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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
In December 2010, the Okinawan city of Ishigaki (within which Japanese administrative law incorporates these islands) adopted a resolution to declare 14 January to be “Senkaku Islands Colonization Day.” The “Colonization Day” is intended to commemorate the incorporation of the islands by cabinet decision 116 years earlier. China immediately protested.
1 References in the following text to “Senkaku” carry no implication as to sovereignty or “proper” name.
2 The question of Taiwan deserves full treatment but is passed over in this short essay save to note that while the majority (and current government) in Taiwan persist in claiming sovereignty a minority concedes it to Japan, and that, when a collision between a Taiwanese ship, the “Lian-ho,” and a Japanese coastguard vessel led to the sinking of the former in June 2008, the then mayor of Taipei, as of 2010 president of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, spoke of war as a last resort for defence of national sovereignty and Japan apologized and paid compensation.
3 Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific, New York and London, Routledge, 2007, especially chapter 7 “The Ryukyus: Okinawa and the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes.”
4 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands,” (accessed 17 December 2010); also “Senkaku islands Dispute,” Wikipedia (17 November 2010)
5 “Clinton: Senkakus subject to security pact,” Japan Times, 25 September 2010.
6 “US fudges Senkaku security pact status,” Japan Times, 17 August 2010.
7 Ibid. For details, Peter Lee, “High Stakes Gamble as Japan, China and the U.S. Spar in the East and South China Seas,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 43-1-10, 25 October, 2010.
8 “Joint Press availability,” Department of State, 27 October 2010, Link.
9 It is even possible that Tokyo might have orchestrated the incident at sea in order “to force an unenthusiastic Obama administration to side with Japan on the Senkakus.” (Peter Lee, cit.)
10 Funabashi Yoichi, “Japan-China relations stand at ground zero,” Asahi shimbun, 9 October 2010, reproduced at East Asia Forum, 20 October, 2010.
11 John Garnaut, “China detonates regional goodwill,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23-24 October 2010.
12 “Taking harder stance toward China, Obama lines up allies,” New York Times, 25 October 2010.
13 Visiting Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, and Singapore, (Mo Ban fu, “Nitchu shototsu no yoha wo kakudai sasete wa naranai,” Sekai, December 2010, pp. 116-123.)
14 “Senkaku Islands dispute,” Wikipedia, cit.
15 Suggesting such a view: Nakano Seigo, “Dato datta chiken handan,” Okinawa Times, 4 October 2010.
16 Sakurai in Shukan posuto, 8 October 2010, and Ishihara in Shukan bunshun, 7 October 2010, quoted in Mark Schreiber, “Weeklies, tabloids hawkish over China,” Japan Times, 10 October 2010.
17 Quoted in Yuka Hayashi, “China row fuels Japan's right,” Wall Street Journal, 29 September 2010.
18 “Bei-O to kyocho shi Chugoku o sekinin taikoku ni michibiite,” Nihon keizai shimbun, 1 October 2010.
19 “Senkaku mondai – Nihon no ryoyu wa rekishiteki, kokusaihoteki ni seito,” Akahata, 5 October 2010, and on the congratulations, Akahata, 10 October 2010.
20 Sato Masaru, “Chugoku teikokushugi ni taiko suru ni wa,” Chuo Koron, November 2010, pp. 70-81. In similar vein, Sato called (“Honne koramu,” Tokyo shimbun, 26 November 2010) for Japan to respond to China force with force, making clear its intent to drop the Cabinet Legal Bureau's interpretation of the constitution so as to be able to join the US in collective security missions, thereby deepening the alliance with the US.
21 For my general reflections on Sato Masaru: “Ideas, Identity and Ideology in Contemporary Japan: The Sato Masaru Phenomenon,” 1 November 2010.
22 Ibid.
23 Neither Medoruma nor Iha appear to doubt the historical legitimacy of Japan's Senkaku possession. For Iha, Senkaku is “indisputably a part of Okinawa,” and Chinese authorities needed to deal with Chinese fishermen and control anti-Japanese demonstrations (interview with Iwakuni Yasumi, 25 September 2010). For Medoruma too, China was to blame for the September clash, and the Japanese government to be criticized only for its “weak-kneed” response. (“Chugoku gyosen no sencho shakuho ni tsuite,” Uminari no shima kara, 25 September 2010, link) For fuller discussion, see Media debugger, “Senkaku=Chogyoto o meguru shogensetsu hihan (4) Shinryakukoku no ‘kokumin no seishi’ o ninau ‘oru-Japan’ gensho,” 4 November 2010.
24 Kim Sonho, “Chugoku kyoiron fusshoku o,” Okinawa Taimusu. 1 October 2010.
25 For brief histories of the islands and analyses of their disputed status, see Inoue Kiyoshi, Senkaku retto – Chogyo shoto no shiteki kaimei, Tokyo, Gendai hyoronsha, 1972; “Senkaku Islands dispute,” Wikipedia, cit; Wada Haruki, “Resolving the China-Japan conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 43-3-10, 25 October 2010; Taira Koji, “The China-Japan clash over the Senkaku islands,” Japan Focus, n.d. (2006?), and Tanaka Sakai, “Rekindling China-Japan Conflict: The Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands Clash,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 39-3-10, 27 September 2010.
26 Reproduced in Wikipedia, “The Senkaku islands dispute”.
27 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign rights and territorial space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 2000, pp. 88-9. See also the home page of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Senkaku shoto no ryoyuken ni tsuite no kihon kenkai,” link.
28 Inoue, pp. 103ff.
29 Inoue, p. 123.
30 The exception is Tokyo Metropolitan University's Murata Tadayoshi. See Murata, Senkaku retto/chogyoto mondai o do miru ka, Rinjin shinsho, 07, 2006. In the blogosphere, however, such anti-mainstream views are expressed and what might be described as the “Inoue Kiyoshi line” is affirmed. See, for example, Heito supichi ni hantai suru kai, “Daioyutai/Senkaku o meguru Nihon no kunigurumi no haigaishugi ni kogi shimasu,” 10 October 2010 (link), and Media debugger, “Senkaku-Diaoyu to o meguru sho gensetsu hihan,” (link).
31 “…the shallow sea floor between Japan and Taiwan might contain one of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in the world, possibly comparing favourably with the Persian Gulf area.” United Nations Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Kabul, 1970, UN Doc.E/CN.11/L.239 (cited Suganuma, p. 129).
32 For the documents covering this: Suganuma, pp. 135ff; Urano Tatsuo et al, Chogyotai gunto (Senkaku shoto) mondai –kenkyu shiryo kihen, Tosui shobo, 2001, pp. 250-2.
33 Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific, 2007, p. 188.
34 Kimie Hara, “The post-war Japanese peace treaties and China's ocean frontier problems,” American Journal of Chinese Studies, vol. 11, No. 1, April 2004, pp. 1-24, at p.23.
35 For this author's reflections on the problem as of that time, see Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, Japanese Imperialism Today, London, Penguin, 1973, pp. 62-65.
36 Beijing Review, 3 November 1978 (cited in Suganuma, p. 138.)
37 For further discussion, see my Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, London and New York, 2007, Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing, 2008.
38 Arata na jidai no anzen hosho to boeiryoku ni kansuru kondankai, “Árata na jidai ni okeru Nihon no anzen hosho to boeiryoku no shorai koso – ‘heiwa sozo kokka’ o mezashite,” (link) August 2010.
39 Ministry of Defence, “National Defence Program Guidelines, FY 2011” (accessed 17 December 2010.
40 “China threat prompts plan for new GSDF unit,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, 11 November 2010, link.
41 Maeda Tetsuo, “Minshuto wa senshin boei o homuru na ka,” Sekai, November 2010, pp. 113-120.
42 Maeda Tetsuo, “Arasou jieitai ni henbo,” Ryukyu shimpo, 18 December 2010.
43 “Chinese navy's new strategy in action,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, May 2010, link.
44 Takimoto Takumi, “Beigun kichi no kyoka to Senkaku wa kanren shinai,” Shukan kinyobi, 8 October 2010, p. 19. See also Masami Ito, “Maehara again defends holding Chinese skipper,” Japan Times, 29 September 2010.
45 As argued by Okinawa University's Wakabayashi Chiyo, “‘Kokka’ koeru hasso de,” Okinawa Taimusu, 2 October 2010.
46 Iha Yoichi, interview, Yomiuri shimbun, 23 October 2010. Iha's position nevertheless was implicitly contradictory since, as noted above, he insisted on Japanese sovereignty over Senkaku.
47 Itoman Seiken, “Senkaku wa gyogyosha no meiko,” Okinawa Taimusu, 19 October 2010.
48 Sato Manabu, personal communication, 10 October 2010.
49 Wada, cit.
50 Suganuma, pp. 159-162.
51 Here I follow the sentiments of the Okinawa taimusu editorialist (26 October) in “Nitchu to Okinawa – daiwa koso kankei kaizen no michi.” The inscription on the bell reads, inter alia, “The Ryukyus are paradisiacal islands perfectly positioned in the South Seas which have adapted Korea's outstanding culture, are inseparably linked to China, and enjoy intimate relationship with Japan…”
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