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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
Reacting to the publication of the US Nuclear Posture Review, Pyongyang in mid-April 2010 officially confirmed its own position on nuclear weapons: “As long as the U.S. nuclear threat persists, the DPRK will increase and update various type nuclear weapons as its deterrent in such a manner as it deems necessary in the days ahead”. Along with other countries, Russia, has to seriously question the viability of the two decades-old efforts for denuclearization of the neighboring country, with special accent on the relevance to the existing diplomatic framework. What is the purpose of the Six-Party talks and what are Russian goals in this exercise? The need to determine real options on the Korean peninsula is obvious. I believe the Russian strategy, coordinated through the Six-Party talks, of making the early denuclearization of North Korea a priority goal should be analyzed from the point of view of broader Russian interests vis-à-vis both the Korean Peninsula and global interaction with major partners, including the US, China, Japan and South Korea.
1 Foreign Ministry Dismisses US Nuclear Plan-KCNA, 09.04.2010.
2 For example, following the DPRK threat to suspend disablement of its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and consider restoring them to the original state, the Russian Foreign Ministry made a statement on 26 August 2008, saying that this decision evoked disappointment and concern in Moscow and that “all the actions in the denuclearization field by the DPRK should be accompanied by adequate political and economic support – meaning assistance to Pyongyang “- and “steps from the other five members of the talks, while Russia fulfills its obligations timely and fully. We wish all other parties to act the same consistently in good faith.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted in September 2008: “Different from some other members of the Six Party Talks, we are acting in a team spirit fashion, collectively, as was agreed initially. We try to avoid unilateral steps…The purpose is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, not solving the bilateral problems of some participants… It would be fruitful if all the members of the Six-Party Talks would fulfill their obligations by the letter of the agreements reached and not file some other requests without consulting other partners. And of course it would be important that all the DPRK's partners in the Six-Party process would actually participate in providing economic assistance to Pyongyang. That, I think, would constitute a package that would enable forward movement” Interview with Minister Sergei Lavrov, Kommersant, August 27, 2008.
3 The nuclear test of May 25, 2009 caused indignation in the Kremlin, which called it “irresponsible,” “absolutely unacceptable” and “unpardonable.” President Medvedev himself did not spare harsh words, noting the “personal responsibility” of the “perpetrators of this action.” The Russian military - probably acting on orders from above - went as far as to suggest deploying Russia's sophisticated S-400 air defense system in its Far Eastern region to protect against any potential test mishap near the border with the DPRK. After the condemnatory UN Security Council resolution 1874 was adopted, Russia “called on the partners in the DPRK to rightfully accept the will of the international community, expressed in the resolution, denounce nuclear weapons and all the military nuclear-missile programs, return to the NPT, the CTBT and the IAEA safeguards regime, and resume participation in the Six-Party talks aimed at finding a mutually acceptable solution of the current knot of contradictions.” Russia also denounced North Korean intentions to proceed to uranium enrichment. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry stuck to its point that the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula should be “settled by the political and diplomatic means in the framework of the six-party negotiation process.”
Prima Media, 4 June 2009; Agence France Presse, “Russia Deploys Air Defence over N. Korea Missile Tests,” Ulanbator, 26 August 2009; ROSBALT News Agency, 17 July 2009.
4 Link.
5 See, for example “A Long-term Strategy for North Korea.”
6 See Vadim Tkachenko, “Korea and Her Great Neighbour. In: Korean Peninsula”, The Time of New Challenges- Moscow, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, 2009, p.58
7 See, for example, Georgy Toloraya. “Continuity and Change in Korea: Challenges for Regional Policy and U.S.-Russia Relations.”