Hostname: page-component-55f67697df-q9hcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-05-10T20:00:55.645Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Japanese Foreign Policy toward the Middle East 1973 to 1990: the Non-Commitment Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2025

Raquel Shaoul
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

[This is the third in a series of articles on Japanese policy toward the Middle East that debates the appropriate framework for unraveling issues of Japan-oil- and the United States in Middle East perspective. See earlier contributions by Raquel Shaoul and John de Boer.]

Dr. John de Boer in his article, “Gauging Japan's Role in the Middle East” (Japan Focus Sep. 6, 2005) portrays Japanese involvement in the Middle East, as characterized by a “multidimensional presence”. In his article De Boer claims that “at various points in time, Japan has had a relatively high political profile in the region and its people/institutions have demonstrated an active commitment to a variety of important causes in the Middle East”, illustrated by examples dated from 1904-5 to the present. He concludes, “Gauging Japan's overall involvement in the region makes clear that Japan and the Japanese did not simply become active in the Middle East with the Madrid Peace Process of 1991. Japan has contributed to the “peace process” on a variety of levels since the 1950s and its presence continues to be felt throughout the Middle East”. A major difficulty emerges from this thesis: its failure to differentiate between Japan's political involvement and her political commitment in the Middle East over the years.

Type
Research Article
Information
Asia-Pacific Journal , Volume 3 , Issue 9 , September 2005 , e3
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2005

References

Notes

[1] R.L. Turner and J.M. Bedore, Middle East Industrialisation: A study of Saudi and Iranian Downstream Investments, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1979, p. 146.

[2] D.C.K. Lang, “Japan's Middle East Diplomacy”, Asian Profile, 1985, Vol. 13, no. 4, p. 307.

[3] Hiroshi Shimizu, “The Japanese trade contact with the Middle East: Lessons from the pre-oil period”, in Kaoru Sugihara and J.A. Allan (eds) Japan in the Contemporary Middle East (London and New York: SOAS Center of Near and Middle Eastern Studies) 1993, p. 27.

[4] Hiroshi Shimizu, ibid, p. 27.

[5] Frank Joseph Shulman, “Japanese-Middle Eastern Economic Relations Before the First Oil Shock”, in Ronald A. Morse (ed.) Japan and the Middle East in Alliance Politics (Washington DC: The Wilson Center) 1986, p. 33.

[6] Frank Joseph Shulman, ibid, p. 39.

[7] Adeed Dawisha, “Middle Eastern Images of Japan: Admiration for an Inconsequential Giant”, in Ronald A. Morse (ed.) Japan and the Middle East in Alliance Politics, p. 32.

[8] Roy Licklider, “Japan: the Perfect Target”, Targets of the Oil Weapon, p. 39.

[9] The ‘Nikaido Statement’ claimed among other things that, “The Government of Japan will continue to observe the situation in the Middle East with grave concern and, depending on future developments, may have to reconsider its policy towards Israel…The inadmissibility of occupying or taking territory by force, a plea to Israel to withdraw from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war, respect for the territorial integrity of all countries in the area, and recognition and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”. See, Sekiyu Renmei, Dai Yoji Chuto Senso to Sekiyu - Kensai Mondai (“The Fourth Middle East War and Oil Economics Problems”) (Tokyo, February 1974) p. 87.

[10] Kyodo News Service, September 18, 1978, quoted by FBIS, September 19, 1978, p. c1.

[11] For example, in June 1979, Esaki Masumi, then MITI Minister, was sent to the Middle East in order to implement the ‘Middle East Four-Point Plan’ introduced by Prime Minister Ohira during the Tokyo economic summit of 1979. Ohira called for a four-point plan for the Middle East within Japan's Comprehensive National Security Policy, by which ‘all nations [should work] towards implementation of UN Resolutions 242 and 338; respect for Palestinian rights to national self-determination and; all parties to pursue their own separate policies in order to assure movement towards a comprehensive peace agreement’.

[12] Among the major diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the Japanese government during the war was the dispatch of Deputy Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs, Matsunaga, Nobou to Iran (October 1982). Parallel to Matsunaga's visit, MITI Vice Minister for International Affairs, Kunio Komatsu, went to Iraq. These visits were followed by an official visit by Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro to Iran, Turkey and Iraq during August 1983. Thereafter, Deputy Foreign Minister Nakajima was sent to Iran in January 1984. In the same year, Iran and Iraq's foreign ministers visited Japan in order to discuss the war.

[13] Shahram Chubin, “The Middle East Factor in Alliance Politics”, in Ronald A. Morse (ed.) Japan and the Middle East in Alliance Politics, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

[14] Bernard Reich and Cheryl Cutler, “Japan” in Bernard Reich Ed. The Powers in the Middle East: The Ultimate Strategic Arena (New York: Praeger, 1987) pp. 301-302.

[15] Japan, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Information Bulletin, September 10, 1984, p. 102.

[16] Kyodo News Service, February 9, 1984, quoted by FBIS, February 10, 1984, p. c5.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Japan, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Diplomatic Blue Book 1981, Tokyo, p. 12.

[19] Kyodo News Service, November 18, 1983; quoted by FBIS, November 18, 1983, p. c1.

[20] Kyodo News Service, May 18, 1984; quoted by FBIS, May 18, 1984, p. c1.

[21] Japan, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Information Bulletin, October 18, 1984, p. 131

[22] Japan, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Diplomatic Blue Book 1986, Tokyo, p. 137.

[23] See for example, Chiba Kazuo, “Japan and the Middle East in the 1970s and Early 1980s: A Japanese Diplomat's View” in Kaoru Sugihara and J.A. Allan (eds) Japan in the Contemporary Middle East, op.cit. pp. 144-154.

[24] Kyodo News Service, February 5, 1975, quoted by FBIS, February 5, 1975, p. c2.

[25] Kyodo News Service, February 7, 1975, quoted by FBIS, February 7, 1975, p. c1.

[26] The Japanese attitude is even more surprising due to the fact that the UN Resolution 242 had massive international and Security Council support.

[27] Dowty Alan, “Japan and the Middle East: Signs of Change?” MERIA Journal 4 no. 4 (December 2000). http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/meria/meria00_doa01.html

[28] Japan, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Diplomatic Blue Book 1973, Tokyo, p. 38.

[29] Ibid.

[30] This term was pointed out by Eliyahu Kanovsky, Another Oil Shock in the 1990's? A Dissenting View, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper no. 6, Washington DC, 1987; OPEC Ascendant? Another Case of Crying Wolf, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper no. 20, Washington DC, 1990.