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33 - Positivism and Totalitarianism

from Part VI - Critique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 January 2021

By
David Dyzenhaus
Edited by
Torben Spaak  and
Patricia Mindus
Torben Spaak
Affiliation:
Stockholms Universitet
Patricia Mindus
Affiliation:
Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
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Summary

Dyzenhaus argues that Hart’s defence of legal positivism fails because Hart cannot without contradiction espouse both the claim that there is no necessary connection between law and morality and the claim that law has authority, that is, Herrschaft, not mere Macht. Moreover, in combination, the two claims result in what Spanish-speaking legal scholars have referred to as ideological positivism. Dyzenhaus argues, more specifically, that although Hart argued that legal positivism in the shape of the separation thesis is conducive to clear thinking and facilitates critical assessment of the law, his failure to follow through on his insights about the authority of law leads to a theory of law that is not free from the undesirable political (theoretical) consequences associated with totalitarianism, alleged by several critics of positivism.

Keywords

positivismtotalitarianismLon FullerH. L. A. HartGustav Radbruch
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism , pp. 764 - 785
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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