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3 - United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement (WT/DS106/ARB): A Comment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2010

Robert Howse
Affiliation:
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School
Damien J. Neven
Affiliation:
Professor of Economics, Graduate Institute for International Studies, University of Geneva
Henrik Horn
Affiliation:
Stockholms Universitet
Petros C. Mavroidis
Affiliation:
Université de Neuchâtel, Switzerland
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Summary

Some of the legal analysis in this study derives from joint work between Robert Howse and Susan Esserman on this ruling, “Trade disputes quire fairer arbitration,” FT.com, Sep 12, 2002

Introduction

This chapter discusses the decision by the arbitrator on suspension of concessions (“retaliation”) in the dispute between the US and the EU regarding the tax treatment of offshore corporate income under US legislation. By way of background, the first part of the chapter (section 2) describes the operation of the US scheme, including as revised after the first round of WTO rulings.

We observe that the arbitrators have adopted an unconventional approach with respect to the notion of countermeasures, which emphasizes the incentive to induce compliance while largely jettisoning proportionality between the countermeasure and the injury suffered by the wronged state as a meaningful normative constraint. Section 4 considers this approach from the perspective of established principles of inter-national law and highlights a number of important shortcomings. Section 5 takes this approach for granted and asks whether countermeasures could actually be relied upon in order to induce compliance. We conclude with respect to export subsidies, the incentives of complainants are such that under-enforcement can often be expected.

The prospect of inducing compliance through countermeasures thus appears to be somewhat poor and at odds with established principles of international law.

Type
Chapter
Information
The WTO Case Law of 2002
The American Law Institute Reporters' Studies
, pp. 36 - 63
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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References

Bernheim, D. and Whinston, M., (1986), Common Agency, Econometrica, 54 (4), 923–942.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bond, E., (1996), Competition Policy in Customs Unions: a Natural Experiment using State Level Antitrust Enforcement, mimeo, Pen State.
Cannizzaro, E., (2001), The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures, European Journal of International Law, 12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, J., (2002), The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text, and Commentaries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Mavroidis, P., (2000), Remedies in the WTO Legal System: between a Rock and a Hard Place, European Journal of International Law, 11 (4), 763–813.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pauwellyn, J., (2002), “The Nature of WTO Obligations”, Jean Monnet Working Paper, at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org, p. 8.
Schwartz, W. and Sykes, A., (2002), The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organisation, The Journal of Legal Studies, 31 J.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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