Writing on punishment can be a punishing experience. We face two kinds of problems, each threatening to make penal reflection a futile exercise. Primarily, there is a body of research and literature which might be called hyper-critical; this research points to the weaknesses of all theories of punishment but fails to replace them by an adequate theory, either because it cannot solve the problems which it raises or because it does not want to, punishment being seen as a concept that is so fraught with difficulties of all kinds that it ought to be altogether rejected. There is, on the other hand, a second trend in the literature, which is more positive and which offers a new theory of punishment. However, what is gained at the level of theory is lost at the level of application: not only is current penal practice unrelated to the proposed ideal, but its proponents do not see at present how we should proceed in adjusting practice to achieve this ideal.
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