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Stability and explicitness: In defense of implicit representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1999

Axel Cleeremans
Affiliation:
Cognitive Science Research Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles CP 122, 1050 Brussels, [email protected] srsc.ulb.ac.be/axc www/axc.html
Luis Jiménez
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Universidad de Santiago, 15706 Santiago, [email protected]

Abstract

Stability of activation, while it may be necessary for information to become available to consciousness, is not sufficient to produce phenomenal experience. We suggest that consciousness involves access to information and that access makes information symbolic. From this perspective, implicit representations exist, and are best thought of as subsymbolic. Crucially, such representations can be causally efficacious in the absence of consciousness.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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