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11 - The Moral Impact Theory, the Dependence View and Natural Law

from Part III - Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2017

By
Mark Greenberg
Edited by
George Duke  and
Robert P. George
George Duke
Affiliation:
Deakin University, Victoria
Robert P. George
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
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The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence , pp. 275 - 313
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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References

Works Cited

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