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North Korean Denuclearization and the U.S.-DPRK Relationship

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2025

Tong Kim
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Given the slow - albeit important – progress that has been made in the process of North Korean denuclearization, it is clear by now that the task of finding a final verifiable resolution will inevitably be handed over to the next U.S. administration. Simply there is too much work to be done and not enough time left for the Bush administration.

Type
Research Article
Information
Asia-Pacific Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 6 , June 2008 , e14
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2008

References

Notes

1. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p 327

2. Secretary Rice's address on “U.S. Policy Toward Asia,” June 19, 2008.

3. At this point, Washington does not think Kim Jong Il has made up his mind to give up his nuclear weapons. In the June 19 address, Rice said, “It may very well be the case that North Korea does not want to give up its nuclear weapons and the nuclear programs. That is a very real possibility.”

4. White House spokeswoman Danna Perino said on April 24, 2008, “We are convinced, on a variety of information, that North Korea assisted Syria's covert nuclear activities” This statement was made after U.S. intelligence officials briefed Congress on North Korea's alleged proliferation activity. Although proliferation was not an agreed agenda for the Six Party Talks, North Korea's nuclear collaboration with Syria is already complicating the denuclearization process. The suspected Syrian facilities were destroyed by Israel last fall beyond repair.

5. The New York Times, May 31, 2008.

6. Rice's June 19, 2009 speech at the Heritage Foundation.

7. Tong Kim, “Off the Record on HEU” The Korea Times, April 8, 2008; Jack Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, chapter 2, Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, chapter 3.

8. The Washington Post, May 13, 2008

9. Statement of assistant secretary of state Christopher Hill, made after the adoption of the September 19 Joint Statement at the close of the fourth round of the Six Party Talks.

10. KEI website: “North Korean Officials Share Thoughts with KEI Staff.” Also The Washington Post, May 30, 2008.

11. After James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang in October 2002, the KEDO Project to construct two Light Water Reactors (LWRs) was suspended. $1.5 billion had been invested in the project, for which South Korean paid most of the cost, while the United States provided 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually.

12. For details, read Scott Rambrandt, “‘Peace in Our Time” at What Cost? “in KEI's monograph U.S. And ROK Policy Options, pp 115-135

13. Secretary Rice's June 10, 2008 speech at the Heritage Foundation.

14. Assistant secretary of state Christopher Hill's statement at the close of the fourth round of the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005.