviewer to impose an artificial order on them to be able to discuss the whole in one go. Instead, the discussion in this review will revolve primarily around some key themes revolving around the method and aims of legal theory.
Maksymilian Del Mar & Michael Lobban, eds, Law in Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected Dialogue (Oxford: Hart, 2016) pp. xiv +347. Numbers in text are to the book.
1. Simpson, AW Brian, Reflections on the Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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4. Ibid at 30.
5. Hart, HLA, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed by Bulloch, Penelope A & Raz, Joseph (Oxford University Press, 1994) at vi [parenthesis added].Google Scholar
6. Ibid at 80.
7. See Brian Leiter, “The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Scepticism” (2011) 31:4 Oxford J Legal Stud 663.
8. See Leslie Green, “The Concept of Law Revisited” (1996) 94:6 Mich L Rev 1687 at 1692 Hart does make apparently contrary remarks in the posthumously published Postscript: Hart, supra note 5 at 239-40.
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12. Brian H Bix, “Raz on Necessity” (2003) 22 Law & Phil 537 at 538.
13. See David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press, 1999) at 221.
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16. HLA Hart, “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights” (1949) 49 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 171 at 176.