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Security, Business and Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2018

Marya FARAH  and
Maha ABDALLAH Open the ORCID record for Maha ABDALLAH [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

Businesses have increasingly recognized their responsibility to respect human rights in their operations. This has been in part guided by international initiatives, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, as well as guidance and regulations from states. Although these measures recognize risks associated with conflict-affected areas, contexts of occupation present unique concerns. These issues become even more complex when states send mixed messages to businesses. This is most evident when examining the discourse on and regulation of business operations linked to Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian territory, especially those with operations and relationships related to ‘security’. This article seeks to highlight the frequent disregard of human rights responsibilities and obligations by states and businesses related to the occupied Palestinian territory and population, which has created a gap in accountability that civil society has attempted to address.

Keywords

civil societycomplicitycorporate accountabilityoccupied Palestinian territorysecurity
Type
Scholarly Articles - Special Issue on Business, Human Rights and Security
Information
Business and Human Rights Journal , Volume 4 , Issue 1: Special Issue: Business, Human Rights and Security , January 2019 , pp. 7 - 31
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 

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Footnotes

*

Research Consultant, Juris Doctor, M.P.P.

**

Legal Researcher, Al-Haq, LL.M. International Human Rights Law.

References

1 The Occupied Palestinian Territory encompasses the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

2 While outside the scope of this paper, it should be noted that Israel’s prolonged occupation has been increasingly deemed illegal by scholars and others. See Ben-Naftali, Orna, Gross, Aeyal Mand Michaeli, Keren, ‘Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (2005) 23:3 Berkeley Journal of International Law Google Scholar ; Falk, Richard and Weston, Burns H, ‘The Relevance of International Law to Israeli and Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza’ in International Law and the Administration of the Occupied Territories: Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, E Playfair (ed) (Clarendon Press, 1992), p 146–147 Google Scholar ; OHCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967’, A/72/43106 (23 October 2017), para 15–62.

3 Israel highlights its perceived vulnerability, including by calling Palestinian citizens a ‘security and demographic threat’ and by noting perceived regional risks. As part of this discourse, it has renewed the ‘state of emergency’ every year since its establishment in 1948. Statements by international actors, like the Quartet, support such a discourse by equating Israeli ‘security needs’ with Palestinian statehood. Evelyn Gordon, ‘No Longer the Political Fringe’, Jerusalem Post (13 September 2006), https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/No-longer-the-political-fringe-34777 (accessed 2 September 2018). ‘Israel’s unique situation – a small and vulnerable country surrounded by many large and Hostile Neighbors […]’, Gerald M Steinberg, ‘Israel at Sixty: Asymmetry, Vulnerability, and the Search for Security’ (June 2008) 564 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://jcpa.org/article/israel-at-sixty-asymmetry-vulnerability-and-the-search-for-security/ (accessed 2 September 2018).

4 Pieter D Wezman et al, ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017’ (March 2018) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/fssipri_at2017_0.pdf (accessed 2 September 2018).

5 ‘After every campaign of the kind that is now taking place in Gaza, we see an increase in the number of customers from abroad.’ Shuki Sadeh, ‘For Israeli Arms Makers, Gaza War Is a Cash Cow’, Haaretz (11 August 2014), https://www.haaretz.com/gaza-war-is-arms-industry-cash-cow-1.5258893 (accessed 2 September 2018).

6 Ibid.

7 These policies have led to 76 per cent of Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem living below the poverty line, and the projection that Gaza will be ‘unliveable’ by 2020. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, ‘East Jerusalem Facts and Figures 2017’ (24 May 2017), https://www.acri.org.il/en/2017/05/24/east-jerusalem-facts-and-figures-2017/ (accessed 29 August 2018). ‘Living Conditions in Gaza “more and more wretched” over Past Decade, UN Finds’ UN News (11 July 2017), https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/07/561302-living-conditions-gaza-more-and-more-wretched-over-past-decade-un-finds (accessed 3 September 2018).

8 For further examples of repressive tactics used by Israel which sought to project legitimacy, see James Ron, ‘Savage Restraint: Israel, Palestine and the Dialects of Legal Repression’ (November 2000) 47 (4) Social Problems 445–472.

9 Due to its effective control over the OPT, Israel incurs the responsibilities of a ‘host’ State. Israel also acts as a ‘home’ state to the numerous Israeli business enterprises operating in the OPT. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Statement on the implications of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in the context of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (6 June 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/OPTStatement6June2014.pdf (accessed 13 April 2018).

10 Israel acts as both home and host state for Israeli businesses present in the OPT.

11 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework (2011), Principle 7. The ‘most egregious business-related human rights abuses take place in conflict affected areas and other situations of widespread violence.’ UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie – Business and human rights in conflict-affected regions: challenges and options towards State Responses’ A/HRC/17/32 (27 May 2011), Summary.

12 This is exemplified in the legislations targeting the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which promotes non-violent measures to end international support to Israel given its continued occupation and oppression of Palestinians, and pressure Israel to comply with international law. Anti-BDS legislation, issued by Israel and other states, seeks to target legitimate civil society movements and obscure states’ legal obligations. See the Entry into Israel Law (Amendment No. 28) (Israel), accepted March 2017. The Law denies visa or residence permit for persons associated with an organization or body that publicly calls for the boycott of Israel, or if the person is personally participating in such boycott, available in English at: http://www.alhaq.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/P-20-1906.pdf (accessed 4 September 2018); see also The Times of Israel, Anti-BDS Legislation, available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/topic/anti-bds-legislation/ (accessed 28 April 2018).

13 Since 1967, Israel established a military administration over the OPT. See Proclamation No. 1 Concerning the Takeover of the Administration by the Israel Defense Forces, followed by Military Proclamation No. 2 Concerning Regulation of Authority and Judiciary (West Bank) (1967). In 1981, through Military Order No. 947, the Israeli Military Commander transferred legal and administrative powers to the Israeli Civil Administration. See also Diakonia, ‘Facts – Law and Order in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (2014), https://www.diakonia.se/globalassets/documents/ihl/ihl-resources-center/fact-sheets/law-and-order-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory.pdf (accessed 9 October 2018).

14 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004) (Legal Consequences hereinafter), para 102, 177.

15 Ibid, para 93.

16 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention’ (5 December 2001), para 2, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/57jrgw.htm (accessed 30 August 2018); United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, ‘Israel’s Settlements have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law, Security Council Reaffirms’ (23 December 2016), https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12657.doc.htm (accessed 9 September 2018); Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations of the Fourth Periodic report of Israel’, CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4 (21 November 2014), para 5.

17 Meron, Theodor, ‘The West Bank and International Humanitarian Law on the Eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Six-Day War’ (2017) 111:2 The American Society of International Law 362–364 Google Scholar .

18 The Israeli government has argued that Israeli citizens have ‘a natural right to establish their homes’ in the West Bank. Adalah, ‘Responses of Israeli Government and Attorney General in Settlements Regularization Law Case (January 2018)’, https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/9371 (accessed 8 October 2018). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israeli Settlements and International Law, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (30 November 2015), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israeli%20settlements%20and%20international%20law.aspx (accessed 25 April 2018).

19 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’, A/HRC/22/63 (7 February 2013), para 22 and 97.

20 In Bargil v Government of Israel, the issue before the Court was whether the Government’s policy to allow Israeli citizens to settle the OPT was legal. The Court denied the petition, holding that the issue was ‘predominately political’ rather than ‘predominantly legal’. Bargil v Government of Israel, HCJ 4481/91 (25 August 1993), para 5, http://www.alhaq.org/attachments/article/238/91044810.z01.pdf (accessed 25 April 2018).

21 Louis Henkin, ‘The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenges of Global Markets’ (Keynote Addresses, 1999), https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=bjil (accessed 12 April 2018).

22 Guiding Principles, note 11, Principle 15, 7 and 29.

23 Nineteen countries have produced a National Action Plan: UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Colombia, Switzerland, Italy, USA, Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Belgium, Chile, Czech Republic and Ireland. UN OHCHR, State National Action Plans, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx (accessed 1 March 2018).

24 For example, the UK adopted the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

25 Ashley Hogan, ‘France Approves Law to Hold Parent Corporations Liable for Subsidiary Human Rights Violations’ Jurist (23 February 2017), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/02/france-approves-law-to-hold-parent-corporations-liable-for-subsidiary-human-rights-violations.php (accessed 2 April 2018).

26 Section 2 of the Dutch International Criminal Offences Act confers extraterritorial jurisdiction to the Dutch court and Dutch criminal law to ‘(a) anyone who commits any of the crimes defined in this Act outside the Netherlands, if the suspect is present in the Netherlands…(c) a Dutch national who commits any of the crimes defined in this Act outside the Netherlands.’ Netherlands, International Crimes Act, available in English at: https://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/netherlands_-_international_crimes_act_english_.pdf (accessed 7 October 2018). ICRC, ‘Netherlands – Practice Relating to Rule 157. Jurisdiction Over War Crimes’, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_nl_rule157 (accessed 7 October 2018).

27 Robert McCorquodale, ‘Human Rights and Business: Is International Law Relevant?’ OUP Blog (19 December 2016), https://blog.oup.com/2016/12/human-rights-business-law/ (accessed 23 March 2018).

28 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 29 July 1899), and Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907).

29 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949); Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949); Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949); Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949).

30 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1997).

31 The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) (adopted 12 August 1949), art 47.

32 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Regulations) (adopted 18 October 1907), art 43.

33 Certain rights, even in times of conflict or states of emergency are non-derogable, ‘not only because these rights are seen as particularly important to both international humanitarian law and human rights law, but also because human rights case-law has in practice treated them as largely non-derogable’. ICRC, Customary IHL Database, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_intofugu (accessed 1 September 2018); UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 29: State of Emergency (Article 4)’, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (31 August 2001), para 6; Fourth Geneva Convention, note 31, art 27(4).

34 Oscar Uhler and Henri Coursier, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: Commentary, Volume IV (ICRC), art 27; Nils Melzer, International Humanitarian Law – A Comprehensive Introduction (ICRC 2016), 225–226.

35 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) A/56/10, art 25.

36 ICRC, ‘Business and International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of Business Enterprises under International Humanitarian Law’ (2006), https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0882-business-and-international-humanitarian-law-introduction-rights-and-obligations (accessed 14 March 2018).

37 Salil Tripathi, ‘Business in Armed Conflict Zones: How to Avoid Complicity and Comply with International Standards’ (2011), https://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Politorbis_50_Tripathi_Business_in_Armed_Conflict_Zones.pdf (accessed 1 February 2018).

38 Harvard University, ‘Private Security Companies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT): An International Humanitarian Law Perspective’ (2008), http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/PSCbrief.pdf (accessed 12 February 2018).

39 This definition could be applied to business enterprises that assume state responsibilities and activities, such as private military and security agents, amongst others. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, note 35, art 4(2) and (1).

40 Fourth Geneva Convention, note 31, art 29.

41 Fourth Geneva Convention, Commentary of 1958, art 29.

42 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), International Court of Justice Summary of the Judgment (19 December 2005).

43 Guiding Principles, note 11, Principles 7 and 12.

44 Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, In International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Zero Draft, 16 July 2018, art 15(4).

45 Rome Statute, International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998 and entered into force 1 July 2002.

46 The Rome Statute differentiates between participation and perpetration through the ‘control over the crime’ and ‘joint control’ and ‘essential contribution’ to the act. See Schabas, William, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4th edn (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 225 Google Scholar . Complicity may be active, encompassing direct and indirect complicity, or passive/silent complicity characterized as beneficiary complicity. Deva, Sureya and Bilchitz, David, Human Rights Obligations of Businesses: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 221 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

47 Prosecutor v Galic, Trial Chamber I (5 December 2003), para 168. Rome Statute, note 45, art 25(3)(a).

48 Gacumbitsi v Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber (7 July 2006), para 129. Rome Statute, note 45, art 25(3)(b).

49 Ibid, paras 181–183. Rome Statute, ibid.

50 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Trial Chamber (2 September 1998), para 480.

51 Business and International Humanitarian Law, note 36, 15.

52 Ramasastry, Anita, ‘Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon – An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations’ (2002) 20:1 Berkeley Journal of International Law 119 Google Scholar .

53 International Commission of Jurists, ‘Volume 1: Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal Path’, International Commission of Jurists (2008), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.1-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf (accessed 3 September 2018). UN OHCHR, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, An Interpretative Guide’ (2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/RtRInterpretativeGuide.pdf (accessed 27 April 2018), 79.

54 International Criminal Court, ‘Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, Office of the Prosecutor’ (15 September 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018), para 41.

55 International Commission of Jurists, note 53, 15–16.

56 While there is no custom definition or differentiation between military and security companies, both provide services that range between military and security services, and as such cannot be easily categorized. In light of this, the paper at hand, similar to the Montreux Document, does not adopt a strict differentiation between military and security companies. ICRC, The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict (ICRC, 2008), https://shop.icrc.org/document-de-montreux-sur-les-entreprises-militaires-et-de-securite-privees-2629.html (accessed 3 September 2018), 38.

57 Schmitt, Michael, ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees’ (2005) 5:2 Chicago Journal of International Law Google Scholar , http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=cjil (accessed 2 March 2018), 515.

58 Stella Ageli, ‘Private Military Companies (PMCs) and International Criminal Law: Are PMCs the New Perpetrators of International Crimes?’ (2016) 8:1 Amsterdam Law Forum, http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/352 (accessed 2 March 2018).

59 The UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries has noted the impact of PMSC’s on ‘human rights and their lack of accountability’, with a ‘“clear gap” regarding the jurisdiction applicable to private military and security contractors’. UN News, ‘UN Body Urges Support for Treaty Regulating Private Military, Security Companies’ (30 April 2010), https://news.un.org/en/story/2010/04/337012-un-body-urges-support-treaty-regulating-private-military-security-companies (accessed 1 September 2018). As a further example, in spite of the numerous civil lawsuits sustaining war crimes in the case of Abu Ghraib prison, infamous for torture and ill-treatment, involving two US PMSCs from Engility Corporation and CACI International, Inc, none of the employees of these two groups was accused. Center for Constitutional Rights, ‘Accountability for Abu Ghraib Torture by Private Military Contractors’ (2016), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/PrivateMilitaryContractors_Factsheet_May%202016.pdf (accessed 28 April 2018). However, in February 2018, the Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that there were indeed acts of torture, war crimes, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment carried out, aided and abetted by the employees of CACI Premier Technology. Center for Constitutional Rights, ‘Private Corporation May be Sued for Role in Abu Ghraib Torture, Judge Rules’ (2017), https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/private-corporation-may-be-sued-role-abu-ghraib-torture-judge-rules?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=tweet1&utm_campaign=Corporate%20Abuses&utm_content=press%20release (accessed 28 April 2018).

60 Percy, Sarah, ‘Regulating the Private Security Industry: A Story of Regulating the Last War’ (2012) 94 (887) International Review of the Red Cross, 941–960 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

61 Al-Jazeera English, ‘Israel “Outsourcing” the Occupation’ (2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HtqvkFndxsQ (accessed 29 March 2018).

62 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘State Regulation concerning Civilian Private Security Services and their Contribution to Prevention and Community Safety’ (2014), https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/crimeprevention/Ebook0.pdf (accessed 29 April 2018), 1–2.

63 Who Profits Research Center ‘Private Security Companies and the Israeli Occupation’ (2016) https://whoprofits.org/sites/default/files/private_security_companies_final_for_web.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018), 18. According to the same source, the aim following 2010 was to fully privatize 34 checkpoints in the OPT.

64 Who Profits Research Center, Modi’in Ezrachi (20 March 2016), https://whoprofits.org/company/modiin-ezrachi (accessed 6 September 2018). In this paper, PSC employees stationed at and operating in settlements are excluded as different rules and policies apply to them and their activities.

65 Who Profits Research Center, note 63, 15.

66 Shira Havkin, ‘The Reform of Israeli Checkpoints: Outsourcing, Commodification, and Redeployment of the State’, CERI (2011), http://www.academia.edu/4768147/The_Reform_of_Israeli_Checkpoints_Outsourcing_Commodification_and_ Redeployment_of_the_State (accessed 22 March 2018).

67 The Montreux Document, note 56, 36.

68 Ibid, 36.

69 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, note 35, art 4 and 5.

70 Ibid, at Article 8. Paragraph 7 of the Commentary to Article 8 notes ‘the three terms “instructions”, “direction” and “control” are disjunctive; it is sufficient to establish any one of them’. Andrew Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’ (September 2006) 88 (863) International Review of the Red Cross 490, 515.

71 Chetail, Cameron, Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 20 Google Scholar .

72 Who Profits, note 63, 27.

73 Ibid, 16.

74 Yael Ronen, ‘Israel: The Use and Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies in Situations of Armed Conflict’ (Priv-War, 2010), http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/privwar_national-report_ronen.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018).

75 Havkin, note 66.

76 Who Profits, note 63, 17.

77 Leticia Armendariz, ‘The Invisible Force: A Comparative Study of the Use of Private Military and Security Companies in Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Colombia. Lessons for an International Regulation’ (Novact 2016), http://novact.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/NOVACT_THE_INVISIBLE_FORCE_2016.pdf (accessed 24 March 2018).

78 The Israeli Powers for Maintaining Public Security Law of 2005 grants private security guards at checkpoints in the West Bank and Jerusalem similar activities to soldiers and police, allowing them to use force. Armendariz, note 77, 34–6.

79 Who Profits, note 63, 20.

80 Armendariz, note 77, 36.

81 B’tselem, Checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza, 30 June 2018, https://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_roads (accessed 2 September 2018).

82 Ibid, 3. Of constant concern are restrictions placed on ambulances at checkpoints which ‘are perceived…as unnecessarily affecting the welfare and dignity of the patients’. World Health Organization, ‘Report of a field assessment of health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) 22 March to 1 April 2015’ (1 April 2015), https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/3822b5e39951876a85256b6e0058a478/93856c7853b37c6e85257e4c00681b41?OpenDocument (accessed 29 April 2018).

83 Ibid.

84 Only nine of these were on the Green Line, and the others were within the West Bank. UN OHCHR, ‘Freedom of Movement, Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Including East Jerusalem’ (February 2016), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/PS/SG_Report_FoM_Feb2016.pdf (accessed 2 September 2018), 7.

85 Israeli organization Yesh Din found that only 3.4 per cent of investigations by the Military Police Criminal Investigations Department between 2011 and 2016 led to an indictment, and only 1.9 per cent of complaints on alleged offences by Israeli soldiers filed by Palestinians resulted in conviction. Yesh Din, ‘March 2018 Data Sheet: Law Enforcement Against IDF Soldiers Suspected of Harming Palestinians – 2016 Summary’, Yesh Din (27 May 2018), https://www.yesh-din.org/en/march-2018-data-sheet-law-enforcement-against-idf-soldiers-suspected-of-harming-palestinians-2016-summary/ (accessed 1 September 2018); Yesh Din, ‘A Court of Non-Convictions for Israeli Felons’ (8 June 2015), https://www.yesh-din.org/en/a-court-of-non-convictions-for-israeli-felons/ (accessed 29 April 2018).

86 UN OHCHR, ‘Press Briefing Note on Israel: Elor Azaria Case’ (24 February 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21221&LangID=E (accessed 30 April 2018). Al-Haq, ‘Impunity Prevails Once Again: Israeli Court Sentences IOF Killer of Nadim Nuwwara to Nine Months Imprisonment’ (26 April 2018), http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/targets/accountability/81-general/1221-impunity-prevails-once-again-israeli-court-sentences-iof-killer-of-nadim-nuwwara-sentenced-to-nine-months-imprisonment (accessed 27 March 2018).

87 Omer-Man, Emily Schaeffer, ‘Extrajudicial Killing with Near Impunity, Excessive Use of Force by Israeli Law Enforcement Against Palestinians’ (Spring 2017) 35 Boston University School of Law International Law Journal, 115, 116, at fn 6.Google Scholar

88 Allison Deger, ‘Meet the Private Contractors Manning Israel’s Checkpoints’, Mondoweiss (5 May 2016), http://mondoweiss.net/2016/05/contractors-israels-checkpoints/ (accessed 3 March 2018).

89 Release the Qalandiyah Video, Haaretz (2 May 2016), https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/release-the-qalandiyah-video-1.5378154 (accessed 2 September 2018). B’tselem, ‘Unwarranted Killings at Qalandia Checkpoint: Systemic Legitimization of a Trigger-Happy Approach Continues to Claim Lives’ (9 May 2016), https://www.btselem.org/firearms/20160509_killing_of_siblings_at_qalandia_checkpoint (accessed 1 September 2018).

90 Raoul Wootliff, ‘Charges Dropped in Shooting of Palestinian Siblings at Checkpoint’ Times of Israel (26 October 2016), https://www.timesofisrael.com/charges-dropped-in-shooting-of-palestinian-siblings-at-qalandiya/ (accessed 23 April 2018).

91 Ibid.

92 Antony Loewenstein and Matt Kennard, ‘How Israel Privatized its Occupation of Palestine’, The Nation (27 October 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-israel-privatized-its-occupation-of-palestine/ (accessed 2 September 2018).

93 Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), ‘Petition: Deployment of Private Security Guards in East Jerusalem Is Unlawful’ (31 October 2011), https://www.acri.org.il/en/2011/10/31/petition-deployment-of-private-security-guards-in-e-jerusalem-is-unalwful/ (accessed 29 April 2018).

94 Ibid.

95 Nir Hasson, ‘Israel Spends Annual $8K per Settler in East Jerusalem Security Costs’, Haaretz (23 November 2014), https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-state-spends-8-000-on-security-of-each-e-j-lem-settler-1.5333550 (accessed 28 April 2018).

96 ACRI, ‘Excerpts from ACRI Petition to the High Court’, https://www.acri.org.il/en//wp-content/uploads/2011/10/E-Jlem-Petition-Security-guards-ENG.pdf (accessed 9 September 2018).

97 Ibid.

98 Yonah Bob, ‘Rule of Law: Navigating the Muddy Waters of Private Security Firms’, Jerusalem Post (9 November 2014), https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Rule-of-law-Navigating-the-muddy-waters-of-private-security-firms-381070 (accessed 30 April 2018).

99 The company’s website notes its presence in ‘securing East Jerusalem’. Modiin Ezrachi Group, English website, http://modiin-ezrachi.co.il/english/ (accessed 4 September 2018).

100 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Saving Lives: Israel’s Anti-Terrorist Fence – Answers to Questions’ (1 January 2004), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2003/Pages/Saving%20Lives-%20Israel-s%20anti-terrorist%20fence%20-%20Answ.aspx#3 (accessed 12 April 2018).

101 UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, ‘OPT: Special Report on the West Bank Security Barrier’ (15 July 2003), https://reliefweb.int/report/israel/opt-special-report-west-bank-security-barrier (accessed 13 March 2018).

102 ‘Access to health services is restricted through the separation wall and checkpoints […]’, World Health Organization, ‘Report of a field assessment of health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory’ (February 2016), http://apps.who.int/gb/Statements/Report_Palestinian_territory/Report_Palestinian_territory-en.pdf (accessed 2 September 2018). ‘[T]he situation has aggravated food insecurity in the region […]’, Legal Consequences, note 14, para 132. The construction of the Wall has led to the confiscation of hundreds of thousands of dunums of farmland. In cases where the land was not confiscated, farmers face limited access due to ‘agricultural gates’ (authors’ note: 1 dunum = 0.01 hectare). Ma’an Development Center, ‘Food Security in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FS.pdf (accessed 2 September 2018), 13.

103 UN Economic and Social Council, ‘Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine – Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967’, E/CN.4/2004/6 (8 September 2003), para 6.

104 UN General Assembly, Resolution ES-10/13, A/RES/ES-10/13 (27 October 2003).

105 UN General Assembly, Resolution ES-10/14, A/RES/ES-10/14 (12 December 2003).

106 Legal Consequences, note 14, para 122.

107 Ibid, para 87.

108 Ibid, paras 120 and 132.

109 Ibid, para 159.

110 UN OCHA, ‘10 Years Since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion’ (9 July 2014), https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/ocha_opt_10_years_barrier_report_english.pdf (accessed 12 February 2018), 3.

111 Beit Sourik Village Council et al v The Government of Israel et al, HCJ 2056/04, Judgment Summary (30 June 2004), http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=6520 (accessed 23 April 2018).

112 Beit Sourik Village Council et al v The Government of Israel et al, ibid, para 28.

113 Ibid, para 30.

114 ‘Our conclusion is, therefore, that the military commander is authorized to construct a separation fence in the area for the purpose of defending the lives and safety of the Israeli settlers in the area. It is not relevant whatsoever to this conclusion to examine whether this settlement activity conforms to international law or defies it, as determined in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at The Hague.’ Mara’abe v The Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ 7957/04, Judgment (15 September 2005), para 19, http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.pdf (accessed 24 April 2018).

115 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission, note 19, para 96.

116 Martin Seipermann, ‘Dutch Company Involved in Construction of the Separation Wall’, Electronic Intifada (18 September 2006), https://electronicintifada.net/content/dutch-company-involved-construction-separation-wall/6423 (accessed 23 February 2018).

117 Liesbeth Zegveld, ‘Prosecution of Riwal for Involvement in Construction of Israeli Wall and Settlements Discontinued’ (14 May 2013), http://www.liesbethzegveld.com/en/selection-of-cases/prosecution-of-riwal-for-involvement-in-construction-of-israeli-wall-and-settlements-discontinued/ (accessed 1 March 2018).

118 Al-Haq, ‘English Translation of Complaint Against Riwal’ (15 March 2010), http://www.alhaq.org/images/stories/PDF/accoutability-files/Complaint%20-%20English.pdf (accessed 1 September 2018), 13.

119 Ibid.

120 Vertikal.Net, ‘Riwal Investigated’ (14 October 2010), http://www.vertikal.net/en/news/story/10961/ (accessed 1 March 2018).

121 Ibid.

122 Landelijk Parket, ‘No Further Investigation into Crane Rental Company’, Openbaar Ministerie (14 May 2013), https://www.om.nl/@31796/no-further/ (accessed 13 March 2018).

123 Ibid.

124 Al-Haq, ‘Prosecutor Dismisses War Crimes Case against Riwal’ (14 May 2013), http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/targets/accountability/71-riwal/704-prosecutor-dismisses-war-crimes-case-against-riwal (accessed 4 September 2018).

125 It should be noted that organs and officials of the US government prior to Trump typically referred to a ‘border fence’, although activists, local officials, and others used the term ‘border wall’. See, for example, El Paso County, ‘Local, State and Federal Elected Officials Send Letter to President-Elect Barack Obama Opposing the Border Wall’ (3 December 2008), http://www.epcounty.com/CS/blogs/ca_press/archive/2008/12/03/local-state-and-federal-elected-officials-send-letter-to-president-elect-barack-obama-opposing-the-border-wall.aspx (accessed 28 August 2018); The Working Group on Human Rights and the Border Wall, ‘Obstructing Human Rights: The Texas–Mexico Border Wall’ (June 2008), https://law.utexas.edu/humanrights/borderwall/analysis/briefing-FULL-SET-OF-REPORTS.pdf (accessed 28 August 2018).

126 Jonathan Ferziger, ‘Israeli Company that Fenced in Gaza Angles to Help Build Trump’s Mexico Wall’, Bloomberg (29 January 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-29/israel-s-magal-pushes-for-mexico-wall-deal-as-trump-buoys-shares (accessed 12 March 2018).

127 Ibid.

128 Jack Moore, ‘Israel’s Elbit Systems wins £87m Contract on US–Mexico Border Fence’, International Business Times (7 March 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/israels-elbit-systems-wins-87m-contract-us-mexico-border-fence-1439378 (accessed 12 March 2018).

129 Udi Etsion, ‘Israeli Company to build US–Mexico Border Wall Prototype’ Ynet News (9 November 2017), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5014926,00.html (accessed 23 March 2018).

130 Amira Hass, ‘Israeli Lawmakers Debate “Construction Terror” by Palestinians in West Bank’, Haaretz (29 January 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/mk-decries-construction-terror-by-palestinians-in-west-bank-1.5770343 (accessed 26 August 2018).

131 According to UN OCHA, 1.5 per cent of permit applications for Palestinians in Area C were approved by Israel between 2010 and 2014. UN OCHA, ‘Under Threat: Demolition Orders in Area C of the West Bank’, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/demolition_orders_in_area_c_of_the_west_bank_en.pdf (accessed 1 September 2018), 3. Israel has zoned only 13 per cent of land in East Jerusalem for Palestinian construction, and confiscated 35 per cent of East Jerusalem for settlement construction. The system has led to at least one-third of all Palestinian homes to lack a building permit and be at risk of demolition. UN OCHA, ‘East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns’ (August 2014), https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/ocha_opt_Jerusalem_FactSheet_August2014_english.pdf (accessed 2 September 2018).

132 Amos Harel, ‘IDF Panel Recommends Ending Punitive House Demolitions for Terrorists’ Families’, Haaretz (17 February 2005), http://www.haaretz.com/idf-panel-recommends-ending-punitive-house-demolitions-for-terrorists-families-1.150620 (accessed 3 September 2018).

133 Between July 2014 and 18 January 2017, 42 Palestinian homes were punitively demolished or sealed. Hamoked, ‘Updated Summary on Punitive Home Demolitions from July 2014 to January 18, 2017’ (18 January 2017), http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Updates1828 (accessed 9 September 2018).

134 Qawasmeh v Military Commander of the West Bank (7 August 2014), para 25. The Court has accordingly upheld demolition orders in cases where a house is being rented by a third party and doubt existed as to the circumstances surrounding the alleged attack. Halabi v Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, HCJ 8567/15 (2015), para 9. Skafi v Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area, HCJ 1014/16 (2016).

135 During the 2008–2009 Operation Cast Lead alone, which lasted less than one month, it was reported that the Israeli military used the Caterpillar D9 armed bulldozers to raze approximately 1,000 homes in Gaza. Who Profits, ‘Heavy Engineering Machinery and the Israeli Occupation’ (July 2014), https://www.whoprofits.org/sites/default/files/facts_on_the_ground_-_heavy_engineering_machinery_and_the_israeli_occupation.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018), para 18. Ali Abunimah, ‘Israel Uses Caterpillar Equipment in Revenge Demolition’, Electronic Intifada (16 August 2017), https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/israel-uses-caterpillar-equipment-revenge-demolition (accessed 9 September 2018).

136 Ibid at Who Profits, 54.

137 CCR Justice, ‘Factsheet: Home Demolitions and Caterpillar’ (17 October 2007), https://ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/factsheet-home-demolitions-and-caterpillar (accessed 27 April 2018).

138 UN General Assembly, ‘Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the right to food, Jean Ziegler,’ A/59/385 (27 September 2004) para 24, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/1B855814A29E512485256F390072EBD2 (accessed 12 March 2018).

139 Amnesty International, ‘Act Now to Stop Caterpillar Inc. From Selling Life-Destroying Bulldozers to Israel’ (2015), http://212.78.226.15/our-work/act-now-stop-caterpillar-inc-selling-life-destroying-bulldozers-israel (accessed 29 April 2014); in 2007, the Center for Constitutional Rights reported that 50,000 letters were sent to the CEO of Caterpillar. CCR Justice, note 137.

140 CorpWatch, ‘Caterpillar Shareholder Resolution on Israeli Human Rights Violations’ (14 April 2004), https://corpwatch.org/article/caterpillar-shareholder-resolution-israeli-human-rights-violations (accessed 23 April 2018).

141 Change.org, ‘Stop Delivery of CAT D9 Bulldozers to Israel’, https://www.change.org/p/stop-delivery-of-cat-d9-bulldozers-to-israel (accessed 27 April 2018).

142 Human Rights Watch documented various faults of the investigation, including Israeli investigators threatening foreign volunteers and failing to interview Palestinian witnesses. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Israel: Dangerous Ruling in the Rachel Corrie Case’ (17 February 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/17/israel-dangerous-ruling-rachel-corrie-case (accessed 23 April 2018).

143 Ibid.

144 The Center for Constitutional Rights, the Ronald A. Peterson Law Clinic at Seattle University School of Law, the Public Interest Law Group PLLC, and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights were counsel on the case.

145 CCR Justice, note 137.

146 Cynthia Corrie et al v Caterpillar, Inc, United States District Court Western District of Washington at Tacoma (22 November 2015), Judgment, https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Corrie_decision_11_05_0.pdf (accessed 23 April 218).

147 Who Profits, note 135, 77.

148 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Caterpillar Response re Alleged Complicity in Human Rights Abuses in Israel and the Occupied Territories’ (23 January 2012), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/caterpillar-response-re-alleged-complicity-in-human-rights-abuses-in-israel-the-occupied-territories (accessed 25 April 2018).

149 Who Profits, note 135, 77.

150 Haaretz, ‘Report: Caterpillar Hired Intelligence Firm to Spy on Rachel Corrie’s Family, Leaked Documents Reveal’ (12 December 2017), https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/report-caterpillar-spied-on-rachel-corrie-s-mourning-family-leaked-documents-reveal-1.5628444 (accessed 12 April 2018).

151 Guiding Principles, note 9, Principle 1 commentary.

152 See more generally: B’Tselem, ‘Getting Off Scot-Free: Israel’s Refusal to Compensate Palestinians for Damages Caused by its Security Forces’ (March 2017), https://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/201703_getting_off_scot_free (accessed 4 September 2018). Human Rights Watch, ‘Separate and Unequal: Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’ (19 December 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/19/israel/west-bank-separate-and-unequal (accessed 27 August 2018).

153 HCJ 2164/09 Judgement [YD Quarries case] (2011), para 10.

154 Ibid, para 13.

155 Ibid.

156 ‘No one underestimates the inherent difficulties that arise during situations of prolonged occupation. A prolonged occupation strains and stretches the applicable rules, however, the law of belligerent occupation must be fully respected regardless of the duration of the occupation.’ International Court of Justice, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby’ (2004), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-06-EN.pdf (accessed 11 October 2018), 255.

157 Yesh Din, ‘The Great Drain: Israeli Quarries in the West Bank: High Court Sanctioned Institutionalized Theft’ (14 September 2017), https://www.yesh-din.org/en/great-drain-israeli-quarries-west-bank-high-court-sanctioned-institutionalized-theft/ (accessed 10 September 2018).

158 Guiding Principles, note 9, Principle 7.

159 Ibid.

160 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECRF), ‘Occupation and Sovereignty: Renewing EU Policy in Israel–Palestine’ (21 December 2017), http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/occupation_and_sovereignty_renewing_eu_policy_in_israel_palestine (accessed 23 April 2018).

161 European Commission, ‘Interpretative Notice on Indication of Origin of Goods from the Territories Occupied by Israel Since 1967’ (11 November 2015), paras 8–11, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/10130/interpretative-notice-indication-origin-goods-territories-occupied-israel-june-1967_en (accessed 23 April 2018).

162 ECRF, note 160.

163 Belgium’s economic and commercial relations with Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Opinion of the Advisory Council on Policy Coherence for Development, 18 January 2018, para12.

164 UN Security Council, Resolution 2334 (2016), S/RES/2334 (2016), 23 December 2016.

165 The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, ‘Briefing to the Security Council on the Situation in the Middle East – Report on UNSCR 2334 (2016)’ (26 March 2018), https://unsco.unmissions.org/briefing-security-council-situation-middle-east-–-report-unscr-2334-2016-0 (accessed 12 April 2018).

166 These activities were detailed in the 2013 UN Fact-Finding Mission report, including the supply of security services to the use of natural resources in the OPT, amongst others. UN Fact-Finding Mission report, note 19, para 96.

167 In March 2018, the UN Security Council listed shipping companies that allegedly smuggled oil and coal for North Korea. See also UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie – Business and human rights in conflict-affected regions: challenges and options towards State Responses’, A/HRC/17/32 (27 May 2011), para 18.

168 Guiding Principles, note 9, Principle 19 commentary.

169 The first Anti-BDS executive order was signed by New York Governor Andrew Cuomo. The order states that any business or entity deemed to be involved in BDS activities would lose public funding. A business enterprise that decided to withdraw its presence from settlements, in line with the UNGPs, would likely be subject to penalty under the order. State of New York, Executive Order Directing State Agencies and Authorities to Divest Public Funds Supporting BDS Campaign Against Israel, 5 June 2016, https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_157_new.pdf (accessed 1 September 2018).

170 This includes internal standards amongst ‘various government policy and regulatory instruments, and internationally across countries’. UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, ‘Guidance on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights’ (December 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_%20NAPGuidance.pdf (accessed 26 April 2018), 3.

171 UN OHCHR, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, An Interpretative Guide’ (2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/RtRInterpretativeGuide.pdf (accessed 27 April 2018), 79.

172 This may include the ‘legitimate representatives’ of the affected communities. Ibid, 32.

173 UN OHCHR, ‘Statement on the implications of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in the context of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (6 June 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/OPTStatement6June2014.pdf, (accessed 29 April 2018), 4.

174 See, for example, Al-Haq, ‘Business and Human Rights Focus’, http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/topics/business-and-human-rights-focus (accessed 28 August 2018); Trocaire, ‘What You Need to Know about the Occupied Territories Bill’ (10 July 2018), https://www.trocaire.org/news/what-you-need-know-about-occupied-territories-bill (accessed 28 August 2018).

175 See, for example, Online Database and Information Center created by Who Profits, https://whoprofits.org/content/about-who-profits (accessed 26 August 2018).

176 See, for example, Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights (LPHR), ‘LPHR submits letter to the UK company, JCB, raising serious legal and human rights concerns about their involvement in the imminent demolition of Khan al-Ahmar’ (21 August 2018), https://lphr.org.uk/latest-news/lphr-submits-letter-to-the-uk-company-jcb-raising-serious-legal-and-human-rights-concerns-about-their-involvement-in-the-imminent-demolition-of-khan-al-ahmar/ (accessed 9 October 2018).

177 See, for example, LPHR, ‘Q&A on LPHR’s Human Rights Complaint against G4S’ (9 June 2015), https://lphr.org.uk/blog/qa-on-lphrs-human-rights-complaint-against-g4s/ (accessed 25 April 2018).

178 See, for example, Al-Haq, ‘Second-Largest Dutch Pension Fund Manager PGGM Withdraws All Investments from Israeli Banks Over Settlement Activities’ (8 January 2014), http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/targets/accountability/81-general/768-second-largest-dutch-pension-fund-manager-pggm-withdraws-all-investments-from-israeli-banks-over-settlement-activities (accessed 8 October 2018).

179 Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions provides for obligations of third states to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions. On the duty to ‘ensure respect’ for the Convention, see Marco Sassòli, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (June 2002) 84 (846) International Review of the Red Cross 401–434. Article 41 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides that ‘states shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach…’, refrain from recognizing wrongful situations and from providing aid or assistance that would maintain them. On the duty of non-recognition, see Annie Bird, ‘Third State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations’ (November 2010), 21:4 European Journal of International Law.

180 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, note 35, art 41; Legal Consequences, note 14, para 157.

181 UN OHCHR, ‘Israel must face new international legal push to end illegal occupation of Palestine, UN expert says’ (26 October 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22315 (accessed 3 September 2018).